Az October művészetelméleti folyóirat és a szemiotika by Timár Katalin
 P é c s i  T u d o m á n y e g y e t e m  B ö l c s é s z e t t u d o m á n y i  K a r  
N y e l v t u d o m á n y i  D o k t o r i  I s k o l a  
K o m m u n i k á c i ó  P r o g r a m  
 
 
 
 
 
 
OCTOBE R  AN D SE MIOTI CS 
 
AZ  O C T O B E R  M Ű V É S Z E T E L M É L E T I  F O L Y Ó I R A T  
É S  A  S Z E M I O T I K A  
 
P H D  D I S S Z E R T Á C I Ó  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T I M Á R  K A T A L I N  
2 0 1 0  
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction           3 
 
Chapter 2 
The Influence and the Possibilities of Semiotics in Art History and Theory  26 
 
Chapter 3.1 
Notes on the Index Part 1         51 
 
Chapter 3.2 
Notes on the Index Part 2         67 
 
Chapter 4 
The Body and the Archive         79 
 
Chapter 5 
The Judgement Seat of Photography       111 
 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion / Visual Culture Questionnaire      144 
 
Bibliography           161 
 
Bibliography           169 
Articles in October 
 
Bibliography           171 
Consulted Materials 
 
 
 3 
Chapter 1 
 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
 
In December 1973, in a unique and unprecedented manner, the cover of the monthly issue of 
Artforum, one of the leading American art magazines of the time, did not depict a famous 
artwork or its detail,1 but the employees of the New York Museum of Modern Art striking in 
front of the building in the autumn of 1973, and joined by the Art Workers Coalition.2 Inside 
the magazine, the then editor John Coplans published an interview with the strikers, whose 
cause went against his convictions because, as he recalls it, ‘you [the strikers] raise strike 
issues that I’m not in the least sympathetic with and people will not be sympathetic with. It’s 
not up to a junior staff of the museum to run the museum as a commune. Someone has to 
take responsibility for the decisions at an executive level and a curatorial level. And you are 
not going to change museums into democracies. And you are not going to elicit any 
sympathy. And to put this down as one of your objectives or complaints makes the strike 
somewhat absurd. I mean surely the strike is a strike about working conditions, pay, and 
unionization. And unions don’t tell the corporations how to run the corporations.’3
                                                 
1 The cover of Artforum had typically depicted a work of art until the arrival of John Coplans as editor-
in-chief in autumn 1971 (although according to the colophon he was only officially marked as such 
from the beginning of 1972). Coplans changed this policy, finding the previous practice a source of 
conflicts of interest and unethical decisions; he thus never published the full image of a work, only 
details, even in the case of non contemporary artists. See: Amy Newman, Challenging Art: Artforum 
1962–1974, Soho Press, New York, 2000, pp. 380–381. 
 In the face 
of the contemporary understandings of the function of the museum in conjunction with 
democracy, Coplans’ statement sounds not only ultra conservative but anachronistically neo-
2 This image is reproduced in Gregory Sholette, ‘Dark Matter: Activist Art and the Counter-Public 
Sphere’, http://www.gregorysholette.com/writings/writingpdfs/05_darkmattertwo.pdf, accessed 2 March 
2010. 
According to Barbara Rose, by dealing with the strike, ‘Artforum began criticizing not art but museums’ 
(Amy Newman, op. cit., p. 375). For more on the strike see Newman, op. cit., p. 376. 
3 Amy Newman, op. cit., p. 376. As Westwater sees it retrospectively, ‘the magazine by this point 
reflected what already existed. Also, probably, the Art Workers Coalition in itself activated a lot of 
people, a lot of artists not within the academy of Artforum, who then asserted themselves, not only as 
a political group for better or for worse, but also in terms of their own art. At that point, let’s say ’72 to 
’73, I think we see the Art Workers Coalition disintegrating’ (Newman, op. cit., p. 370). 
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liberal. 
 
The reason, however, why I begin with this historical moment is that I would like to use it as a 
starting point and as a metaphor to introduce a text about the American art journal October, 
which began to be published from 1976 as a quarterly. At the time of the strike in front of 
MoMA, the later to be founding editors of October, Annette Michelson and Rosalind Krauss, 
worked for Artforum as increasingly discontented associate editors, and subsequently they 
left the magazine in order to create a new journal which ended up being ‘arguably the most 
prominent journal of contemporary theory in art history in the United States,’ as Donald 
Preziosi put it.4
 
 
Some of the historical events in the art world and in intellectual history may serve here not 
just as a metaphor but also, to a certain degree, as an explanation of the creation of October. 
The complexities of these times cannot be adequately addressed here, but the legacy of 
Clement Greenberg, one of the earliest and certainly the most famous examples for art critics 
and the power they exert in the 20th century, should be mentioned. What is important to note 
here is that Greenberg’s legacy is not exclusively intellectual, but it is underwritten with a 
subtext of personal relationships, and consequently with a set of emotional responses and 
preferences. Interestingly, all this is repeated in the course of October’s thirty-four-year-long 
history. On the eve of October’s foundation, ‘by the end of the 1960s […] formalism and the 
Greenberg legacy were unquestionably perceived as power, but now it became inescapable 
that there were far more potent powers at work.’5
 
 
This thesis and this introduction, however, do not aim to map the intricate network of human 
relations, even if, to a certain extent, they influence the intellectual trajectory of such an 
endeavour as a theoretical journal. There are several reasons that inform this decision. 
                                                 
4 Donald Preziosi, Rethinking Art History: Meditations on a Coy Science, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven 
and London, 1989, p. 112. 
5 Amy Newman, op. cit., p. 328. 
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Firstly, access to such information is difficult, scarce and random. Secondly, focusing on 
such information would be part of an art historical project aiming at the reconstruction of the 
historical context of October, while my text has a different agenda.6
 
 Thirdly, personal 
witnesses of and participants in the events may have inaccurate recollections of what 
happened, or may even lie about the past and their own involvement in it. 
There is another possible avenue that this thesis does not directly follow, namely the analysis 
of October as an important institution within the American – and to a lesser extent the 
Western – art world and art history. Yet, in an oblique way, the question of institutionalization 
has to be addressed, since October’s influence on contemporary art theory is unquestionably 
great, or to put it another way, October profoundly shaped the discourse of art theory in the 
1970s and 1980s, so much so that today this is a point of reference for those working in the 
field. 
 
To come back to Artforum as a platform whose existence to a certain degree, and indirectly, 
shaped the intellectual stance of October, Artforum itself was a magazine full of personal 
clashes that sometimes took the shape of intellectual and theoretical disagreements.7 An 
interesting and at the same time telling example of this is Krauss’ recollection of what 
brought her together as an ally and friend with Annette Michelson: ‘Annette and I didn’t get to 
be really close friends until after I had written “A View of Modernism” [September 1972]. We 
consolidated our friendship around our mutual loathing of Lawrence Alloway and the pull he 
exerted on John Coplans.’8
 
 
                                                 
6 In this sense I agree with Norman Bryson’s theoretical position, which questions the very possibility 
of reconstructing a ‘true’ context since, according to traditional art history, the only true context is the 
context that existed at the birth of an artwork (or of an intellectual project for that matter). Bryson, ‘Art 
in Context’, in Ralph Cohen (ed.), Studies in Historical Change, Univ. of Virginia Press, Charlottesville, 
1992, pp. 18–42. 
7 On Lawrence Alloway’s clashes with Michelson, see Amy Newman, op. cit., p. 341. On Coplans’ 
clashes with Krauss and Michelson, see Newman, op. cit., p. 342. 
8 Amy Newman, op. cit., p.344. 
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These rival factions within the editorial board of Artforum clashed along methodological lines, 
which are very often described by the participants with a military – albeit metaphorical – 
vocabulary. What seem to be quite contradictory, however, are the reasons for the 
disagreement between the factions. According to Krauss, ‘by the early ’70s Lawrence 
[Alloway] and Max [Kozloff] were really interested in getting rid of Annette and me because 
we were not going in the direction they wanted for the magazine—which was more and more 
explicit about the importance of social context. Lawrence was totally engaged in the idea of 
Pop Art and in thinking about how art reflects social experience. Max was much more 
involved in how art manifests the state of capital […] Annette and I believed that it was 
important to deal with the structure of works of art. For instance, she was very happy with the 
piece on Eisenstein, which she commissioned from me.9 And so we began to realize that we 
had common cause against them.’10 All this probably coincided with Michelson’s aims; 
according to her own formulation, she ‘had a project at the magazine. It had to do with 
instituting a place for critical and theoretical work on performance and film.’11
 
 
Michelson seems to have been able to realise her project later as one of the founding editors 
of October, where there was a strong emphasis on film and performance in the 1970s and 
1980s, but which has since diminished. Yet at the time of October’s launch, well before the 
emergence of visual culture as a discipline and methodology, film theory was the ‘new field’ 
where interdisciplinary approaches, such as psychoanalysis and feminism, first appeared 
before becoming part of the standard interpretation. Meanwhile, according to Michelson, ‘art 
criticism, art theory, was getting quite tired’12
 
; the new impetus that changed the current 
paradigm of art history was yet to arrive, and October was not only part of this transformation 
in the discourse, but one of its initiators. 
                                                 
9 Krauss, ‘Montage “October”: Dialectic of the Shot’, Artforum (January 1973). 
10 Amy Newman, op. cit., p. 344. 
11 Ibid., p. 343 (original italics). 
12 Ibid. 
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Yet, in the context of the Editorial Introduction to the first issue of October, in conjunction with 
the choice of the journal’s title, Krauss’ recollections of the clashes are in fact contradictory. 
As the ‘Introduction’ explains, October was created in a specific historical context in which, 
according to the founding editors, art practice and critical theory became connected to the 
project of social construction in a similar way to what happened in the 1910s and 1920s.13
 
 
The choice of the journal’s name was by no means a coincidence; it was a direct reference to 
the film Sergei Eisenstein made to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the October revolution. 
Yet neither the choice of the title, nor the reference to this particular historical and artistic 
period contain any ‘nostalgic gestures’ on the part of the founding editors, since the most 
important considerations of that period, which appear in the strapline of the journal (art | 
theory | criticism | politics), seem to be equally relevant in the 1970s. The matrix, delineated 
by these four notions (art, theory, criticism, politics), defines the framework in which the 
paradigm shift of the 1970s, i.e. the questioning of the basic premises, assumptions, and 
methods of the modernist canon, and the incipience of postmodernism can be interpreted. In 
this context it is very difficult, if not impossible, to explain the reservations Krauss and 
Michelson had had at Artforum against Kozloff’s and Alloway’s seemingly Leftist and/or 
Marxist theoretical positions. 
It is at this point, and in relation to Marxism, that Clement Greenberg has to be mentioned. 
Not only did he play an important, albeit indirect, role in this trajectory of Artforum but also in 
that of October. As Robert Storr notes, Greenberg has been a father figure to a few 
generations of art critics not only in the intellectual but also in a psychological sense of the 
term, thus with a dual ‘heritage’ to either adopt or fight against.14
                                                 
13 This is formulated by the editors in the Introduction to the book that was published on the tenth 
anniversary of the journal. See Annette Michelson et al. (eds.), October: The First Decade, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 1987, pp. ix-xii. 
 He rose to such fame and 
became a point of reference in such a way that many artists, art historians, and critics felt the 
14 Robert Storr, ‘No Joy in Mudville: Greenberg’s Modernism Then and Now’, in Kirk Varnedoe and 
Adam Gopnik (eds.), Modern Art and Popular Culture: Readings in High and Low, The Museum of 
Modern Art and Harry N. Abrams, Inc., New York, 1990, pp. 160–190. 
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need to define themselves in relation to Greenberg’s ideas, statements, behaviour and 
personality. His ‘theories’ can be characterised by a political and intellectual eclecticism 
ranging from an adherence to Spengler to constant references to Marxist terminology, and 
from an admiration of T.S. Eliot’s conservative formalism to heralding American avant-garde 
art. Yet even if Greenberg’s legacy and its ramifications are highly complex and widespread, 
and seem to be directly or indirectly related to almost anything in American art history and 
theory of the past 70 years, it would be impossible to discuss this within the framework of this 
thesis. Moreover, it has very little to do with October’s theoretical approach to semiotics and 
semiotically informed analytical tools. 
 
Coming back to the events of the early 1970s, the cracks among the editors of Artforum 
started to become visible around 1972 when the tenth anniversary issue came out. This was 
also the result of the complex historical and social period; as Barbara Rose comments, ‘It 
seemed that the social implications of art were taking precedence over formal questions. 
Partly because they were so overwhelming—once you have the Vietnam War, and you have 
a lot of labor disputes, and you have an economy that has been so affluent that they’ve had 
so much surplus that nobody wants to be responsible for anything. The minute that 
happened, the magazines changed their relationship to their audience […]. The social 
pressure was very great. All the collectors read it. All the professors read it and all the artists 
read it. So therefore Artforum was gospel. People suddenly based their own perceptions and 
writings on what was in Artforum.’15
 
 
In 1972 John Coplans decided to dedicate the anniversary issue to his predecessor, Phillip 
Leider, and in this way he played a double-sided game. It was partly meant as a homage to 
Leider, but also partly as a break with the tradition Leider had built. This endeavour was 
implicitly reinforced by Krauss, for instance, who thought that, ‘part of the magazine […] was 
committed to color field painting for a long time, and as someone who was formerly part of 
                                                 
15 Amy Newman, op. cit., p. 366. 
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that wing I am perfectly happy to talk about my own defection from it.’16 In his turn, Phillip 
Leider did not take the issue as a heartfelt homage, but rather reacted to it with outrage, as 
he thought it was an insult to him.17 Or, as Mel Bochner remembers, ‘The best line that Phil 
[Leider] wrote, his most memorable line, was after he had quit and Coplans dedicated the 
Tenth Anniversary issue to him, Phil sent John a postcard saying, “Dedicating an issue like 
that to me is like dedicating the Aswam Dam to Golda Meir. There must be some mistake.”’18
 
 
As for Krauss, the anniversary issue gave her an opportunity to publish a text in which she 
could achieve several goals at the same time. Besides summing up her previous ten years’ 
activities at Artforum, the essay also served as ‘a declaration of farewell to […] a kind of 
juvenile relation to authority figures’. Here Krauss obviously refers to Clement Greenberg and 
his most long-term and loyal follower, Michael Fried, who actually tried everything in his 
capacity to prevent John Coplans from putting Krauss’ name on the masthead despite the 
work she performed for the magazine. The text also allowed Krauss to start assuming her 
own voice and – as she put it – ‘maturing’ as a writer and leaving the ‘kind of dogmatic tone 
that I no longer wanted to associate myself with.’19
 
 
According to the reminiscences of Artforum’s editors, including Michelson and Krauss,20
                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 346. 
 the 
source of their intellectual disagreement and eventual resignation was to be found in the 
editorial choice of topics to be covered on the one hand, and the level of discussing these 
themes on the other. This resentment was mutually visible and formulated by both sides. As 
Robert Pincus-Witten, a then associate editor at Artforum saw it: ‘Not that John [Coplans] 
was an angel, but he was a fine editor. He was a careful reader. And it was one of the 
reasons he was in constant conflict with Annette [Michelson] and Ros [Krauss], who often 
wrote very obtuse, dense, long-winded, impenetrable things. That had always been thrown 
17 Ibid., p. 348. 
18 Ibid., p. 347. 
19 Krauss, ‘A View of Modernism’, Artforum (September 1972). See Amy Newman, op. cit., p. 347. 
20 See Amy Newman, op. cit., pp. 365-390 (various passages). 
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up at us: our impenetrability and jargonizing—and October was still to come. And John tried 
to do something about it. So did Lawrence Alloway. Lawrence wanted to get rid of all of that 
extremely alienating, patrician obfuscation. And of course everybody got so fucking 
defensive about it.’21 As Hal Foster formulates it, ‘associate editors Rosalind Krauss and 
Annette Michelson left at the time when the notorious advertisement of Lynda Benglis was 
published, causing the “cracking apart of an already tense editorial board”.’22 As opposed to 
Foster’s claim that appears in an essay about Artforum, and Newman’s book more 
particularly, Michelson herself states that ‘it was over a performance issue that I left Artforum, 
too—one that didn’t happen.’23
 
 
Foster, who is a current member of October’s editorial board, even calls the events of 1974 
around Artforum an ‘editorial meltdown’.24 Michelson would have liked to see more articles 
on cinema and, together with Krauss, was keen to have more scholarly texts, which the 
editor-in-chief believed would be hard to read for a larger audience and so opted for a style 
of belle-lettrists. Interestingly enough and quite exceptionally, though, feminism was not 
among the issues Michelson and Krauss found missing from Artforum, even if the numbers 
of articles on feminism and women artists visibly rose after 1971.25 As John Coplans 
remembers, ‘I got interested in feminism. I remember putting Louise Bourgeois on the cover 
[March 1975] and I remember the fury of Krauss and Michelson about it—that she wasn’t 
worthy a cover.’26
 
 All this is partly apparent and partly discontinuous and contradictory in the 
face of October’s subsequent editorial policy and commitment. 
At this point I would like to make a methodological digression on the temporal limits of the 
materials used in my thesis. Since October is still published in the same quarterly structure 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 335. 
22 Hal Foster, ‘Art Critics in Extremis’, p. 105, in Hal Foster, Design and Crime (and Other Diatribes), 
Verso, London and New York, 2003, pp. 104–122 
23 Amy Newman, op. cit., p. 356. 
24 Hal Foster, ‘Art Critics in Extremis’, op. cit., p. 105. 
25 See Amy Newman, op. cit., p. 325. 
26 Amy Newman, op. cit., p. 367. 
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as when it was started (with occasional special issues and, since 1988, the so-called October 
books), to define the temporal borders is relevant. Within the confines of this thesis I draw on 
materials from October between its beginning in 1976 until 1996, when, in issue 77, the 
in/famous ‘Questionnaire on Visual Culture’ was published.27 Bearing my theoretical 
approach and standpoint in mind, this questionnaire on the one hand retrospectively 
repositions October’s relationship to semiotics and interdisciplinarity, and on the other 
positions the journal vis-à-vis the discipline of visual culture.28 In the questionnaire the editors 
formulate four questions in an impersonal, authoritative language, and ascribe highly 
problematic arguments to anonymous subjects.29
 
 In my view it is with the publication of these 
editorial questions that October’s relationship to interdisciplinarity and to a semiotically 
informed poststructuralist thinking is revealed as one determined by the modernist theoretical 
paradigm. 
October’s relationship to semiotics dates back to its beginning, explicitly to issues 3 and 4 
(1977) in which Rosalind Krauss published her ‘Notes on the Index’ essay in two parts. This 
text is one of the most important breakthroughs of semiotics as an interpretive tool in the 
discussions of contemporary art.30
                                                 
27 ‘Visual Culture Questionnaire’, October 77 (Summer 1996), pp. 25–70. 
 Although this was far from the first instance of the 
‘linguistic metaphor’s’ appearance in the interpretation of the visual arts and the analysis of 
the nature of visual representation, later on it in fact played a fundamental role in art theory’s 
28 See e.g. Irit Rogoff, ‘Studying Visual Culture’, in Nicholas Mirzoeff (ed.), Visual Culture Reader, 
Routledge, London and New York, pp. 14–26. In Rogoff’s terminology, visual culture is not even a 
discipline but a ‘project’ and a ‘strategy’. 
29 The problematic aspects of the questionnaire is analysed and Krauss’s relationship to visual culture 
is assessed by Keith Moxey, ‘Nostalgia for the Real: The Troubled Relation of Art History to Visual 
Studies’, in Keith Moxey, The Practice of Persuasion: Paradox and Power in Art History, Cornell Univ. 
Press, Ithaca and London, 2001, pp. 103–123. 
See also W.J.T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images, Univ. of Chicago 
Press, Chicago and London, 2005. 
30 Rosalind Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America Part 1’, October 3 (Spring 1977), pp. 
68–81, ‘Part 2’, October 4 (Fall 1977), pp. 58–67. 
Further reproductions of this essay are in October: The First Decade, op. cit., pp. 2–15 (only the first 
part); and Rosalind Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 1986, pp. 196–219 (full version). 
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paradigm shift from the so far dominant mimetic tradition.31 By the 1970s this detachment 
seemed to be indispensable in the face of contemporary artistic practices on the one hand, 
and contemporary theories on the other. The emergence of postmodernism and – mostly 
semiotically-informed – poststructuralism in other disciplines (mostly in literary theory32
 
) 
produced invaluable analytical tools in the discussions of such questions as representation, 
the dichotomy of high and low, ideology, performativity, subjectivity, agency, etc. 
For Krauss, ‘index’ was a new term, which worked against such well-known and established 
categories of art history as ‘medium’ and ‘style’ that are not just dubious but also irrelevant 
and useless for contemporary art. ‘Index’ was invaluable in the establishment of a new 
critical discourse that enabled the discussion of the photographic. By the photographic 
Krauss does not mean photography as a medium, but a special signifying and 
representational system that deeply influenced the art practices of 1970s. It is interesting to 
note to what extent the activities and practices of contemporary artists using photography 
(e.g. Cindy Sherman, Sherrie Levine, Victor Burgin, Michael Snow, Jeff Wall, and in the 
1980s Robert Mapplethorpe, Nan Goldin, etc.) engendered, generated and induced this 
paradigm shift in art theory and criticism on their turn.33
 
 
                                                 
31 Other examples are: Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, 
Hackett, Indianapolis, 1976. By producing an analytical account of the linguistic metaphor, Goodman 
convincingly argues against mimetic claims. 
It is this paradigm shift that Arthur C. Danto describes in his book The Philosophical 
Disenfranchisement of Art, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1986, see chapter V, ‘The End of Art’, 
pp. 81–116. 
32 As an important symbolic result of this paradigm shift, even the name of the discipline was changed 
from literary history to literary theory. In art history this shift has not happened yet and in my view the 
existence of the ‘Questionnaire’ proves that in its present state art history (as a discipline and not 
some of its individual practitioners) is incapable of integrating the consequences and the 
repercussions of the linguistic turn into this field. 
33 There is a recurring difference between the use of the term ‘photographer’ and ‘artists using 
photography’ which is independent from any geographical determination. Their theoretical and 
institutional reasons are discussed by John Tagg, ‘A Means of Surveillance. The Photograph as 
Evidence in Law’, in John Tagg, The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and 
Histories, Macmillan, London, 1988, pp. 66–102. Also Christopher Philips, ‘The Judgement Seat of 
Photography’, October 22 (Fall 1982), pp. 27–63. 
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For these reasons, and similarly to October’s trajectory, the discussion of photography and 
the photographic is in the focus of my thesis. One specific example for this is the snapshot, 
which also questions the currency of the traditional taxonomy of photographic images, based 
on a peculiar mix between technique and content. Possible counter theories of taxonomy 
(Tagg) raise issues of power: it seems that a certain branch of photography aspires to be 
discussed along aesthetic lines, thus being rescued from the autonomy of photography as 
art. Another group includes on the one hand those pictures that can be connected to 
modernity’s institutions of knowledge production (and function as evidence in the hands of 
different scientific, technical, medical, legal and political apparatuses), and those images that 
derive from such non-autonomous realms as advertising and the family on the other.34
 
 
Opposed to Tagg’s taxonomy and analysis, and predicated on a critique of power, Thierry de 
Duve’s categorisation, based exclusively on the differences of the emotional responses to 
photographs, distinguishes the ‘snapshot’ from the ‘time exposure’.35
 
 He also defines four 
components of the photographic paradox that he places in a dual matrix of time and space. It 
seems that his analysis follows a traditional taxonomy based on the content of the images, 
while semiotics remains a recurring label in his essay, without foundation. Just like Hubert 
Damisch, his text helps to construct a phenomenology of photography rather than a 
semiotically informed critical investigation. 
Interestingly enough, Krauss herself raises the problematic approach of the photographic 
discourse in an essay from 1984. She claims that the popularity of photography and the 
basis for its critical discourse lies in its social function.36
                                                 
34 See e.g. John Tagg, ‘A Means of Surveillance. The Photograph as Evidence in Law’, op. cit., pp. 
66–102. 
 For this reason, such traditional 
aesthetic categories as expression, originality, uniqueness, etc. are incompatible with a 
35 Thierry de Duve, ‘Time Exposure and Snapshot: The Photograph as Paradox’, October 5 (Summer 
1978), pp. 113–25. A similarly formalistic approach is employed by Hubert Damisch, ‘Five Notes for a 
Phenomenology of the Photographic Image’, October 5 (Summer 1978), pp. 70–72. Both essays are 
published in a special issue on photography. 
36 Rosalind Krauss, ‘A Note on Photography and the Simulacral’, October 31 (Winter 1984), pp. 49–68. 
 14 
critical discourse of photography. When photography deconstructs the distinction between 
original and copy, it achieves this by means of stereotypes, such as in the work of Cindy 
Sherman,37 whose images are already ‘reproductions’ of ‘reproductions’.38 Moreover, there is 
a more important and fundamental aspect of Sherman’s work. When she uses herself as the 
model for stereotypical roles, she disrupts the understanding of ‘the artist as the source of 
creativity’ (vis-à-vis ‘his’ model), a basic premise in Western artistic tradition.39
 
 
When Krauss introduces the notion of the simulacrum into her analysis, she does that to 
designate the complete loss of the distinction between reality and fantasy, and between the 
real and the simulated.40 The photographically produced images are by no means copies of 
reality, but ‘products of “reality effects”’ (Barthes) created by simulation and signs, which by 
exactly having this effect are able to deconstruct ‘the whole concept of the uniqueness of the 
art object, the originality of its author, the coherence of the oeuvre within which it is made, 
and the individuality of so-called self-expression.’41 It is on these premises that Krauss 
revises Bourdieu’s claim that there is no proper discourse to photography. According to 
Krauss, ‘there is a discourse proper to photography, only, we would have to add, it is not an 
aesthetic discourse.’42 Sherman’s ‘use of photography does not construct an object for art 
criticism but constitutes an act of such criticism. It constructs of photography itself a 
metalanguage […].’43
 
 
Thus the semiotic paradox of photography lies not in what de Duve claims, namely in the 
signified comprising part of the sign referring to it. The paradox is produced by the fact that 
                                                 
37 A similar approach can be detected in György Péter, ‘Sztereotípia és individualitás’, in György Péter, 
Művészet és média találkozása a boncasztalon, Kulturtrade Kiadó, Budapest, 1995, pp. 56–93. 
38 This, of course, is true to a certain extent. The ‘real’ ‘originals’ of Sherman’s pictures are not to be 
found in images of popular culture or high art, but in everyday ‘reality’. For more on this see: Rosalind 
Krauss, ‘Film Stills,’ in Cindy Sherman 1975–1993, Rizzoli, New York, 1993, pp. 17-88. 
39 Krauss, ‘A Note on Photography’, op. cit., p. 59. 
40 With that understanding, she does not follow Baudrillard’s notion of the simulacrum, see: Jean 
Baudrillard, Simulations, Semiotext(e), New York, 1983. 
41 Krauss, ‘A Note on Photography’, op. cit., p. 63. 
42 Ibid. (original italics). 
43 Ibid., p. 68. 
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the semiotic approach to photography is based on the separation (i.e. the dichotomy) of the 
signified (reality) and the signifier (the photographic image), yet photography produces 
images that are connected to this reality in many ways exactly through the ‘reality effects’. 
 
In its turn, the poststructuralist approach to semiotics (and theories based on this approach) 
opposes this dichotomy of reality and its signs (i.e. fiction), yet none or very little of this 
appears in October. For example Slavoj Žižek, whose work is based on Lacanian theory and 
opposed to Freud’s claims, maintains that ‘“reality” is not something given in advance but 
something the ontological status of which is in a way secondary.’44
 
 
Reality taken in this sense is, of course, constituted by the subject. The German literary 
theorist, Wolfgang Iser introduces the ‘trichotomy’ of the real, the fictive and the imaginary. 
He endeavours to displace the Cartesian dichotomy of reality and fiction by seeking to 
answer the following question: ‘Hogyan létezhet olyasvalami, ami, bár tényleges és jelenvaló, 
mégsem hordozza magán a valóság jegyeit?’45 Through this, Iser approaches the way 
psychoanalytic theory treats the various forms of activities (dreams, fantasies, memories, 
etc.) of human consciousness as part of the reality (and analytic work) constituted by human 
subjects on the same level as the subject’s interactions with the ‘external’ world. To a certain 
extent, W.J.T. Mitchell uses the same idea in his ‘picture theory’ by which he does not intend 
to ‘eliminate all differences between mental and physical images, but it [this theory] may help 
to demystify the metaphysical or occult quality of this difference, and to allay our suspicion 
that mental images are somehow improper or illegitimately modelled on the “real thing”.’46
 
 
                                                 
44 Slavoj Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom! Jacques Lacan In Hollywood and Out, Routledge, New York 
and London, 1992, pp. 49–50. The ‘constitution of the subject’ is understood by Žižek according to the 
tradition of German idealism. 
45 Wolfgang Iser, A fiktív és az imaginárius, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2001, p. 22. [‘How is it possible for 
something to exist which, although real and having a presence, does not bear the signs of reality?’ – 
my translation] 
46 W.J.T. Mitchell, ‘What Is an Image?’, p. 18, in W.J.T. Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology, 
Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1986, pp. 7–46. 
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The relationship between original and copy in the face of photography bears another point of 
relevance in October’s case since the journal played a decisive role in Walter Benjamin’s 
American reception in 1970s, especially in the ways in which Benjamin’s ideas on 
reproducibility were applied in the field of the theory of photography (mostly by Rosalind 
Krauss and Douglas Crimp). It is due to October’s commitment to historical references and 
their revival that Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay has made such a ‘career’ and became an 
ineluctable source, inspiration and point of reference in contemporary theory.47 The essay is 
based on the dichotomy Benjamin perceived between photography as the paradigm of a new 
kind of artistic production on the one hand, and the unique (auratic) work of art, the product 
of an era to be surpassed on the other. Benjamin’s essay has not been published in October 
itself, but it is one of the most frequently quoted and referred to texts in the journal, which has 
become an auratic text of art history on its turn, playing an important role in the dissemination 
of Benjamin’s ‘schismatic’ viewpoints. The ‘Work of Art’ essay is still considered a reliable 
and historically accurate source material for the history and theory of artistic reproduction, 
but the special geo-political and historical circumstances of its inception are mostly 
dismissed. One of the few who attempted to provide a critical analysis of this text from a 
rigorous art historical point of view and based on research in the area was Jacquelynn 
Baas.48
 
 
Baas’ analysis is just one of the possible approaches to the reinterpretation and 
recontextualisation of Benjamin’s text and the theoretical positions of October’s editors and 
contributors. In my view, a close reading of the ‘Work of Art’ essay, and a reconsideration of 
the relationship between originality and copy as it is discussed in the journal from a semiotic 
position, could be very productive. This can be based on Julia Kristeva’s and Gérard 
                                                 
47 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, in Walter Benjamin, 
Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn, New York, Schocken Books, 1969, pp. 217–251. Interestingly 
enough, the essay was published in English in the same year as in Hungarian. 
48 Jacquelynn Baas, ‘Reconsidering Walter Benjamin: “The Age of Mechanical Reproduction” in 
Retrospect’, in Gabriel P. Weisberg et al. (eds.), The Documented Image: Visions in Art History, 
Syracuse Univ. Press, 1987, pp. 337–347. 
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Genette’s theories on intertextuality and on texts in the ‘second degree’.49 The fact that 
Krauss both as an editor and as a theorist dismisses Kristeva’s ideas is partly explained in 
the roundtable discussion held as a preliminary to the Informe exhibition Krauss co-curated 
in the Centre Pompidou in Paris in 1996.50
 
 As part of her contribution to the discussion, 
Krauss confronts Kristeva’s theory of the abject with Bataille’s notion of the informe and 
takes sides with the latter as being also the foundation and starting point for her exhibition. 
Yet Krauss fails to analyse Kristeva’s usage of the abject, and repeatedly dismisses her not 
for intellectual but for personal reasons. 
The method of close reading seems to be useful in further cases of emblematic texts such as 
that of Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, Christopher Philips and Allan Sekula, all of whom published 
influential essays in the journal.51 Methodologically speaking, this close reading is informed 
by a semiotic approach to narratology as it is laid out by Mieke Bal in a text in which she 
demonstrates a possible avenue for adopting this critical methodology of literary theory in the 
field of the visual arts. Her approach relies on Roland Barthes’ narratological analysis of 
Balzac’s S/Z and the application of the five codes Barthes identified as means of activating 
the reader.52
 
 
                                                 
49 Julia Kristeva, Séméiotiké. Recherches pour une sémanalyse, Seuil, Paris, 1969. Julia Kristeva, 
Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1984. 
Gérard Genette, Palimpsests: La littérature au second degré, Seuil, Paris, 1982. 
50 ‘Round Table: The Politics of the Signifier (Part 2): A Conversation on the Informe and the Abject’, 
October 67 (1994), pp. 3–21. The exhibition L’informe, mode d’emploi took place between 22 May and 
26 August 1996 and was co-curated by Krauss and Yve-Alain Bois in the Centre Pompidou in Paris. 
51 Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, ‘From Faktura to Factography’, October 30 (Fall 1984), pp. 82–119. 
Christopher Philips, The Judgement Seat of Photography’, op. cit., pp. 27–63. Allan Sekula, ‘The Body 
and the Archive’, October 39 (Winter 1986), pp. 3–64. All three essays have been republished and 
anthologised on several occasions, and they all appear together in Richard Bolton (ed.), The Contest 
of Meaning: Critical Histories of Photography, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 
1989. 
52 Mieke Bal, ‘Seeing Signs: The Use of Semiotics for the Understanding of Visual Art’, in Mark 
Cheetham et al. (eds.), The Subjects of Art History: Historical Objects in Contemporary Perspectives, 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998, pp. 74–93. Another seminal essay dealing with the semiotic approach 
in art history is Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson, ‘Semiotics and Art History’, Art Bulletin 73 (1991), pp. 
174–208. 
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Another possible way in which this approach can be expanded is the inclusion of film theory 
into the critical analysis of ‘still images’. In the case of October this seems to be even 
evident, since the journal is also famous for publishing seminal essays in the area of film 
theory, very importantly from a feminist perspective. The major paradigm shift in film theory 
in the late 1960s and early ’70s was due to such intellectual and political impetus as 
feminism and other social movements such as the Afro-American emancipation movement. 
Thus, besides a reconsideration of the spectator’s role, the relationship between high art and 
popular cultural products53 became a subject of heavy reassessment. Teresa de Lauretis and 
Kaja Silverman are two major figures working in the conjunction of the changing notions of 
spectatorship and popular culture.54 However, there are two interesting instances of film 
theory in the history of October that have a relevance to photography and/or a semiotically 
informed critical analysis. One is part of the outstanding and overwhelming theoretical 
reception of a Hollywood production, Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner in the 1980s and the 
fundamental role played by photography in the construction of identities within the film.55 The 
other is related to another film by Ridley Scott (Alien), when James H. Kanavagh employs 
Greimas’ semantic square to discern the various ideologies that inform the filmic narrative.56
 
 
Another instance for the application of semiotic terms in the visual arts is when Krauss uses 
the notion of the ‘shifter’ to underline the context-based character of pictorial 
representations.57
                                                 
53 In her groundbreaking essay, Laura Mulvey calls this ‘narrative cinema’, by which she refers to 
Hollywood-style productions. See Laura Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, Screen 16/3 
(1975), pp. 6–18. 
 The ‘shifter’ is not an unknown term in the area of literary theory either. 
Shortly before the publication of Krauss’ ‘Index’ essay, Jonathan Culler’s book Structuralist 
54 Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema, Macmillan, London, 1983. Kaja 
Silverman, The Subject of Semiotics, Oxford Univ. Press, New York and Oxford, 1983. Most 
semiotically informed essays on film theory, including their authors, that have not been published in 
October, should be read against those published in the journal. One example is the film theorist 
Christian Metz, whose ‘Photography and Fetish’ (October 34, Fall 1985, pp. 81–90) was published in 
October, but strangely enough not his essays in the area of film theory. 
55 In October see Giuliana Bruno, ‘Ramble City: Postmodernism and Blade Runner’, October 41 
(Summer 1987), pp. 61–74. 
56 James H. Kavanaugh: ‘“Son of a Bitch”: Feminism, Humanism, and Science in Alien’, October 13 
(Summer 1980), pp. 91–100. 
57 See Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index’, op. cit. 
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Poetics came out, in which he analyses deixis as a rhetorical means in the mobilisation of the 
reader in the reception of the artwork.58
 
 
So far there has been very little research done into the subject of October’s critical reception 
– either as an art institution or the individual activities of its editors – with the exception of a 
few essays that mention the journal to various degrees. One of the largest ones in terms of 
its size is David Carrier’s book on Krauss’ theoretical project as a philosopher of art.59 Carrier 
compares her to the philosopher Arthur C. Danto, which is a strange and misconceived 
reference to Danto’s periodisation, which he put forward in his The Philosophical 
Disenfranchisement of Art.60 Danto establishes three models or phases for art in an almost 
Hegelian and teleological manner, claiming that although artworks will continue to be created 
and exist, the concept of art will vanish by turning into philosophy.61 Without making a 
concrete reference to Danto’s periodisation, Carrier discusses Krauss’ ‘contribution to the 
philosophical study of visual art,’62
 
 yet Carrier fails to provide any specific grounds for using 
this category rather than ‘art history’, ‘art theory’ or ‘critical theory’, which are far more current 
usages in this field. 
To illustrate the level of discussion and arguments in Carrier’s book, it is perhaps sufficient to 
quote the last paragraph, in which Carrier expands on Paul Barolsky’s understanding of art 
history as belonging ‘to the imaginative tradition of writing about art that […] should be 
categorized under historical fiction.’63
                                                 
58 Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature, Cornell 
Univ. Press, Ithaca and London, 1975. 
 Carrier continues, ‘Why then […] should we be 
unwilling to read Rosalind Krauss in an equally charitable way? In admiring her fantasies, but 
refusing to take them literally, I am only adopting a consistent attitude toward all creative art 
59 David Carrier, Rosalind Krauss and American Philosophical Art Criticism: From Formalism to 
Beyond Postmodernism, Praeger Publishers, Westport, Connecticut 2002. 
60 Arthur C. Danto, The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art, Columbia Univ. Press, 1986. 
61 Arthur C. Danto, Hogyan semmizte ki a filozófia a művészetet?, Atlantisz, Budapest, p. 90. 
62 Carrier, op. cit., p. xi (emphasis added). 
63 Paul Barolsky, ‘Art History as Fiction’, Artibus et historiae 34 (1977), p. 17, quoted in Carrier, op. cit., 
p. 120. 
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writing. Whatever the ultimate judgement on her claims, her development over three decades 
from formalism to beyond postmodernism is a very remarkable intellectual journey. No one 
has moved as quickly, no one else has offered so many challenging arguments. That is why 
Krauss is our greatest philosophical art critic.’64
 
 Not only do these arguments not sound 
intellectually and academically sustainable, they also avoid any serious analysis of Krauss’ 
intellectual or ‘philosophical’ project. My thesis is, of course, not related to the latter, but 
partly touches upon Krauss’ work as one of the editors and regular contributors of October. 
This is also why I refrain from discussing Carrier’s arguments and opinions any further. 
It is perhaps not a mere coincidence that another text was published in the same year (in 
2002) in which Michael Kelly also compares Krauss with Danto, using their writings on Cindy 
Sherman as examples to demonstrate the problematic relationship of their views to 
contemporary art theory.65 In relation to discussing Krauss’ philosophical approach, Kelly 
uses as examples her analysis on Cindy Sherman, in which Krauss’ central argument can be 
summed up as the ‘fragmentation of meaning’.66 When Krauss shifts the theoretical inquiry 
‘form the signified to the signifier,’67 she, by the same token, moves from analysing ‘form’ to 
the investigation of the ‘informe’, which, according to Kelly, requires a process of ‘unveiling’. 
As Kelly formulates it, ‘meaning is veiled or it does not exist, that is, it exists only as veiled (at 
least until it is unveiled—and thus rendered transparent—by the philosopher/critic).’68
 
 This 
idea of unmediated representation appears at Krauss already as early as in her Index-essay 
in 1977. The other problematic aspect of her theoretical standpoint – which cannot, by any 
means, considered as poststructuralist – is related to the privileged position she attaches to 
the philosopher/critic in the process of interpretation, as having full access to meaning. 
                                                 
64 Carrier, op. cit., p. 120. 
65 Michael Kelly, ‘Danto and Krauss on Cindy Sherman’, in Michael Ann Holly and Keith Moxey (eds.), 
Art History, Aesthetics, Visual Studies, Clark Art Institute, Williamstown, Mass., 2002, pp. 122–146. 
66 Ibid., pp. 133-135. 
67 Ibid., p. 135. 
68 Ibid. 
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In his text Kelly mentions the problem of the historicity of art, and this is precisely the main 
topic of another essay, this time by Sande Cohen, in which he analyses October from the 
perspective of French theory’s American reception and its influence on the journal.69 Similarly 
to Mieke Bal’s proposition of replacing Rembrandt with ‘Rembrandt’, French theory should 
probably be called ‘French theory’ given its level of institutionalisation and the multiplicity of 
often conflicting approaches the term designates.70
 
 Coming back to Cohen, in his text he 
compares the relationship to historicity of two influential American journals, Critical Inquiry 
and October in the face of what Cohen calls ‘French theory’. 
One of the disadvantages of Cohen’s text is that he fails to provide an explanation for 
comparing exactly these two journals; certainly they have not been the only platforms for 
disseminating French theory in America. They were, indeed, founded around the same time 
(Critical Inquiry was launched in 1974, two years prior to October), they both had a 
relationship to historicity which can certainly be analysed along the lines of the Nietzsche’s 
French reception, but Cohen’s arguments are not convincing enough and this still remains 
mostly an oblique input in the – historical – analysis of these periodicals. At one point, 
however, Cohen presents an explanation of what he very precisely means by ‘historicising’ in 
the case of October, when he turns to discussing the editorial shift and its effects that took 
place in the journal at the beginning of the 1990s. According to Cohen, ‘new episodes are 
offered where to historicize increasingly meant one must accept the loss and lack of 
modernist theory and ask as to what is recoverable from that “history”.’71
 
 
According to Cohen’s conclusion, ‘as edited, which is to say politicized, by Critical Inquiry, 
“French theory” is tolerated only inasmuch as such theory does not interfere with the 
                                                 
69 Sande Cohen, ‘Critical Inquiry, October, and Historicizing French Theory’, in Sylvère Lotringer and 
Sande Cohen (eds.), French Theory in America, Routledge, New York and London, 2001, pp. 191–
215. 
70 See Mieke Bal, Reading Rembrandt: Beyond the Word-Image Opposition, Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1991. 
71 Sande Cohen, op. cit., p. 207. 
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language and sense of history, deemed necessary for transition to the future, nothing other 
than the classical subject of liberalism, the good people of enlightenment. It takes a lot of 
editorial energy to preserve this.’72 Later on, and in comparison to October, he summarizes, 
‘Critical Inquiry and October all too often display the self-satisfaction of two kinds of 
connoisseurship, which is to say, a politics of language. On the one hand, Critical Inquiry 
places itself in charge of French theory along a spiritualized /idealized axis, characterized by 
the ethical charge of responsibility for other, which maintains a liberal hegemon on the 
subject: we “know” who the subject is, what it needs and lacks. On the other hand, October’s 
more explicit political slice into French theory radically historicizes the present in order to 
make contemporary art history “monumental,” by elevating historical consciousness as itself 
the stake of historical reflection.’73
 
 Cohen, however, fails to notice that his application of the 
term ‘French theory’ is highly reductive and simplified because on the one hand it assumes 
French theory as coherent and monolithic, and on the other referring only to historicity. Yet 
we all know that this is far from the case and neither of these journals can serve as case 
studies, but only as examples in this framework. 
In the case of October, it is quite problematic that Cohen implicitly suggests that there is a 
coherent relationship of these journals to historicity, and this assumption of his is based on a 
few, carefully selected texts. These might indeed be symptomatic of the relationship Cohen 
attempts to demonstrate but they do not seem to provide him with a substantial enough basis 
to draw a plausible conclusion for the whole journal. It is equally disturbing that Cohen refers 
to a number of articles published in the journal with a recurring impersonal tone, i.e. naming 
the essays’ authors only in the footnotes. Astonishingly, this impersonal tone is exactly the 
same manner of addressing intellectual accusations as the one used by the editors of 
                                                 
72 Ibid., p. 204 (original italics). 
73 Ibid., pp. 211–212 (original italics). 
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October themselves in the infamous ‘Visual Culture Questionnaire’ a few years prior the 
publication of Cohen’s essay.74
 
 
The American reception of French theory is obviously a neglected area of research with 
interesting conclusions to be drawn, as in the case of October’s preference for a number of 
writers and its dismissal of certain other theorists. The case of Julia Kristeva can be taken as 
a telling example to explain some of the reasons for the history of this uneven reception.75 In 
a roundtable discussion of the theoretical affiliations of the exhibition Informe, Krauss 
expresses her preferences for Bataille’s term at the expense of dismissing Kristeva’s notion 
of the abject, yet she fails to provide accurate and adequate reasoning for her own choice.76
 
 
When trying to produce a survey of the history of October’s reception, we encounter sporadic 
texts that discuss specific elements of this historiography, mostly related to photography in 
conjunction with the reception of Walter Benjamin. Besides Jacquelynn Baas, the names of 
Diarmuid Costello,77 Kelly Dennis,78 Kaja Silverman79 and Sarah James80
 
 can be mentioned. 
Since these texts don’t discuss the journal as such, as an institution, and as an editorial 
collective with a monolithic, unified, and fully coherent editorial policy and conforming 
contributors, but some of its very concrete aspects and intellectual affiliations, I will come 
back to analysing them in the corresponding chapters. 
                                                 
74 ‘Visual Culture Questionnaire’, op. cit. 
75 This is related to the reception of German theory and – as part of it – Benjamin’s reception, as well, 
and later to the ways in which the new discipline of visual culture was treated and discussed by 
October. See the ‘Visual Culture Questionnaire’. 
76 ‘The Politics of the Signifier II: A Conversation on the Informe and the Abject’, October 67 (Winter 
1994), pp. 3–21. 
77 Diarmuid Costello, ‘Aura, Face, Photography: Re-Reading Benjamin Today’, in Andrew Benjamin 
(ed.), Walter Benjamin and Art, Continuum, London and New York, 2005, pp. 164–183. 
78 Kelly Dennis, ‘Benjamin, Atget and the “Readymade” Politics of Postmodern Photography Studies’, 
inJ.J. Long et al. (eds.), Photography: Theoretical Snapshots, Routledge, London and New York, 
2009, pp. 112–124. 
79 Kaja Silverman, ‘The Screen’, in Kaja Silverman, The Threshold of the Visible World, Routledge, 
New York and London, 1996, pp. 195–227. 
80 Sarah James, ‘What Can We Do with Photography?’, Art Monthly, Dec–Jan, 2007–2008, pp. 1–4. 
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It is difficult to locate the temporal beginning proper of my investigations since the history of 
Artforum could serve as either a comparison or a genealogical explanation for some of the 
aspects discussed here. Yet my current aim is neither the construction of a narrative from an 
art historical perspective nor a mechanical comparative analysis of two periodicals. In this 
sense, Artforum cannot by any means be considered the most adequate comparison, rather 
partly as an historical predecessor to surpass, and partly as source for some re-enacted 
behaviour. Despite this mostly historical and slightly anecdotal introduction which serves both 
as a backdrop and a historiographic survey for the assessment of the journal, my aim is not 
to create a narrative or an account of October’s historical activities, but to produce a critical 
analysis of the journal’s theoretical approach to photography, and as part of this, its relation 
to semiotics and semiotically informed interpretive methodologies.81
 
 And it is for this reason 
that I use the case of the ‘Visual Culture Questionnaire’ from 1996 as a temporal limit for my 
analysis, since it is exactly the emergence of this new field that October not only failed to 
handle intellectually but also to integrate into its – implicit – editorial policy. 
Since the theorists and theories – including my own position – against which I read October 
can be labelled poststructuralist, the historiographically relevant question can be raised. Has 
there ever been a truly structuralist period in art history? What is the relationship between 
poststructuralism in art history and the visual turn (i.e. the appearance and emergence of 
visual studies)? Has the linguistic turn already taken place in art history? Who would be 
considered the structuralist art historians? In his book Cultural Theory, Philip Smith situates 
the beginning of structuralism in the 1950s.82
                                                 
81 The founding editors are Rosalind Krauss and Annette Michelson. Members of the editorial board 
have changed, although one of the most important and influential editors was Douglas Crimp who, 
following a controversy between himself and the founding editors, left the journal in 1990. This 
moment can also be seen as the end of an era in the history of the journal. After Crimp had left, a new 
and larger editorial board came into being, which has been functioning with more or less the same 
members ever since. 
 In the arts and in art history that was the peak 
of modernist criticism and Greenberg’s exclusive influence and ‘reign’. Can Krauss – or any 
of October’s contributors for that matter – be labelled as structuralist and in what sense of the 
82 Philip Smith, Cultural Theory: An Introduction, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, p. 97. 
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term?83
                                                 
83 I will argue that she is, or at least was in the 1970s, a structuralist in the sense of Lévi-Strauss and 
structural anthropology. 
 And if yes, then besides her, whom else in art history and theory can we see as 
structuralist? These are the questions that I intend to answer – either explicitly or in some 
cases implicitly – in this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2 
 
T H E  I N F L U E N C E  A N D  T H E  P O S S I B I L I T I E S  O F  S E M I O T I C S  
I N  A R T  H I S T O R Y  A N D  T H E O R Y  
 
 
One of the most powerful and lasting anecdotes or topoi of art history goes back to Antiquity 
when Pliny recorded the story of the rival painters in the Historia Naturalis. The most 
prominent painter of the time, Zeuxis, enters into a competition with a fellow painter 
Parrhasius, to decide which one of them is the most outstanding of all. Zeuxis depicts grapes 
so realistically that birds try to pluck them from the image. When, in his turn, Parrhasius 
invites him to look at what he has produced, Zeuxis asks him to pull off the curtain and reveal 
the picture. It turns out that the curtain is itself Parrhasius’ painting—thus Parrhasius ends up 
being the better painter, for while Zeuxis managed to deceive animals, his fellow artist 
succeeded in deceiving humans.1
 
 
In relation to this topos, Norman Bryson notes that interestingly enough this anecdote has 
not lost its relevance since, and in my view this is not only true for 1983 when his book Vision 
and Painting was published, but to a certain extent still today. According to Bryson, until art 
history finds a way to change itself as a discipline, this topos will sum up its basic principles, 
which remain unquestionable. Within the framework of the traditional understanding, 
representation is not only transparent but also realistic, thus the dichotomy between an 
‘external’ reality and the representation referring to this reality is one of its main 
characteristics. It is exactly along this line that the linguistic metaphor and a semiotic analysis 
can enter into the field of art history and change its basic premises. 
 
                                                 
1 Norman Bryson, Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1983, p. 
1. 
 27 
Art history at the time of its disciplinary foundation at the end of the 19th century was not only 
a European, but more precisely a Central European field. Its founders and most outstanding 
practitioners were members of the Vienna School, such as Alois Riegl, Max Dvorák, Julius 
von Schlosser, Franz Wickhoff, Otto Pächt, Hans Sedlmayr, and later Ernst Gombrich 
himself.2
 
 At this time the most important problem in art history was the definition of style, both 
as that of an individual artist and as the prevalent style of a period. In conjunction with the 
question of style, other issues, which were derived from the figure of the connoisseur, 
became equally foundational in the discipline, e.g. originality, authorship, beauty, etc. 
A major turn in art history occurred in the late 1920s and early 1930s when Erwin Panofsky 
developed a new scientific methodology for the analysis of mostly historical works of art, 
which he called iconology.3
 
 Due to Panofsky’s followers and to several generations of post-
Panofskyan scholars, this is still a method practiced by many and not only academic art 
historians, which aims at the most detailed, precise and accurate reconstruction of the 
‘original’ context and interpretation of the given artwork. 
Object of Interpretation  Equipment for Interpretation  Controlling Principle of 
         Interpretation 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Primary or natural  Practical experience   History of style (insight into 
subject matter –  (familiarity with objects and  the manner in which, under 
a/ factual,   events).    varying historical conditions, 
b/ expressionist,       objects and events were 
constituting the world       expressed by forms). 
of artistic motifs. 
 
 
 
2. Secondary or  Knowledge of literary sources  History of types (insight into 
conventional subject  (familiarity with specific themes  the manner in which, under 
matter, constituting the  and concepts).    varying historical conditions, 
world of images, stories       specific themes and concepts 
and allegories.        were expressed by objects 
         and events). 
                                                 
2 Between approximately 1850 and 1950. The relationship with the Warburg Institute is embodied in 
Gombich, who studied in Vienna but moved to London in 1930s and worked at the Warburg Institute, 
where other members included Panofsky, Wittkower and Edgar Wind, among others. 
3 Erwin Panofsky, ‘A képzőművészeti alkotások leírásának és tartalomelemzésének problémájához’, in 
Erwin Panofsky, A jelentés a vizuális művészetekben, Gondolat, Budapest, 1984, pp. 249–261. 
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3.Intrinsic meaning4
content, constituting the with the essential tendencies of  or ‘symbols’ in general (insight 
 or  Synthetic intuition (familiarity  History of cultural symptoms 
world of ‘symbolic’ values. the human mind, conditioned by into the manner in which, 
    personal psychology and  under varying historical 
    ‘Weltanschauung’.   conditions, essential 
         tendencies of the human mind 
         were expressed by specific 
         themes and concepts).5
 
 
 
It is not only interesting, but almost ironic, that Panofsky himself constantly warned his 
followers of the traps and problematic aspects of his own method, although many seem to 
dismiss the ‘master’s advice’. Moreover, his method raises a number of questions that 
neither he nor his followers endeavoured to pose, let alone answer. One is related to 
description, the first step in Panofsky’s system, which is already a kind of interpretation, as 
the postmodernist approach to history and the poststructuralist approach to narratology have 
convincingly proved.6 Another problematic aspect is that within this system, the separation of 
the three layers of interpretation implicitly suggests a temporality that in practice can be 
counterproductive. It is Panofsky himself who provides us with an apt example for that when 
he mentions the case of the hovering figure, which may elicit different descriptions depending 
on whether we look at it from the point of view of modern naturalism or of medieval 
spiritualism. Thus categorisation by style should precede description because the latter is 
dependent on the former.7
 
 Or to put it another way, they are mutually interdependent and 
temporally parallel. 
                                                 
4 Panofsky borrows this term from Karl Mannheim, see Panofsky, op. cit., p. 257. 
5 In practice, these layers never appear independently from one another, see Panofsky, op. cit., p. 
259. ‘A formaalakítás története azokról a módozatokról tájékoztat, amelyek szerint a történeti fejlődés 
során a tiszta forma meghatározott tárgyszintű és kifejezésszintű jelentésekkel kapcsolódott egybe; a 
típustörténet azokról a módozatokról tájékoztat, amelyek szerint a történeti fejlődés során a tárgyi 
értelmek és kifejezésértelmek meghatározott jelentésértelmekkel kapcsolódnak egybe; végül az 
általános szellemtörténet azokról a módozatokról tájékoztat, amelyek szerint a jelentésértelmek (tehát 
a nyelv fogalmai vagy a zene melizmái is) bizonyos világnézeti tartalmakkal megteltek.’ Panofsky, op. 
cit., pp. 258–259. 
6 Panofsky, op. cit., p. 253. See also the work of Hayden White and Mieke Bal, among others. 
7 Panofsky, op cit., p. 253. 
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There is another, epistemological question about reconstructing the original contexts of 
artworks. Not only does this approach give a priority to the ‘original’ context8
 
 (a preference 
that cannot be justified by plausible arguments), but it is also based on another not less 
implausible claim according to which it is possible to collect all the textual documents 
(philosophical, historical, clerical, etc.) for the ‘proper’ reconstruction of the primary context of 
the artwork’s birth. For Panofsky, this is not a question of hermeneutics. Yet even if it were 
possible and intellectually tenable to produce such a reconstruction, the question of how to 
do this still remains the same. In the case of a 14th-century painting, should we aim at the – 
approximate – reconstruction of a clergyman, a merchant, a peasant, never mind a woman, 
etc. As Norman Bryson pointed out, there have been social groups whose reception was 
never recorded, so the recorded evidence that we can use is already heavily biased, even if 
it pretends to be ideologically neutral on behalf of the ‘natural’ argument. 
It is perhaps the result of Panofsky’s unformulated insight that the periods and the works of 
art he discusses as relevant for the methodology of iconology are all from before the 18th 
century, and there is no mention of contemporary art is his work.9 He himself mentions the 
example of Renoir’s Peaches, a case for which to search for the relevant literary and 
philosophical texts would be fruitless since such texts do not exist and therefore cannot take 
part in the interpretation of the painting.10
 
 
Another problematic aspect of Panofsky’s method is its blind spot to the specificities of 
artworks, namely that they are the products of different historical periods and yet, in a 
paradoxical way, they are all contemporaries, since they live with us and we encounter them 
in the present via our own subjectivity. According to Panofsky it is the history of tradition 
which somehow ‘channels’ or limits the ‘over-burgeoning’ subjectivities of interpretation 
                                                 
8 See Norman Bryson, ‘Art in Context’, in Ralph Cohen (ed.), Studies in Historical Change, Univ. of 
Virginia Press, Charlottlesville, 1992, pp. 18–42. 
9 By contemporary I mean early and mid 20th-century art, contemporaries to Panofsky himself. 
10 Panofsky, op. cit., p. 255. 
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because it is exactly the historical knowledge of tradition which is capable of showing what 
artworks would not have been able to say, given their temporal and spatial specificities; 
certain things were unrepresentable, unthinkable or even unimaginable.11 This approach, 
however, ignores – or let us say takes for granted – the changing function of interpretation, 
the variety of viewers taking part in the process of interpretation, the dynamics and the 
temporal character of interpretation, among other aspects. It takes the idealized reading of 
the scholar, devoid of social, ideological, geographical background, and determination, as 
universal and superior to any other interpretation, although readings of works of art are in 
fact much more varied and complex than what Panofsky’s system posits.12
 
 
The idea of limiting interpretation to ‘what was possible’ at the time of the birth of the artwork 
leads us back to the well-recycled anecdote of Pliny and to one of the oldest art historical 
topoi of the innocent eye. It is a recurrent nostalgic wish that one encounters too often even 
today. Arthur Danto cites Mark Tansey’s painting, The Innocent Eye Test (1981) as a ‘wry 
and witty’13 commentary on this matter. However, I do not agree with Danto’s assumption 
that animals respond to ‘pictorial content’, and thus with the deduction that ‘pictorial 
competence, like perceptual competence, is something of which the theoretically and 
culturally innocent eye is capable.’14 What animals are not capable of, is responding to those 
‘features of pictures’ which ‘fall outside of pictorial competence of which they are capable.’15
                                                 
11 ‘Megmutatja, hogy mi az, amit a dolgok nem is mondhattak volna ki, mivel tekintettel a korra és a 
helyre, az illető valami vagy ábrázolhatatlan, vagy elgondolhatatlan volt.’ See Panofsky, op. cit., p. 
257. Other subjective elements of interpretation are in greater need of some kind of a corrective force 
and that is the general history of thought (Geistesgeschichte). See Panofsky, op. cit., p. 258. 
 
It is not so much the first part of Danto’s opinion with which I disagree (even if I think it is very 
problematic to collect verifiable data of visual response from animals), but rather the 
theoretical sustainability of the ways in which pictorial competence enters the field of art. To 
12 Michael Ann Holly, Past Looking: Historical Imagination and the Rhetoric of the Image, Cornell Univ. 
Press, 1996. Also: Michael Ann Holly, ‘Past Looking’, Critical Inquiry, vol. 16, no. 2 (Winter 1990), pp. 
371–396. 
13 Arthur Danto, ‘Animals as Art Historians: Reflections on the Innocent Eye’, in Arthur Danto, Beyond 
the Brillo Box: The Visual Arts in Post-Historical Perspective, The Noonday Press, New York, 1992, 
pp. 15–31. 
14 Arthur Danto, ‘Animals’, op. cit., p. 20. 
15 Ibid., p. 21 (original italics). 
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a certain extent, it is also amusing to see that in Tansey’s painting it is a cow who is 
expected to respond to a painting of a bull, not only for the sexually charged connotation of 
this response,16
 
 but also for the allusion to another, by today’s standard’s old-fashioned, 
slang word ‘cow’ to designate a woman. It is equally quite telling that this topos takes vision 
and the acquisition of knowledge via visuality as corruption, as something negative that we 
have to accept, live with, but not necessarily like. 
In Panofsky’s case there is obviously no wish to return to the innocent eye in the original 
sense of the term, but a wish to select among possible and available knowledge, and choose 
only the desirable, the useful, and the appropriate for scholarly purposes, and by that token, 
staying uncorrupted by ‘useless’, academically invalid, and uncanonical information. Yet 
there is no way back; ‘innocence’, either literally or visually taken, can be lost only once as 
Tania Modleski pointed out in an essay in which she made use of the theoretical function of 
the prostitute to illustrate her point with a powerful and provocative metaphor. 
 
According to Modleski, many theorists aim at explaining the cultural or interpretive 
conventions of various interpretive communities (including women), and how literary 
competency is acquired via experience. In the process of the acquisition of competence, ‘as 
in other experiences, one is a virgin but once’.17 This means that we can never enter the 
process of interpretation as innocent virgins, as our subjectivities are being ‘corrupted’ from 
the moment of our birth. As Modleski notes, this can even be considered as ‘a naïve account 
in a post-Althusserian, post-Derridian literary world; for, as the continental thinkers have 
taught us, often using similarly unfortunate metaphorical language, in readings as in writing 
one is always already fucked. Never a virgin, but always a whore.’18
 
 
                                                 
16 Do we know if the cow’s disinterest is addressed to the painting or to the bull in the painting? 
17 Tania Modleski, ‘Some Functions of Feminist Criticism, or The Scandal of the Mute Body’, p. 10, 
October 49 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–24. 
18 Tania Modleski, op. cit., p. 10. 
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Coming back to Panofsky and his methodology of iconography, there is an interesting 
metaphor which can be applied in its case and which can lead us directly not only to 
semiotics, but also to the critique of the ways in which the use of semiotics in the visual arts 
have been understood and carried out. This metaphor of the detective was suggested by two 
theorists in parallel with each other in 1980; one is the Italian historian Carlo Ginzburg,19 and 
the other one is the Hungarian-born American semiotician Thomas Sebeok.20
 
 Ginzburg 
draws a parallel between the investigative methods of Freud, Morelli and Sherlock Holmes, 
claiming that they all based their deductions on small, fragmentary signs, i.e. symptoms, that 
most people ignore or consider unimportant, yet these signs lead the ‘trained eye’ to the right 
interpretation of the overall scheme, thus to the ultimate meaning of a psychic event, the 
veritable author of a work of art, or the cold-blooded criminal for that matter. 
There is, however, one crucial element in which a crime investigation is different from the 
interpretation of artworks, namely that in the first case there can be only one possible 
offender, while in the case of the latter, the meaning of a work may differ considerably, 
according to the variety of actual spectators. In fact iconographical meaning is mostly fixed 
and rarely contextual, but iconography is not the same as interpretation either, so to reduce 
the possibilities of a semiotic analysis in such a way would be a misunderstanding of both 
semiotics and iconography. Iconography in this sense can be compared to a dictionary that 
reduces meaning to the most common, most obvious and relatively stable usages. One 
counter-example could be taken from Panofsky himself, when he mentions a representation 
of Judith, in which Holofernes’ head lies on a plate which, in its turn, is an iconographical 
                                                 
19 Carlo Ginzburg, ‘Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific Method’, History 
Workshop 9 (Spring 1980), pp. 5–36. 
20 T. A. Sebeok and J. U. Sebeok, ‘“You Know My Method”: A Juxtaposition of Charles S. Peirce and 
Sherlock Holmes’, The University of Indiana Press, Bloomington, 1980. In Hungarian, Ismeri a 
módszeremet? avagy a mesterdetektív logikája, Gondolat, Budapest, 1990. 
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attribute to the representation of Salome. At the end, as Panofsky notes, it is the sword that 
pushes meaning towards the representation of Judith, as a logically stronger sign.21
 
 
At this point, and staying within this system, the question becomes twofold. If art is getting 
further and further in improving the production of ‘perceptual equivalences’ (Danto22), how far 
can it go on this path? Or what can this theory do with works of art that obviously do not aim 
at this improvement. And can the production of perceptual equivalences be considered to be 
art’s main preoccupation? This is exactly the starting point of Nelson Goodman’s seminal 
book Languages of Art.23
 
 
According to Goodman, denotation is a specific category of representation in the sense that 
resemblance between the signifier and the signified is not a precondition of representation. In 
this sense representation can never be symmetrical. Goodman’s example is the Duke of 
Wellington and his portrait; while the painting may represent the Duke, the Duke can never 
represent the portrait (even if it is his). Goodman annotates and complements this statement 
with another one; Constable’s painting of Marlborough Castle resembles other paintings 
more than other mansions, yet it represents the Castle and not other pictures. When talking 
about the relationship between the original and its representation or copies, Rosalind Krauss 
uses the example of late 18th–early 19th-century landscape painting and its prerequisite for 
the ‘picturesque’. Krauss claims that the original always goes hand in hand with the copy, 
                                                 
21 ‘Az abdukció a tényekből indul ki anélkül, hogy a kiinduláskor bármilyen elmélet felmerülne, jóllehet 
az az érzés motiválja, hogy egy elméletre van szükség a meglepő tények magyarázatához. A indukció 
egy szinte magától értetődő hipotézisből indul ki, amely kiinduláskor nem meghatározott tényeket tart 
szem előtt, bár érződik az, hogy szükség van elméletet alátámasztó tényekre. Az abdukció az 
elméletre törekszik, az indukció a tényekre. Az abdukció során a tények átgondolása adja a hipotézis 
ötletét, az indukció során a hipotézisben mélyedünk el, ebből származnak a kísérletekre vonatkozó 
ötletek, s így kerülnek napvilágra azok a tények, amelyekre a hipotézis irányította a figyelmünket.’ 
(Peirce quoted by Sebeok, op. cit., pp. 45–46.) 
22 Arthur C. Danto, ‘A művészet vége’, in Hogyan semmizte ki a filozófia a művészetet?, Atlantisz 
Kiadó, Budapest, 1997, pp. 95–129. In English: Arthur C. Danto, ‘The End of Art’, The Philosophical 
Disenfranchisement of the Art, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1986, pp. 81-116. 
23 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc, Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1976. Goodman also dealt with the question of induction. 
/Excerpts in Hungarian: Nelson Goodman, ‘Két fejezet a Művészet nyelveiből’, in Horányi Özséb (ed.), 
A sokarcú kép, Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont, Budapest, 1982, pp. 26–68, pp. 261–273./ 
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which in its turn presupposes the original. Thus the originality of a landscape does not stem 
for the uniqueness of the given topographic location, but from the way in which the given 
landscape is able to influence the beholder’s imagination, exactly on the basis of previously-
seen picturesque representations.24
 
 
For W.J.T. Mitchell, Goodman is an extreme conventionalist who endeavours to produce a 
theory of representation devoid of any value.25 In his book there is no reference whatsoever 
to his personal aesthetic, moral or political preferences. Goodman takes realism as a 
convention or a certain kind of representational standard, and it is exactly for this reason, 
Mitchell claims, that he has a blind spot for the theorisation of such non-realistic tendencies 
as Cubism or Surrealism. No matter how these two seem to be familiar and conventional, we 
could never designate them as ‘realist’, since the values they inform them are inverse to 
those of realism.26
 
 
Based on his value-free approach, Goodman takes a radical stance in the relationship 
between original and fake in the case of the copying or forging an existing work of art, even if 
he differentiates between allographic and autographic types of works in the face of 
authenticity. In my view this is probably the reason why his theory served as an impulse but 
not a direct reference for those who aimed to renew the discipline of art history in 1970s, 
mostly on semiotic grounds. Art seems to be a complex system these days, not only an 
academic field but also an industry with substantial financial and even political interests 
involved which cannot allow such fictions as that of an author to be destroyed, even it if is the 
heritage of the 19th century. The author has not only a rhetorical function, but also a function 
in the market, and their disappearance would cause the collapse of the entire system of art. 
                                                 
24 Rosalind Krauss, ‘The Originality of the Avant-Garde: A Postmodernist Repetition’, p. 164, October 
18 (Fall 1981), pp. 47–66. Victor Burgin formulates the same idea in relation to picturesque 
representations, in Victor Burgin, ‘Photographic Practice and Art Theory’, p. 47, in Victor Burgin (ed.), 
Thinking Photography, Macmillan, London, 1982, pp. 37–83. 
25 W.J.T. Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 65. 
26 Ibid., pp. 72–73. 
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It is at this point and exactly in relation to Goodman that the question of how semiotics 
entered the field of art history and theory can be raised. First of all, semiotics is generally 
considered to be an anti-realist hypothesis of signs, and this provided theory with the right 
means to deconstruct traditional theories of representation based on mimesis. Secondly, by 
the 1970s such art historical categories as style, originality and authorship, and the 
endeavour to reconstruct the historical past, no longer seemed to be adequate and useful in 
the discussions not only of contemporary, but also historical art, as well. Semiotics proved to 
be a useful and productive theoretical tool in the deconstruction of these categories on the 
one hand, and also in providing a new theoretical methodology on the other. 
 
On top of this, semiotics is able to entice a paradigm shift in art history in which even the 
name explicitly and implicitly suggests a dominant, 19th-century style chronological approach, 
which functions as an all encompassing ‘grand narrative’, in which one has to fit extremely 
disparate objects and artworks with a large variety of geographical and temporal origins. 
Compared to this narrative, all other possible narratives either cannot appear or become only 
a ‘sub-narrative’ within this framework. As a result of the linguistic turn in the discipline of 
history, the construction of historical narrative and temporality have been critically reshaped, 
but this has not fully been embraced by art history yet. 
 
It is interesting to note in this context (and as a comparison) that around the mid 1970s the 
field of literary studies was able to leave behind the so far ruling principle of the historical-
chronological paradigm in its own designation, and switch from literary history to literary 
studies. This was mostly due to the introduction of semiotics and of an interdisciplinary 
approach based on semiotics (such as narratology, rhetorics, etc.) into that field.27
                                                 
27 See Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature, 
Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca and London, 1975. 
 As the 
Dutch literary theorist Ernst van Alphen noted, this sticking to the old notion of history also 
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results in a kind of an obligatory analysis when it comes to the discussion of the visual arts, 
namely that there is always an assumption that the work of an artist ‘responds to artists of 
the earlier generations.’28 Yet this is, of course, not to the only thing artists respond to. 
‘Perhaps an artist responds more to literature, to television or to film, or other aspects of 
culture […] But as soon as you do art history, you have to relate an artist to an other artist 
which is extremely modernist; the present situation of art history is extremely modernist.’29
 
 
The notion of the ‘linguistic turn’ was first used by Richard Rorty in the book he edited with 
the same title.30 In the editorial introduction he proposes that instead of asking the rhetorical 
question, ‘Should we philosophize?’ we should rather ask ourselves, ‘How should we 
philosophize?’.31
                                                 
28 See my ‘You Can Never Get Rid of Your History, An Interview with Ernst van Alphen’, Praesens 
2004/3, pp. 79–89. 
 Thus in terms of the methodological, i.e. semiotic, turn in art history in 
1970s, we should also make the same inquiry about the actual content of this turn, and 
investigate which semiotic theories started to be applied in the discipline of art history. At the 
time it mostly meant that art historians tried to read the writings of Saussure, and to a lesser 
extent those of Peirce, against visual production. It is important to note, however, that this 
reading very often meant a simplified usage of their basic principles on meaning making, 
which after a while ended up becoming commonplaces, similar to such phrases as ‘the work 
of art in the age of mechanical reproduction’ (Walter Benjamin) or ‘the society of the 
spectacle’ (Guy Debord). Besides Saussure and Peirce, the semiotic approach of the time 
was complemented by the theoretical work of Roland Barthes, also reduced almost to the 
level of slogans, just like the work of Saussure and Peirce. For many, this situation is still 
prevalent today—with psychoanalysis relying solely on Freud and Jung more than a hundred 
years after the foundation of the discipline. In the case of Peirce and his highly complex, 
triadic typology of signs, only one of the triads entered the field of art history and that is when 
29 ‘You Can Never Get Rid of Your History’, op. cit., pp. 82–83. 
30 Richard Rorty, The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method, Univ. of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1992 (originally published in 1967). 
31 Ibid., p. 13. 
 37 
he classifies signs according to their relation to reality, thus differentiating between symbol, 
icon, and index. This choice of the Peircian triad can be easily explained by art history’s long 
term pursuit of, or even obsession with, mimesis and realism, i.e. the ways in which 
representations are linked to reality they refer to. 
 
Part of the reason why for many art theorists and historians semiotics equals Saussure and 
Peirce is probably due to the way in which this understanding was ‘officially’ introduced and 
promoted as ‘the’ semiotic approach by the British art historian Margaret Iversen in a major 
book summarizing what has become known as ‘new art history’, even if this promotion could 
be equalled with relying exclusively on Freudian theory when it comes to psychoanalysis. 
The term ‘new art history’ was first used publicly in 1982 when the journal Block, ‘and its 
seedbed, Middlesex Polytechnic, held a conference’ with a question mark at the end of the 
phrase.32 ‘New art history’ is a term comprising different impacts and impetuses that reached 
the discipline in the post-1968 era, such as feminism, Marxism, structuralism and 
psychoanalysis, and it is unified only as opposed to the state of art history which preceded 
this turn.33
 
 It the context of my thesis, it is quite telling that among the 16 essays published in 
this volume (The New Art History), two deal explicitly with photography (as indicated in their 
respective titles): those of Victor Burgin and Ian Jeffrey. 
Iversen not only introduces Saussure and Peirce as ‘models for a semiotics of visual art’, but 
with her title, immediately antagonises them.34
                                                 
32 ‘Introduction’, in A. L. Rees and Frances Borzello (eds.), The New Art History, Camden Press, 
London, 1986, p. 3. Middlesex Polytechnic is one of the educational institutions that was turned into a 
university by John Major’s governmental policy in 1992 in Great Britain. 
 She underlines the fact that according to a 
semiotic approach to ‘meaning making’, signs are arbitrary and thus conventional, which 
obviously undermines the understanding of representation as ‘natural and immediate’ to its 
33 The term new art history does not include the challenges that reached the discipline in the 1990s, 
such as postcolonialism, and gender and queer studies. 
34 Margaret Iversen, ‘Saussure versus Peirce: Models for a Semiotics of Visual Art’, in Rees and 
Borzello, op. cit., pp. 82–94. 
 38 
object.35 This idea, however, cannot be exclusively attributed to semiotics, since Gombrich 
already problematized the question of resemblance between representation and its object in 
his famous essay on the hobbyhorse.36
 
 The hobbyhorse, being only a broomstick, is the 
ultimate proof for the denial of the necessity of resemblance, which probably dates back to 
the birth of playing. The broomstick does not represent the horse in any possible way, yet it 
is capable of functioning as a horse in children’s games. 
As a real art historian, Iversen had the need to make references to the age-old Platonic 
dichotomy between visual and verbal representation, which has appeared under many 
different guises, ranging from Plato to the Renaissance. Perhaps paradoxically, this 
understanding of the word and image relationship also falls into the category of the 
dichotomies that seek to demonstrate their similarities. As Iversen notes, ‘The analogy with 
language is another, perhaps better, way of revealing the gap between pictorial 
representation and its objects.’37
 
 In my view, Iversen’s comment, in its turn, reveals two 
things. One is the dichotomy she perceives between representation and its objects, and the 
other is that she indeed envisages an analogy between the ways in which visual and verbal 
representations produce meaning. I would like to suggest that such an analogy, no matter 
how appealing it may sound, is only a point of departure from the mimetic theory of 
representation, and does not equal with a semiotically-founded visual theory. The linguistic 
metaphor has proved to be extremely useful in this process, but it cannot by any means 
considered a theory. 
Iversen stresses an important contribution by Saussure to semiotics when he formulated 
some important statements about language as a system of difference. This she illustrates 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 85. 
36 E.H. Gombrich, ‘Meditations on a Hobby Horse or the Roots of Artistic Form’, in E.H. Gombrich, 
Meditations on a Hobby Horse and Other Essays on the Theory of Art, Phaidon, London, 1985, pp. 1–
11. In Hungarian, E.H. Gombrich, Elmélkedés egy vesszőparipáról, avagy a művészi forma gyökerei, 
in Horányi Özséb (ed.), A sokarcú kép, Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont, Budapest, 1982, pp. 
15–25. 
37 Iversen, op. cit., p. 86. 
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with an amusing example taken from Saussure himself, comparing the relationality of 
linguistic units to the ‘8:25 pm Geneva-to-Paris trains that leave at 24-hour intervals. “We feel 
it is the same train each day, yet everything – the locomotive, coaches, personnel – is 
probably different … what makes the express is its hour of departure, its route, and in 
general every circumstance that sets is apart from other trains.”’38
 
 According to Iversen’s 
conclusion, it would be erroneous to assume that these signs have fixed meanings and this 
is the ‘lesson’ Saussure’s anecdote may teach us. In my opinion, and within a functional 
understanding of meaning, these two trains are the same since they have the same function, 
which is to take the passengers from one city to another. Just as an iconographic motive 
bears the same significance in two different paintings because it stands for the same 
meaning, so two different editions of the same book generate the same meaning (or better to 
say, the differences of meaning do not stem from that of the editions, but from other factors 
and sources). Yet later developments in semiotics as well as Iversen’s contemporaries show 
that even in the field of visual arts, semiotics possess a lot more analytical and critical 
potential than an ‘improved version’ of iconography. 
The most problematic part of Iversen’s account, however, is when she discusses the Peircian 
typology and claims that, ‘Since for Peirce the sign relation is triadic, each of these signs 
bears a different relation to the interpretant as well as to the object. The […] conventional 
relationship between sign-vehicle and object characteristic of the symbol relies upon an 
interpretant who knows the rule.’ Just to avoid any possibility of mistaking the ‘interpretant’s’ 
identity, she continues, ‘To put it another way, there is an intrinsic dependence on the mind 
for there to be any relation at all.’39
 
 Yet to confuse the Peircian category of the interpretant 
with the figure and function of the interpreter is a serious misunderstanding of Peirce’s 
typology, which is difficult to explain within the context of Iversen’s essay. 
                                                 
38 Iversen here quotes Saussure, op. cit., p. 86. 
39 Iversen, op. cit., p. 89. 
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From a different perspective, there is another problematic element in Iversen’s application of 
semiotics, namely when she puts forward an understanding of Abstract Expressionism as 
‘the apotheosis of the indexical sign’, which points ‘back to the presence of the artist.’40
 
 It is, 
of course, obvious that the example of Jackson Pollock’s work – his paintings being the end 
products of a highly subjective application of paint on the surface of the canvas – lends itself 
readily to such an interpretation, yet to equate the painting to the indexical trace of the artists 
cannot be confined to the domain of Abstract Expressionism, but should logically be 
extended to all paintings. Iversen’s proposal therefore remains vague and only a general, 
almost metonymical comment on all allographic art. 
It is exactly in relation to this gestural use of the indexical sign that Iversen mentions an 
essay that has become one of the most famous and well-known examples for the application 
of the Peircian typology in the interpretation of contemporary art. This is Rosalind Krauss’ 
text on the index, which was published in two parts as early as issue 3 of October in 1977. 41 
Within the context of the relationship between semiotics and art history, it is quite astonishing 
that Iversen has only one short comment about this essay – that it has been ‘written about 
Duchamp’s preoccupation with the index.’42
 
 Not only is this an intellectually inaccurate note 
to a long and rich text, it is also a sloppy summary of Krauss’ most important claims. 
Duchamp himself could not have been preoccupied with the index as a semiotic category, 
but only with signs that we retrospectively consider indexical, such as his painting Tu m’, 
which can be taken as a reservoir of the indexical shadows of his readymades. 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 90. 
41 Rosalind Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America Part 1’, October 3 (Spring 1977), pp. 
68–81, ‘Part 2’, October 4 (Fall 1977), pp. 58–67. In Hungarian, Megjegyzések az indexről, Ex 
Symposion 2000/32–33. szám, pp. 4–16. 
The first part of the essay was reprinted in October: The First Decade, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
and London, England, 1987, pp. 2–15; and the entire version in Rosalind Krauss, The Originality of the 
Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 
1986, pp. 196–219. 
42 Iversen, op. cit., p. 90. 
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Although not a unique endeavour in this field even from the 1970s, Krauss’ essay 
nevertheless ended up being one of the most influential discussions of the ways in which the 
interpretation of the visual arts could leave the mimetic paradigm behind.43
 
 The reason why 
this paradigm shift proved to be necessary was exactly the growing need to theorise 
contemporary art and culture in the 1970s, and the rising discontentment with existing 
theories and interpretative frameworks which – with the emergence of postmodernism – 
seemed to be incapable of dealing with such dichotomies as the relationship between high 
and low, which has been one of the most recurring questions in art theory. Examples from 
the 20th century range from Clement Greenberg (‘Avant-garde and Kitsch’) and Walter 
Benjamin (‘The Work of Art’ essay) to the seminal project of The Museum of Modern Art in 
New York entitled High and Low. 
Coming back to Krauss, the introduction of the category of the index allows her to take a 
stance against such previously functioning ones as ‘medium’ and ‘style’. These are not only 
dubious terms for contemporary art, but also useless and irrelevant, too. Thus the notion of 
the index allowed the foundation of a critical discourse, which in its turn made the discussion 
of the ‘photographic’ possible. By the photographic Krauss does not mean a concrete 
medium, but a specific signifying and representational system that exercised a tremendous 
influence on both art theory and the shifting character of artistic practices of the 1970s. In this 
context it is interesting to note to what extent the contemporary art of the time generated, 
promoted and created that shift. To mention a few examples, we can think of the work of 
Cindy Sherman, Sherrie Levine, Victor Burgin, Allan Sekula, Michael Snow, Jeff Wall, and 
later, in the 1980s, Robert Mapplethorpe, Nan Goldin, and so on. I will come back to a full-
length discussion of the ‘Index’ essay and its ramifications in two separate chapters. 
 
There is an essay by Victor Burgin that is probably the fullest and richest survey of the 
conjunction of semiotics, photography and art theory, in which Burgin employs a variety of 
                                                 
43 Other, less often cited, examples are the essays of Victor Burgin and Allan Sekula. 
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interrelated methodologies, including linguistics and rhetoric, to provide an interpretative 
framework for the field.44
 
 Needless to say, he goes much further than repeating and recycling 
Saussure and Peirce, or even Barthes for that matter. It is impossible to address all the 
issues raised in this essay adequately here; I will come back to some of its theoretical claims 
in later chapters. For the sake of this summary of the relationship between art theory and 
semiotics, I will outline two points that have certain resonances, and probably intentional 
ramifications, with other theorists who have worked on ‘translating’ and adapting semiotic 
concepts and theories to the area of visuality. 
Among Burgin’s manifold aims, one is to argue against the romantic understanding of the 
transparency of the image for which he borrows Eco’s concept of realism, according to which 
realism is based on an analogy between the perception of the image and the perception of 
the image’s model.45
 
 Another important comment Burgin makes is related to the nature of the 
linguistic model in the analysis of pictorial representations, as well as indirectly to the 
question of the basic unit of this analysis. The picture of a man, as Burgin claims, is 
analogous with a complex utterance rather than a ‘simple’ word, thus this picture of a man is 
far from being equal to the word ‘man’ but more with the phrase, ‘middle-aged man in an 
overcoat and hat walking in a park’. This does not only have a resonance with Goodman’s 
views on representation, but also with Metz’s ideas concerning the potentials of a semiotic 
methodology in the area of non-linguistic sign production and reception. 
There is an interdisciplinary area within the field of poststructuralist literary theory, namely 
narratology. Its influence on art history is sporadic, although this field has produced some 
critical tools that can be ‘recycled’ in art history, particularly when it comes to the discussion 
of spectatorship. Narratology is important because it focuses on the communicative aspects 
                                                 
44 Victor Burgin, ‘Photographic Practice and Art Theory’, op. cit., pp. 39–83. In Hungarian Victor 
Burgin, ‘A fényképezés gyakorlata és a művészetelmélet’, in Bán András és Beke László (eds.), 
Fotóelméleti szöveggyűjtemény, Enciklopédia Kiadó, Budapest, 1997, pp. 203–232. 
45 Ibid., p. 65. 
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of they ways in which the beholders enter into an interaction with the works, emphasizing the 
temporality, the interactive and sometimes contingent character of this communicative act. 
An example of this is Roland Barthes’ S/Z and the ways in which the codes he develops in 
this book can result in new readings of even older works of art, and how these codes are 
capable of activating the reader in the act of reading. The theorist who proposed this 
framework is the Dutch literary theorist, Mieke Bal, who is one of the leading academics in 
the fields of semiotics, art history and poststructuralism and their conjunction. In collaboration 
with the British literary theorist Norman Bryson, Bal produced one of the few surveys on the 
topic of ‘semiotics and art history’.46 In another survey essay that Bal wrote without any 
collaborators, she uses the case study of Caravaggio’s Judith and Holofernes to demonstrate 
her method.47
 
 
The starting point of Bal’s analysis is the discrepancy she notices within the pictorial unity of 
the painting, i.e. between the representations of the two women (Judith and her maidservant) 
on the one hand, and between Judith and Holofernes on the other. According to Bal, blood 
can be considered as the most important signifier for the lack of unity within the painting for a 
set of intertwining reasons. First of all, blood as a sign simultaneously functions as an icon, 
an index and a symbol. It is an iconic sign in the sense that there is a clear parallel between 
the colour of the applied paint and this bodily fluid. It is an indexical sign that refers to the 
victim of the killing since it stems from him. It is a symbolic sign in the sense that it enhances 
the realist illusion between the paint and blood. In addition Bal proposes to read the painting 
literally as text, as writing that adds an element of temporality to her interpretation according 
to which the fact that blood precedes the sword – although in a normal sequence of events 
the sword comes first, followed by blood – disrupts the traditional reading of the painting not 
only in the relationship with the spectator, but also in the relationships within the picture. 
                                                 
46 Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson, ‘Semiotics and Art History’, Art Bulletin 73 (1991), pp. 174–208. 
47 Mieke Bal, ‘Seeing Signs: The Use of Semiotics for the Understanding of Visual Art’, in Mark 
Cheetham et al. (eds.), The Subjects of Art History: Historical Objects in Contemporary Perspectives, 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998, pp. 74–93. 
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Bal also demonstrates a possible way in which the codes that Roland Barthes ‘itemizied’ 
(Daniel Chandler) in S/Z can be useful for visual analysis.48 In the case of the Caravaggio 
painting, the status of the codes is defined by the disruption of the usual temporal sequence 
of blood-follows-sword. Thus – to quote Bal at length for the sake of precision – ‘the semic 
code carrying cultural stereotypes had to recede, and the symbolic code was ambiguously 
suspended: “Blood” remained between hostility and suffering on the one hand, and passion 
on the other. The prorairetic code, bringing in known models of action, was equally brought 
to a standstill. These suspensions explain the odd stillness of the figure of Judith. Instead, 
the code that comes to the fore is the hermeneutic code, which presupposes an enigma and 
induces us to seek out details that can contribute to its solution. As I said before, there is a 
hermeneutic code at work for the viewer precisely when an image’s subject is hard to make 
out.’49
 
 
Within this framework, Bal only indirectly refers to Barthes’ fifth code, the cultural, since 
according to her claim, the intertwining elements of this particular representation of Judith 
work exactly against this code, which refers to scientific and social knowledge, as Barthes 
formulates it.50
                                                 
48 Roland Barthes, S/Z, Osiris, Budapest, 1997. 
 The core of this knowledge is related to the conjunction of the traditional 
system of gender roles and the division of labour. The biblical story of Judith is in itself a 
story about the reversal of these roles, and labour divisions. In Caravaggio’s painting, 
though, the challenge to and the disruption of this tradition is represented not only in terms of 
the narrative, but also with the support of a set of visual sings, such as Judith’s position (she 
is not reclining but standing erect), her active participation in the story (as opposed to 
passivity), and the reversal of emotional expressions (she is emotionless and statuesque, 
while Holofernes’ facial expression is dramatic). Thus Judith, or as Bal says, ‘Judith’, in the 
49 Mieke Bal, ‘Seeing Signs’, op. cit., p. 83 (original italics). 
50 Roland Barthes, op. cit., p. 34. Bal calls this the ‘referential code’ (Bal, ‘Seeing Signs’, op. cit., p. 
78). 
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painting becomes a sign ‘that stands in for the absent referent’, since Caravaggio painted her 
as ‘already dead’, as a monument. 51
 
 
At this point I would like to mention another interdisciplinary field, film theory, which also 
investigates a special area of visuality in which semiotic theories have been employed. 
Compared to the historiography of art history, film theory’s disciplinary history had its 
advantages and disadvantages. The arrival of semiotics to this field had been preceded by a 
relatively undifferentiated, impressionistic, methodologically loose, ontologically founded 
phase, operating with relatively undefined categories.52 It would be the topic of another 
dissertation to asses the ramifications of film theory and semiotics, so for the sake of my 
present argument, I would like to mention only a few which have a direct relevance in relation 
to October’s intellectual trajectory. One area consists of those instances that are independent 
from each other, but have as their common denominator the use of semiotics as an 
interpretative tool, such as James H. Kavanaugh’s essay on Ridley Scott’s film Alien in which 
he applies Greimas’ semantic square in order to pinpoint the ideological motivations of the 
film.53 Another example for the breakthrough of postmodern theory and the changing 
relationship between high and low is the emblematic theoretical reception of another of 
Ridley Scott’s films, Blade Runner. One essay among the many was published in October, 
where Giuliana Bruno analyses the capacities of photography in identity formation.54
 
 
In her book The Subjects of Semiotics, Kaja Silverman extensively discusses sature, an 
element of filmic rhetorics and one of ‘the textual strategies whereby subjectivity is constantly 
reactivated’, or rather, it ‘is the name given to the procedures by means of which cinematic 
                                                 
51 Mieke Bal, ‘Seeing Signs’, op. cit., p. 84. 
52 Cassetti, Filmelméletek, p. 126. 
53 James H. Kavanaugh, ‘“Son of a Bitch”: Feminism, Humanism, and Science in Alien’, October 13 
(Summer 1980), pp. 91–100. 
54 Giuliana Bruno, ‘Ramble City: Postmodernism and Blade Runner’, October 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 
61–74. 
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texts confer subjectivity upon their viewers.’55 In the case of films, the viewer’s subjectivity is 
constructed by means of interlocking shots, in the form a syntactic relationship. The camera 
is able to survey and show a field that a viewer ‘in real life’, ‘on the spot’ would not grasp; 
however, under ‘normal’ circumstances this is not done in conformity with the so-called 180 
degree rule. This rule ‘is predicated in the assumption that a complete camera revolution 
would be “unrealistic”, defining a space larger than the “naked eye” would normally cover. 
Thus it derives from the imperative that the camera deny its own existence as much as 
possible, fostering the illusion that what is shown has an autonomous existence, independent 
of any technological interference, or any coercive gaze.’56
 
 
Sature, in fact, is most interesting when, instead of concealing the apparatus, we observe it 
being revealed and starting to function as a critical tool. This happens, for example, when the 
film makes constant references to the speaking subject, or when the viewer is constrained to 
take up an unpleasant position not only towards the cinematic apparatus, but also towards 
the spectacle it has created. By this, the viewer is forced, abruptly and constantly, to shift 
his/her identifications,57 thus the formation of a coherent and, in a certain sense, universal 
subject position becomes impossible.58
 
 
The reason why sature can be a useful critical tool is because of its capacities to deconstruct 
a kind of realism, which looks for an accumulation of ‘perceptual equivalences’ (Arthur 
Danto) within pictorial representations as a tautological reinforcement and justification of its 
own theoretical premises. Sature in this sense is closely related to – if not the same as – 
what Mieke Bal describes in her essay in which she mentions Vermeer’s painting Woman 
                                                 
55 Kaja Silverman, The Subjects of Semiotics, Oxford Univ. Press, New York and Oxford, 1983, p. 194. 
56 Ibid., pp. 201–202. 
57 Ibid., p. 206. 
58 See my related catalogue text, Timár Katalin, ‘Nagyítás’, in Szépfalvi Ágnes, Ludwig Múzeum 
Budapest – Kortárs Művészeti Múzeum, Budapest, 2003, pp. 38–39. 
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Holding a Balance (National Gallery of Art, Washington DC).59 Bal draws the viewer’s 
attention to a small detail of the painting, a nail, a hole and the shadow of the nail on the wall 
next to the picture of the Last Judgement. Compared to the rest of Vermeer’s painting, these 
minor elements seemingly do not bear any meaning that would enhance the possibilities of 
focusing on the painting’s main topic or support this interpretation, except for its function as a 
‘reality effect’, as Bal designates Barthes’ term. In this sense it does not matter whether the 
picture was painted in the painter’s studio where he decided to shift the position of the Last 
Judgement – he could have chosen not to include the element that indicated the shift. It is in 
this way that the hole, the nail and its shadow function as sature, which invites the viewer to 
reconsider the question of realism.60
 
 
When speaking about the conjunction of semiotics, film theory and October, there has been 
only one essay in the journal from a theorist working in this area – Christian Metz’s 
‘Photography and Fetish’ – yet even this text is not an example for his contribution to film 
theory.61 Metz’s theory, though, raises some fundamental questions in relation to the limits 
and the potentials of the linguistic metaphor, and its difference from a linguistic analogy, 
since none of these equals semiotic theory. Metz intends to break with an ontological 
understanding of film in favour of method-oriented theories.62
                                                 
59 Mieke Bal, ‘Introduction. Balancing Vision and Narrative’, in Reading Rembrandt: Beyond the Word-
Image Opposition, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 1–24. In Hungarian, Látvány és 
narratíva egyensúlya, in Thomka Beáta (ed.), Narratívák 1.: Képleírás, képi elbeszélés, Kijárat Kiadó, 
Budapest, 1998, pp. 155–182. 
 This means that instead of 
searching for the essential qualities of film as a medium, critical analysis focuses on features 
that are defined by the given analytical approach. Thus for Metz, film is rather ‘language’ and 
not ‘langue’, and for this reason cannot be characterised by ‘double articulation’, and cannot 
be dissected to smaller, meaningful units (monemes) and even smaller, meaningless units 
60 At the same time, Bal offers another reading for these reality effects, which corresponds to the 
overall topic of the painting – judgment. Yet she also underlines the potential of these effects to 
mobilise viewers in the act of reading, while establishing their relationship with the idea of ‘judgement’. 
61 Christian Metz, ‘Photography and Fetish’, October 34 (Fall 1985), pp. 81–90. 
For a critique of Umberto Eco’s theory of signs, see Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, 
Semiotics, Cinema, Macmillan, London, 1984. 
62 Francesco Casetti, Filmelméletek 1945–1990, Osiris, Budapest, 1998, pp. 89–90. 
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(phonemes).63 In addition, film does not possess a set of signs, which, in their turn, could 
comprise the units of a dictionary in which these units could be paradigmatically 
interchangeable or could be paired in binary oppositions. Finally, instead of meaning, film is 
about showing, i.e. film functions on the level of expression and not on that of 
communication. For Metz, although film is not as a strong a sign system as language, 
semiotics can nevertheless study it as a flexible system with conformingly flexible methods.64
 
 
According to Metz, the experience of the spectator is not analogous with dream but with 
reverie.65
 
 While watching the film, the spectator is looking for the ‘good object’ or signifier 
against which he/she can measure him/herself. As a consequence, there are three 
overlapping zones between film and the psyche: specular identification, voyeurism and 
fetishism (in the absence of an object, e.g. a heroic act, the film itself becomes a fetish). 
Identification and voyeurism are the key concepts of Laura Mulvey’s famous essay from 
1975, which is one of the first in the area of a feminist approach to Hollywood cinema.66
                                                 
63 See Umberto Eco’s opposing views on this matter, Casetti, op. cit., p. 129. For more on the question 
of langue/language see Jonathan Culler’s analysis on Sade, Fourier, Loyola in Jonathan Culler, 
Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature, Cornell Univ. Press, 
Ithaca, 1975, pp. 100–02. 
 
Mulvey employs Freudian concepts in a ‘political’ way in order to demonstrate how the 
unconscious of patriarchal society influences cinematic structures. Taking Freud’s ideas as 
starting points, Mulvey claims that scopophilia is the result of the male spectator’s narcissistic 
identification with the male protagonist of the film on the one hand, and the voyeuristic 
pleasure this spectator enjoys while sitting in the dark space of the cinema and watching the 
unfolding narrative from an outsider’s position. The feminist aspect of Mulvey’s critique 
touches upon the position of the female spectator for whom identification is possible only with 
64 Casetti, Filmelméletek, op. cit., pp. 127–128. 
65 Ibid., p. 163. 
66 Laura Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, in Visual and Other Pleasures, Indiana Univ. 
Press, Bloomington, 1989, pp. 14–26; originally published in Screen 16/3, 1975, pp. 6-18. In 
Hungarian: Laura Mulvey, ‘A vizuális élvezet és az elbeszélő film’, Metropolis 2000/4, pp. 12–23. 
 49 
the female character who in her turn is only an image, and whose existence is secured via 
the male protagonist and thus the male spectator. 
 
In the end, both as a summary and as a theoretical foundation for what follows, I would like 
to mention the most comprehensive ‘survey’ of the topic of semiotics and art history that has 
been written so far, Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson’s extensive essay from 1991.67 In this 
methodological and historiographic introduction it is not possible to discuss this text and its 
repercussions in detail but it is a point of departure and a reference, as well as a subtext for 
the following chapter. As a matter of disciplinary borders and exchange, it is probably not a 
coincidence that both Bal and Bryson have arrived at art history by way of literary theory. 
They both produced foundational texts on the word/image opposition – Bryson wrote an 
historical analysis of this relationship at the time of the ancien régime,68 and Bal’s first major 
book in the field of the visual arts deals with one of the most emblematic figures of art history, 
Rembrandt, from the same perspective.69
 
 
‘The basic tenet of semiotics, the theory of sign and sign-use, is antirealist,’70
                                                 
67 Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson, ‘Semiotics and Art History’, Art Bulletin 73, no. 2, 1991, pp. 174–
208. Bal and Bryson explicitly oppose the term ‘survey’ for their essay, although its scope and depth 
would justify this categorisation (p. 175). 
 reads the first 
sentence of the essay, putting an overall emphasis on the ways in which the authors 
envisage the methodological instrumentality of semiotics. As I have already noted at various 
points in this chapter, this methodological foundation of anti-realism was essential is 
establishing a new theoretical paradigm for art history which allows a different, and probably 
more pertinent, range of inquiries to emerge, such as ‘the polisemy of meaning; the 
problematics of authorship, context and reception; the implications of the study of narrative 
for the study of images; the issue of sexual difference in relation to verbal and visual signs; 
68 Norman Bryson, Word and Image: French Painting of the Ancien Régime, Cambridge Univ. Press, 
Cambridge, 1981. 
69 Mieke Bal, Reading Rembrandt: Beyond the Word-Image Opposition, Cambridge Univ. Press, 
Cambridge, 1991. 
70 Bal and Bryson, op. cit., p. 174. 
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and the claims to truth of interpretation.’71
 
 To these I would like to add some other important 
areas of discussion, such as intentionality (as a specific area of authorship in terms of a 
break with previous methodological paradigms where the search for the authorial intention 
was central); the issue of racial difference as it appears in postcolonial studies; the anti-
hierarchical claims of high and low; and the various deconstructivist strategies of ideological 
formation. In my view these are equally important areas of investigation and are probably 
even further away from traditional, ‘positivist’ art history on the theoretical spectrum than 
those mentioned by Bal and Bryson. 
There are eight topics Bal and Bryson discuss in detail, which reveal a lot from their titles: 
Context, Senders, Receivers, Peirce, Saussure, Psychoanalysis as a Semiotic Theory, 
Narratology, History and the Status of Meaning. It is important to note that most of these 
areas of research focus on the artwork’s communicative aspect, and envisage it as an object 
with a certain level of agency as opposed to some dead fossil. These topics are, indeed, 
capable of offering a new, contemporary perspective on objects of art history that possess 
the paradoxical features of being our contemporaries while having been made in the past. 
Interpretation has to come to terms with this contradiction, but does not conceal it. Rather the 
opposite – every interpretation has to bring this temporal discrepancy to the fore and deal 
with it, not in a positivist way, but by striving to explain and analyse the contemporary interest 
in these historical objects – an ambitious project yet to be realised.72
 
 
                                                 
71 Ibid. 
72 Besides the activity of Bal, an example of this is Michael Ann Holly’s essay on the Mérode 
altarpiece, which she analyses from her position as a feminist. Michael Ann Holly, ‘Witnessing an 
Annunciation’, in Past Looking: Historical Imagination and the Rhetoric of the Image, Cornell Univ. 
Press, 1996, pp. 149–169. 
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Chapter 3.1 
 
NOTES ON THE INDEX PART 1 
 
 
Within the trajectory of October, it was as early as in issue 3 that the linguistic metaphor and 
a semiotic approach to visual production appeared with the publication of Rosalind Krauss’ 
highly influential and seminal essay on the index.1 It is perhaps no coincidence that this 
happened in relation to the theoretical discussions of photography, at least for two obvious 
reasons. The first one is connected to the aim of establishing photography as an artistic 
medium in the 1970s, which Krauss also mentions as an endeavour in relation to all those 
specific art forms that emerged in the 1970s and which rely heavily on photographic 
documentation (earthworks, body art, story art, etc.).2
                                                 
1 Rosalind Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America Part 1’, October 3 (Spring 1977), pp. 
68–81. The second part of the essay was published in the next issue: Rosalind Krauss, ‘Notes on the 
Index: Seventies Art in America Part 2’, October 4 (Fall 1977), pp. 58–67. In Hungarian: Rosalind 
Krauss, ‘Megjegyzések az indexről’, Ex Symposion 2000/32–33, pp. 4–16. 
 The second one is informed – 
precisely in conjunction with photography – by the need for the foundation of a ‘new’ theory 
of representation which – at least in art history – would be able to leave the by then 
unproductive mimetic paradigm behind. In this respect photography seems to have a 
privileged capacity to evoke semiotically informed interpretations; at the same time, it is also 
a field of visual production that requires an interdisciplinary approach per se. Photography’s 
direct link to – a certain type and understanding of – semiotics was also formulated by the 
photography critic and art historian Abigail Solomon-Godeau, who takes the Pierceian sign 
system metaphorically in relation to photography in the introduction to her book when she 
makes a reference to the methodological diversity of the theoretical approaches to this area: 
‘[…] the sine qua non of photography’s repositioning lay in its division, from the very outset, 
along one axis—supposed to consist of subjectivity, art, and beauty (the axis of the icon)—
and another axis—composed of science, truth, objectivity, and technology (the axis of the 
2 Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index Part 1’, op. cit., p. 78. 
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index).’3 In the accompanying footnote to this ‘taxonomy’ she refers to Allan Sekula (‘The 
Body and the Archive’ essay in particular), and John Tagg’s book The Burden of 
Representation.4 Yet, as Victor Burgin perceives, most writing on photography is informed by 
a certain ‘logocentric longing’5
 
 which is in fact synonymous with an attachment to 
metaphysical interpretations, including the belief in the transparency of representations. 
Coming back to October and the historical circumstances of the theoretical scene in the late 
1970s, the journal proved to be one of the most influential platforms for a certain type of 
paradigm shift in the contemporary artistic discourse, including the one on photography. In 
this chapter I aim to demonstrate the self-contradictory, often controversial and problematic, 
ways in which October envisaged working with semiotics as part of a larger project of 
interdisciplinarity. It seems that semiotics entered the arena of theoretical tools in October as 
part of a more general claim for interdiscplinarity that would serve the necessary and much 
awaited renewal of art history (and criticism) in the context of the early 1970s.6 
Interdisciplinarity seemed to be one of the strategic buzzwords of the past decades in the 
endeavour to dismantle the old and rigid academic disciplinary borders; as Robert Scholes 
formulated it, ‘the jurisdictional boundaries between those political fictions we call 
“departments”.’7 Disciplines such as visual or cultural studies also emerged as an answer to 
the crisis in respective areas of the humanities.8
                                                 
3 Abigail Solomon-Godeau, Photography at the Dock: Essays on Photographic History, Institutions, 
and Practices, Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1991, p. xxii (original italics). 
 The general political and economic crisis of 
the 1970s was ‘complemented’ by an academic disciplinary crisis that was induced, 
4 The reason why I do not discuss these relations in detail here is because Chapter 4 focuses on an 
analysis of Sekula’s essay, and in Chapter 5 I have included ample references to Tagg’s ideas. 
5 I borrow this term from Victor Burgin, ‘Photographic Practice’, p. 55, in Victor Burgin (ed.), Thinking 
Photography, Macmillan, London, 1982, pp. 39–83. 
6 This ‘renewal’ is related to a more scholarly and academic foundation of the contemporary field of the 
discipline, which, at the time in the United States, was also a generational question. Clement 
Greenberg did not have an academic training in art history, but Michael Fried and Rosalind Krauss did. 
7 Robert Scholes, ’The Humanities, Criticism, and Semiotics’, p. 1, in Semiotics and Interpretation, 
Yale Univ. Press, New Haven and London, 1982, pp. 1-16. 
8 See e.g. Stuart Hall, ‘The Emergence of Cultural Studies and the Crisis of the Humanities’, October 
53 (Summer 1990), pp. 11–24. 
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particularly in the area of contemporary art, by the changing modes and premises of artistic 
production of the time. 
 
This general claim was also formulated by the editorial introduction to the first issue of 
October in 1976: ‘October’s structure and policy are predicated upon a dominant concern: 
the renewal and strengthening of critical discourse through intensive review of the 
methodological options now available. October’s strong theoretical emphasis will be 
mediated by its consideration of present artistic practice. It is our conviction that this is 
possible only within a sustained awareness of the economic and social bases of that 
practice, of the material conditions of its origins and processes, and of their intensely 
problematic nature at this particular time.’9
 
 
Interestingly and, in my view, quite tellingly, the term ‘interdisciplinarity’ appears as early as 
in the above-mentioned editorial introduction: ‘October is planned as a quarterly that will be 
more than merely interdisciplinary: one that articulates with maximum directness the 
structural and social interrelationships of artistic practice in this country. Its major points of 
focus will be the visual arts, cinema, performance, music; it will consider literature in 
significant relation to these. October will publish critical and theoretical texts, by scholars and 
critics, texts by artists of the past whose work has influenced contemporary practice […] Its 
emphasis on contemporaneity is designed to initiate a series of reexaminations of historical 
developments.’10
 
 For the time being, it is sufficient to note that within this introduction, the 
editors envisage putting an emphasis on the territorial expansion of their field rather than a 
methodological shift. 
This formulation of goals already raises a number of questions, one of which, for instance, is 
related to October’s vision of history and historicity and is discussed by Sande Cohen in the 
                                                 
9 ‘About October’, p. 4, October 1(Spring 1976), pp. 3–5. 
10 Ibid., p. 4. ‘[…] the central aim of October’s texts: the location of those coordinates whose axes chart 
contemporary artistic practice and significant critical discourse’ (p. 5). 
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face of French theory in America.11 Another obvious point of criticism could be directed to the 
understanding October employs in this introduction vis-à-vis the traditional division between 
the media. Yet, even if these points have further implications for the trajectory of October’s 
relation to inderdisciplinarity, in-depth discussion of them would divert my analysis from the 
main topic (i.e. October and semiotics). For this reason, I would like to focus on showing how 
October’s initial commitment to interdisciplinarity, and the constant references their texts bear 
to semiotics prove to be retrospectively rather problematic. In my view, there are certain 
detectable ‘patterns of grids’ in October’s relation to semiotic theory and I intend to use 
‘patterns of grids’ both as a metaphor and as a subtext to refer to the ways in which semiotic 
theories have been applied by October with a distinctive pattern and a concrete – yet rather 
limited – shape. At the same time, the grid is, of course, concretely introduced by Rosalind 
Krauss as a motive with an historical and – paradoxically – an ahistorical genealogy in two of 
her essays, ‘Grids’ and ‘The Originality of the Avant-Garde’.12
 
 Within the conjunction of 
photography and semiotics, it was as early as issue number 5 that the editors dedicated a 
special issue to photography, and as early as issue numbers 3 and 4 that Krauss published 
her essay on the index. In my view, these texts defined the ways in which October was about 
to tackle theoretical problems – not just those of photography and semiotics, but also a whole 
set of interrelated questions such as representation, originality, modes of production, the 
relation of high and low, etc. 
In ‘Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America’, Krauss on the one hand introduces a 
specific category of the Peircian sign system (the index) as a tool to discuss certain of Marcel 
Duchamp’s works and some contemporary artistic practices in the form of a particular 
exhibition. On the other hand, she applies the linguistic category of the shifter to stress the 
relational character of a given body of artworks. Among these she confers special attention 
                                                 
11 Sande Cohen, ‘Critical Inquiry, October, and Historicizing French Theory’, pp. 191–215, in Sande 
Cohen and Sylvère Lotringer (eds.), French Theory in America, Routledge, New York and London, 
2001. See more about Cohen’s views on October and historicity in Chapter 1. 
12 Rosalind Krauss, ‘Grids’, October 9 (Summer 1979), pp. 50–64. ‘The Originality of the Avant-Garde: 
A Postmodernist Repetition’, October 18 (Fall 1981), pp. 47–66. 
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on Vito Acconci’s video Airtime (1973), in which the artist mixes the usage of the personal 
pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’, depending on whether he is talking to the ‘spectator’ or to his reflected 
image in a mirror. According to Krauss, the shifter (a type of sign that directly refers to a 
temporal, a spatial or personal aspect of a situation in which an utterance is made, such as 
now/then, here/there, I/you13) is an ‘empty’ sign that gets ‘filled with signification’ by actual 
situations – an idea that she borrows from such semioticians as Jakobson and Benveniste.14 
Krauss also claims that ‘the confusion of the shifter’ we encounter in Duchamp’s work is a 
‘kind of breakdown’ that is related to the autobiographic in his artistic activity, and she 
explains – almost in a classical, biographical manner – what exactly the excessive usage of 
shifters results in in Duchamp’s personality (a split in his identity). In a similar manner, the 
shifter proves to be instrumental for Krauss in providing a psychological analysis of Airtime, 
connecting this linguistic term to Lacan’s mirror stage and to a general breakdown of 
language acquisition and usage, such as aphasia.15
 
 Yet none of these interpretations are 
able to give any account of the viewer’s viewing (or rather, ‘reading’) process and his/her 
ways of engaging with the given artwork. 
It seems to me, however, that the shifter is not necessarily emptier as a sign than any other 
sign, but its mutable referent puts the relational aspect of signs into the foreground. Thus it is 
a term that can be productive in analysing the ways in which a work establishes a network of 
                                                 
13 Deixis (or deictics) is another term that refers to the same linguistic phenomenon as the shifter. 
Mieke Bal notes that even adverbs of time, such as ‘tomorrow’, can fall into the category of deixis e.g. 
in reported speech (or indirect discourse). See Mieke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of 
Narrative, Univ. of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo and London, 1997, pp. 48–49. 
14 Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index Part 1’, op. cit., p. 69. It is interesting to note that, when discussing 
Peirce’s concept of the index, Winfried Nöth states that within this class, ‘Peirce included […] a 
weathercock, a yardstick, a photograph, a rap on the door, a pointing finger, an appellative cry, and 
the field of linguistic deixis, including proper names and possessive, relative, personal, and selective 
pronouns.’ (See Winfried Nöth, Handbook of Semiotics, Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, 1990, pp. 113–114, my italics.) Krauss mentions Duchamp’s painting Tu m’ (1918) which 
she calls a ‘panorama of the index’ (Krauss, p. 70), since it contains a number of indexical signs, such 
as identifiable cast shadows of Duchamp’s readymades, and an index finger, painted in the realistic 
manner of now old-fashioned urban public signs. 
15 A similar approach forms the basis of Fredric Jameson’s essay in which he connects schizophrenia 
with disrupted language acquisition and production on Lacanian grounds. See Fredric Jameson, 
‘Postmodernism and Consumer Society’, in Hal Foster (ed.), The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on 
Postmodern Culture, Bay Press, Seattle, 1983, pp. 111–125. 
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relationships with its viewers, rather than employing it in a quasi-psychoanalytic process of 
focusing on the artist’s narcissistic persona. This also means that Krauss fails to give an 
account of the shifter’s capacity to create a dynamics of reading with the mobilisation of the 
reader’s involvement in the reception of the work. It is because the reader becomes an 
addressee and is forced by the work of art – and by its various linguistic and extra-linguistic 
devices – not only to establish a communicative relationship with it, but also to construct its 
internal framework for him/herself, what Jonathan Culler calls ‘the fictional situation of [the] 
utterance’.16
 
 
Culler employs a spatial approach to deixis by which he primarily understands those forms of 
distance that come into being between the author and the reader. The example he uses 
complements this spatial distance with a temporal one – particularly in the case of works of 
art – by comparing the effects of deictic signs in the case of an imaginary poet’s letter and his 
poem. The letter, as Culler claims, is already a direct form of communication where a 
concrete, identifiable reader or addressee is ‘inscribed’, whether we, subsequent readers, 
are aware of the identity of this addressee and the specific context in which the letter was 
produced, or not. In the case of the poem, there is, obviously, a sort of an ‘implied reader’ but 
this reader is not only unidentifiable as a concrete persona, but s/he may be – both in a 
temporal and in a spatial sense – far away from the poet and the original circumstances in 
which the poem was conceived. As Culler states, ‘The poem is not related to time in the 
same way, nor has it the same interpersonal status.’17
                                                 
16 Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature, Cornell 
Univ. Press, Ithaca. New York, 1975, p. 166. 
 Yet it is important to note, especially in 
relation to Krauss’ psychoanalytical interpretation, that although readers obviously relate to 
actual or ‘empirical’ situations in order to distract meaning from a work of art, this is far from 
taking them as instances of ‘truth’; readers ‘are aware that such stories are fictional 
17 Ibid., p. 165. 
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constructs which we employ as interpretive devices.’18
 
 In my view, this is precisely where 
Krauss’ approach falls short with her ‘psychoanalytically’ inclined interpretative framework. 
As an anchor to the category of the index, Krauss introduces the snapshot in relation to 
Duchamp’s Large Glass, based on an understanding of Duchamp’s notes as ‘a form of a 
huge, extended caption’ and interpreting the work itself as – at least a metaphor for – a 
photographic image.19 (The Large Glass for her is a self-portrait; thus, paradoxically, it does 
not only require biographical background information in order to be interpreted as a self-
portrait, but the work in itself is a source of biographical information.) Krauss takes on 
Benjamin’s idea, as part of a larger project of differentiating between captions of paintings 
and of photographs, that it is only now – i.e. in the 20th century – that ‘captions have become 
obligatory’. To which Krauss adds, ‘The photograph heralds a disruption in the autonomy of 
the sign. A meaninglessness surrounds it which can only be filled in by the addition of a 
text.’20 In the second part of her essay she comes back to this idea again, claiming that it is 
with the excessive appearance of photographs in contemporary art that the use of captioning 
has become so widespread as well. At the end of the text, she extends this remark to 
paintings, explaining the ‘necessity to add a surfeit of written information to the depleted 
power of the painted sign.’21 Since I come back to the relationship of word and image in the 
final chapter, it is sufficient to say here that on the one hand a certain set of textual 
information – whether it takes the form of a caption or it appears outside of the closest 
physical premises of the work – always accompanies the work of art in more or less explicit 
ways, and on the other, her comparison between painting and photography does not take the 
differences between the two media as different ‘means of communication’.22
 
 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 165. 
19 Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index Part 1’, op. cit., p. 77. 
20 Ibid., p. 77. 
21 Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index Part 2’, op. cit., p. 67. 
22 This difference is noted by Victor Burgin by relying to a series of articles by Jean-Louis Swiners from 
1965, Burgin, ‘Photographic Practice’, op. cit., p. 70. 
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In the face of what has been done in the ‘general’ theory of representation, the following 
sounds equally problematic. In relation to the index, Krauss introduces a phrase from 
Barthes, ‘message sans code’, to support the idea of the photograph as an uncoded 
representational mode. Krauss quotes Barthes himself: ‘What this [photographic] message 
specifies […] is, in effect, that the relation of signified and signifier is quasi-tautological. 
Undoubtedly, the photograph implies a certain displacement of the scene (cropping, 
reduction, flattening), but this passage is not transformation (as encoding must be). Here 
there is a loss of equivalency (proper to true sign systems) […] the sign of this message is no 
longer drawn from an institutional reserve; it is not coded. And one is dealing here with the 
paradox of a message without a code.’23 If a ‘message’ (or a pictorial representation) is 
uncoded, then it is unmediated, therefore direct. Is it possible to describe a representation of 
any kind in such terms, or to rely uncritically on such an understanding of coding? Victor 
Burgin steps back even further and argues for the impossibility of an ideology-free perception 
when he states, ‘In the very moment of their being perceived, objects are placed within an 
intelligible system of relationships (no reality can be innocent before the camera). They take 
their position, that is to say, within an ideology.’24 It is for this reason that Burgin argues for 
the consideration and inclusion of this ‘pre-photographic’ stage into photographic practice. In 
addition, Burgin, drawing on Umberto Eco’s argument, also stresses the fundamental 
difference between ‘our comprehension of an object and our comprehension of its image,’25
 
 
and disagrees with the premises of Barthes’ formula. 
Barthes’ famous phrase has been defended by many theorists, but its contextual 
embeddedness is discussed in a semiotic framework. When Barthes established the model 
of the denotative and connotative levels of meaning, together with the interplay between the 
two, he extended the idea of denotative meaning to photographs with the exception of press 
pictures, to which he also attributed a level of connotative meaning. As Winfried Nöth sums it 
                                                 
23 Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index Part 2’, op. cit., p. 59. 
24 Burgin, ‘Photographic Practice’, op. cit., pp. 45–46 (original italics). 
25 Ibid., pp. 61–62. 
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up, ‘Since connotations are always derived from a code, Barthes concluded that in (press) 
photography there is a “co-existence” of two messages, the one without a code (the 
photographic analogue), the other with a code. To Barthes, the generation of a “connoted 
message on the basis of a message without a code” constituted the specific photographic 
paradox.’26
 
 
In defending Barthes’ statement, Daniel Chandler starts from the assumption that the famous 
phrase is largely misunderstood, although it is no coincidence that he mentions it in relation 
to Goodman’s concept of realism. For Goodman, realism is just another system of 
representation with its own standards and codes,27 yet Chandler does not here include the 
Peirceian icon and index, partly because Peirce himself attributed a special status of 
photography as both an indexical and an iconic sign, and partly because Barthes does so 
too. Here Chandler refers to the distinction Barthes establishes between ‘transformation’ and 
‘recording’, which describes the two ways in which the signifier may refer to the signified, with 
photography belonging to the latter by merely ‘capturing mechanically’ – as opposed to 
coding – the visual information in front of the camera. In addition, Chandler points to another 
important feature of Barthes’ theory, namely his observation of the fact that, unlike language, 
a photographic sign cannot be broken down into ‘elementary “signifying units”.’28
                                                 
26 Nöth, Handbook of Semiotics, op. cit., p. 462, original italics. Nöth refers here to Barthes’ ‘The 
Photographic Message’, in Roland Barthes, Image – Music – Text (1961), Fontana, Collins, 1977, pp. 
15–31. 
 In this 
sense, Barthes’ theoretical standpoint is parallel to Christian Metz’s investigations on 
cinematic communication. To answer his own, Saussurean, question as to whether film is a 
langue (language) or parole (speech), Metz claims that cinema resembles speech rather 
than language for two reasons. First is that it cannot be characterised by one of the most 
important features of language, i.e. double articulation, and second is that film is not a 
27 Chandler here mentions Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1976, p. 37, in 
Daniel Chandler, Semiotics: The Basics, Routledge, London, 2002, p. 163. 
28 Chandler, Semiotics, op. cit., p. 164. I briefly discuss the question of the basic meaning-making unit 
of photography in relation to Sekula’s ‘The Body and the Archive’ essay in Chapter 4. 
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system of signs that are meant to intercommunicate.29 This not only indicates the limitation of 
a direct understanding of the linguistic metaphor in the visual arts and of the mechanical 
application of semiotic theory in the field of visuality, but the limitation of relying on ‘older 
sources, notably Roland Barthes’30
 
 when it comes to the discussion of both semiotics and 
contemporary visual production. 
Complementary to Barthes’ phrase ‘message sans code’, André Bazin’s ideas on the 
‘ontology of the photographic image’ function as a point of reference for Krauss in her 
explanation of the relationship between the painted and the photographic image. Here 
Krauss quotes Bazin, ‘The photographic image is the object itself […] No matter how fuzzy, 
distorted, or discolored, no matter how lacking in documentary value the image may be, it 
shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the 
reproduction; it is the model.’31 Culler’s spatial views on deixis can be instrumental here 
again to critically assess the way in which neither Bazin nor Krauss observes a difference 
between signifier and signified in the case of photographic images. This is because distance 
is an obvious mode for a description that approximates a semiotic understanding of sign 
systems, since the distance between the signifier and the signified is a recurring question of 
semiotic investigations.32
                                                 
29 A useful summary of Metz’s essay (‘Le cinema: langue ou langage?’, 1964) can be found in 
Francesco Casetti, Filmelméletek 1945–1990, Osiris, Budapest, 1998, pp. 126–128. See also Victor 
Burgin, ‘Photographic Practice’, op. cit., pp. 62–63, and pp. 67–68. 
 In Saussure’s model, the signifier and the signified are at best on 
the two opposing sides of a sheet, inseparable from each other, but never on the same side. 
Even if we insist on a dyadic model of the sign and the dichotomy entailed between reality 
and its representation, any kind of representation creates a distance per se between itself 
30 Sarah James, ‘What Can We Do with Photography?’, p. 2, Art Monthly, December–January (2007–
2008), pp. 1–4. 
31 Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index Part 1’, op. cit., p. 75. She quotes from André Bazin, What Is Cinema?, 
Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 1967, p. 14, original italics. 
32 Kaja Silverman also employs a spatial description (contiguity) when she speaks of certain 
categories of the ‘sign’ (or figures of speech), such as metonymy. Kaja Silverman, The Subject of 
Semiotics, Oxford Univ. Press, New York and Oxford, 1983, pp. 87–125. Victor Burgin also mentions 
distance that appears as a form of absence in conjunction with the relationship between the signifier 
and the signified (Burgin, ‘Photographic Practice’, op. cit., p. 53). 
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and the represented reality it attempts to evoke, and it does so by employing a degree and a 
mode of coding. 
 
When Krauss evokes Barthes’ phrase about the message without a code, she also implies 
the dichotomy between reality and its representation even if in the case of the indexical sign 
(or photography) these two overlap. Yet later, when she discusses the work of Dennis 
Oppenheim, David Askevold and Bill Beckley on the basis of their exploitation of the index, 
she claims that, ‘the meaning of these three works involves the filling of the “empty” indexical 
sign with a particular presence. The implication is that there is no convention for meaning 
independent of or apart from that presence.’33 The way in which she takes presence as a 
constitutive part of the indexical sign is in contradiction to her earlier definition of the same 
type of sign, when she claims, ‘As distinct from symbols, indexes establish their meaning 
along the axis of a physical relationship to their referents. They are the marks or traces of a 
particular cause, and that cause is the thing to which they refer, the object they signify.’34
                                                 
33 Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index Part 1’, op. cit., p. 80. 
 In 
my view, ‘marks’ and ‘traces’ are, indeed, indicators of a presence, but there is a clear 
temporality when it comes to connecting presence with them. Moreover, even if we accept 
that both the index and the shifter (deixis) are empty as signs, it is a misunderstanding of 
both and their relationship to make such a claim of the ways in which their emptiness gets 
filled with presence. In both cases, any presence can be taken indirectly or even 
metaphorically, and this is not a prerequisite of the production of meaning. An example for 
the index could be smoke when we do not actually need to see the source (i.e. fire) in order 
to attribute meaning to the indexical sign of smoke; and in the case of the shifter, reported or 
indirect speech would be helpful in refuting Krauss’s statement on presence. It seems, 
though, as if the relationship that Krauss establishes between the index, the trace and the 
34 Ibid., p. 70. 
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shifter can be described by what Burgin borrows from Umberto Eco, a partial analogy 
between ‘perceptual situations’.35
 
 
It is at this point that I would like to refer again to the two major influences of semiotics that 
appear in discussions on the visual arts and the limited ways in which these semioticians are 
employed and their works exploited. On the one hand, Saussure’s ideas on the 
conventionality of languages proved to be useful in relegating mimetic theories to past 
methodologies, and on the other, Peirce’s triadic and largely simplified typology contributed 
to the understanding of the variety of relationships in the process of meaning production. Yet 
there is only one of Peirce’s triads that entered the field of the visual arts; even that ended up 
being so much simplified that one of its major achievements, the idea of endless semiosis, 
was lost.36
 
 It is exactly by endless semiosis that the production of signs and meaning 
becomes a process determined by contextual and temporal parameters, instead of being 
fixed, stable and eternal. So far, this understanding of meaning making has not been 
exploited very deeply within the discipline of art history. 
Coming back to the snapshot, it was introduced in relation to the index and it returned in the 
special issue of October dedicated to photography. This time it is an essay not by one of the 
editors but by Thierry de Duve, with the suggestive title: ‘Time Exposure and Snapshot: The 
Photograph as Paradox’. 37 In his taxonomy of photographic images, de Duve sets up two 
categories with distinctive features on the ‘superficial’ level and on the ‘referential’ level on 
the basis of the photograph as a signifier.38
                                                 
35 Burgin, ‘Photographic Practice’, op. cit., p. 66. 
 One of these is the snapshot, which is an ‘abrupt 
artifact’ and behaves as an ‘event-like’ representation (e.g. the press photograph). The other 
is the ‘time exposure’ which, besides having ‘picture-like’ qualities, functions as a ‘natural 
36 According to Peirce, a ‘representamen’ calls an ‘interpretant’ into being, which itself becomes a sign, 
thus resulting in a chain of endless semiosis. 
37 Thierry de Duve, ‘Time Exposure and Snapshot: The Photograph as Paradox’, October 5, Summer 
1978, pp. 113–125. 
38 Ibid., p. 117. 
 63 
evidence’ for the once existence of a semiotically taken signified (the example de Duve uses 
is the funeral portrait).39 The first is a ‘frozen gestalt’, while the second is ‘an autonomous 
representation […] which curiously ceases to refer to the particular event from which it was 
drawn.’40 It is between the superficial and the referential levels that we find the psychological 
response – ‘in the form of an unresolved oscillation’41 – towards the photograph. In the case 
of the snapshot, de Duve calls this response ‘mania’, and in the case of time exposure, the 
appellation he employs is ‘depression’. These psychological responses are related to trauma 
and mourning which accompany the reception of the given image. According to de Duve, 
these two kinds of photographic images mutually exclude one another because ‘they do not 
constitute a contradiction that we can resolve through a dialectical synthesis. Instead they set 
up a paradox, which results in an unresolved oscillation of our psychological responses 
towards the photograph.’42
 
 
De Duve goes further when he defines four features of the photographic paradox and places 
these elements into a dual, spatio-temporal matrix. His theoretical position raises two, 
fundamental questions, which are in diametrical opposition to all the lip-service de Duve pays 
in his essay to a semiotic approach. The first is the establishment of his unfounded 
categorisation along spatio-temporal axes, and the second is de Duve’s traditional division of 
genres according to the images’ themes. His essay does not only take these two 
assumptions for granted, but posits them as compatible with a semiotic analysis; yet it 
supports a phenomenological and formalistic approach to photography which is based on 
photography’s sentimental association with death and a limited temporality of existence. 
 
De Duve also refers to Krauss and her introduction of the Piercian index in his text – as a 
form of including semiotics in the discussion of the paradoxical nature of photography. Yet he 
                                                 
39 Ibid., p. 113. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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claims that, ‘in the case of photography, the direct causal link between reality and the image 
is light and its proportionate physical action upon silver bromide.’43
 
 In my view this is a 
misunderstanding of the index, since light is not the cause of the creation of the image but its 
circumstance. The correct question in a semiotic sense that should be posed in relation to 
photography interrogates the referent of the sign. In the case of photography this is a form of 
reality – whether staged or found – that was in front of the camera at the time of the 
exposure. 
Within his matrix, de Duve also establishes a network of syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
relations, yet this is based on a traditional division of genres that revolves around the content 
or theme of the image. In comparison with Tagg’s taxonomy, where the categorisation is 
defined by the ‘afterlife’ of the picture and the ways in which it gets contextualised by its 
usage, de Duve’s system seems to be traditionalist in its maintenance of a link with art 
historical approaches. 
 
In the editorial introduction to this special issue on photography, the most fundamental, 
primal dichotomy of photography that is formulated by the editors sets the scene for what 
comes later. It is somehow distressing to see how the dilemma of whether photography is art 
on the one hand or merely a means of reproduction in the service of mass culture and 
vernacular cultural practices on the other has been prevalent since the technical invention of 
this medium. The articles in this issue and in October in general maintain this distinction on 
no other basis than the content of the images, sometimes with the addition of comments on 
artistic intentionality, traditional descriptions and a phenomenological approach. Besides de 
Duve’s essay, another example for this approach in the same special issue is a text by 
Hubert Damisch, already titled ‘Five Notes for a Phenomenology of the Photographic Image’. 
 
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. 114. 
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To come back to my usage of the grid as a metaphor, in her text Krauss suggests a reason 
for the success of the grid in contemporary art. She compares it with the structure of myth as 
this is introduced by Lévi-Strauss and her definition runs as follows: ‘ … the notion of myth I 
am using here depends on a structuralist mode of analysis, by which the sequential features 
of a story are rearranged to form a spatial organization. The reason why the structuralists do 
this is that they wish to understand the function of myths; and this function they see as the 
cultural attempt to deal with contradiction.’44
 
 
As Jonathan Culler argues at the end of his book Structuralist Poetics, the paradigm shift that 
took place in the study of literature and altered the protocols of the discipline is due to the 
appearance of semiotics and semiotically informed interpretative methodologies in the middle 
of the 1970s.45
 
 It was at this point that it eventually became possible for literary studies to 
abandon its primary concern with establishing a chronology as the foundation of a mostly 
historical approach, and even to leave the old name of the discipline ‘literary history’ behind. 
In discussing the appearance of the linguistic metaphor in criticism, Culler distinguishes two 
approaches in the way in which semiotics and structuralism influenced literary theory.46 The 
first one is based on a general analogy between a given works of art and language and uses 
this analogy for further analysis. The work is taken as a system and dealt with accordingly. In 
the second case the work is understood as a semiotic project, a semiological system on its 
own, and investigated accordingly. This latter approach is able to produce more complex 
readings beyond the superficial metaphoric association of certain elements in the work with 
linguistic or semiotic notions ‘in the search for an invariant pattern in the work’.47
                                                 
44 Krauss, ‘Grids’, op. cit., p. 13. 
 It seems to 
me that Krauss managed to find this ‘invariant pattern’ in the visual arts of the 1970s 
concretely in the idea of the grid and in analysing works as a system metaphorically, parallel 
45 Culler, ‘Structuralist Poetics’, op. cit., pp. 255–265. 
46 Ibid., pp. 96–109. 
47 Ibid., p. 103. 
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to the appearance of the linguistic metaphor in art history. Visual studies, however, is rather 
based on the second premise and takes works and other units as semiotic projects applying 
all the necessary interpretative tools that are foundational in the interdisciplinary and more 
productive analysis that visual studies can provide. 
 
‘Art history’s troubled relation to visual studies’ – to use Keith Moxey’s formulation – is still 
prevalent.48
 
 Issues and basic questions of art history and theory, such as the word and 
image opposition, spectatorship, questions of high and low, the politics of visual production, 
etc. are central, even foundational points of discussion in visual studies. This is 
complemented with an understanding of the sign as a meaning making unit without an 
intrinsic value of its own, thus it is the task of interpretation and cultural analysis to show the 
values we attribute to these visual signs and the ideologies that inform these values. In the 
face of all this, the attack October leads against visual studies and visual culture with the 
‘Questionnaire’ in issue 77 in 1996 is understandable, yet intellectually quite retrograde. A 
detailed discussion of October’s relationship to visual studies and visual culture in the form of 
a conclusion follows in the final chapter. 
                                                 
48 Keith Moxey, ‘Nostalgia for the Real: The Troubled Relation of Art History to Visual Studies’, pp. 
103–123, in Keith Moxey, The Practice of Persuasion: Paradox and Power in Art History, Cornell Univ. 
Press, Ithaca and London, 2001. 
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Chapter 3.2 
 
N O T E S  O N  T H E  I N D E X  P A R T  2  
 
 
In the second part of the ‘Index’ essay, Krauss puts forward examples of contemporary art 
works which she takes from an exhibition that was held at P.S.1, ‘a public school building on 
Long Island City which has been leased to the Institute for Art and Urban Resources for use 
as artists’ studios and exhibition spaces. The exhibition in question was called Rooms. 
Mounted in late May, 1976, it was the inaugural show of the building.’49
 
 Via the concrete 
examples and the exhibition itself, ‘Part 2’ illustrates Krauss’ theoretical standpoint and also 
the possible avenues she envisages for the application of her theory. Her choice of examples 
and particularly the fact that she uses this exhibition are indicators of the acute need for 
adequate critical theory in the 1970s. 
The starting premises of Krauss’ dealings with the index in this particular context are already 
formulated at the end of Part 1 when, introducing the exhibition, she relates the works to ‘the 
functioning of the index in the art of the present.’50 Within the exhibition, she continues, ‘there 
was tremendous variation in the quality of these works, but almost none in their subject. 
Again and again this group of artists, working independently, chose the terminology of the 
index. Their procedures were to exacerbate an aspect of the building’s physical presence, 
and thereby to embed within it a perishable trace of their own.’51
                                                 
49 Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index Part 2’, op. cit., p. 60, footnote 3. P.S.1 has been an official external 
exhibition location, an ‘affiliate’ of MoMA since 2000, which, in my reading, is an ironic outcome and 
‘development’ of the fate of artists’ initiatives from the 1970s. 
 This somewhat lengthy 
quotation illustrates the confusion, and a certain level of inconsistency of the terminology 
Krauss applies, in discussing the indexical character of these artworks. In my view, it is a 
misunderstanding of the concept of the indexical sign in the first place to claim that it can 
50 Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index Part 1’, op. cit., p. 81. 
51 Ibid. 
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function as the subject of an artwork (or an exhibition), rather than perceiving the work as 
performing the function of that sign. In that sense it is not possible to ‘chose the terminology 
of the index’ since it does not possess any specific or particular terminology. It, indeed, 
defines a particular relationship between the signified and the signifier but this relationship is 
not a matter of terminology or of subject. It is also interesting to note that the artistic 
phenomenon Krauss aims at describing and identifying is what we would today call site-
specificity, and what, in Krauss’ definition, ‘belongs to the genre of installation piece and [ … ] 
exploited the derelict condition of the building itself.’52
 
 In my view, however, site-specific 
works do not enter into an indexical relationship with their location because they do not point 
to as aspect of the site in the same way as the indexical sign does, but they enter into a 
dialogical relationship with the context of the given location. 
Moreover, an exhibition, whether its location is a white cube in the most classic sense of the 
term, or a derelict building, can never be reduced to a mere sum of the works it contains, 
rather it is the result of a dialogue among the works, the space, the curatorial ‘intentions’, and 
the viewers, at most. To formulate it another way, ‘The exhibition is no longer the end result 
of a process, its “happy ending” (Parreno) but a place of production.’53 Towards the end of 
her essay, Krauss makes it clear what this meaningful unit, or message, within her 
framework is: ‘In each of these works it is the building itself that is taken to be a message 
which can be presented but not coded.’54
 
 It is in this sense, and also based on a 
reconsideration of the idea of a meaningful unit in the case of the visual arts, that I would like 
to propose to extend Barthes’ phrase ‘the rhetoric of the image’ to a rhetoric of exhibitions. 
                                                 
52 Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index Part 2’, op. cit., p. 60. 
53 Nicolas Bourriaud, Postproduction, Lucas and Sternberg, New York, 2007. Unfortunately, I cannot 
precisely locate the quotation which Bourriaud borrows from the artist Philippe Parreno. 
54 Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index Part 2’, op. cit., p. 65. 
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In his essay on exhibition rhetorics,55 Bruce Ferguson not only places exhibitions in an 
anthropomorphic position as ‘central speaking subjects in the standard stories about art 
which institutions and curators […] tell’, he also conceives exhibitions ‘as the medium of 
contemporary art in the sense of being its main agency of communication.’56 Later he 
continues: ‘If an exhibition of art is like an utterance or a set of utterances, in a chain of 
signification, it can be considered to be the speech act of an institution […], [W]hen an 
institution speaks, it speaks exhibitions […] By asking who speaks it is possible to establish 
the gender, ethnicity, race, age and cultural background and the history of texts of the 
speaker.’57
 
 
That the exhibition is a speech act, let alone of a particular kind, is a widely accepted view in 
the field of the semiotic approach to contemporary museology.58 This constative speech act 
creating a narrative discourse entails the presence of rhetorical figures, such as the ‘invisible 
but authoritative “first-person” narrator [that] can be called the subject of such speech acts.’59 
I would like to argue that if we put an institution into the position of the speaker, this renders 
the narrator invisible, as part of ‘a “third-person” fictional narrative, that literary style wherein 
the agent of ordering and focusing, highlighting and obscuring, selecting and ordering, puts a 
special effort into making these acts appear as “natural”.’60 Mieke Bal, while making a highly 
effective and useful differentiation between the narrator and the focaliser, opposes ‘the false 
neutrality’ of the ‘third-person narrative, with an invisible narrator and a non-identified 
focaliser’61
 
 leading to the depoliticisation and, as a consequence, to the aesthetisation of not 
just the art objects, but of the exhibitions, i.e. showing and telling, too. 
                                                 
55 Bruce Ferguson, ‘Exhibition Rhetorics: Material Speech and Utter Sense’, in Reesa Greenberg et al. 
(eds.), Thinking About Exhibitions, Routledge, New York and London, 1996, pp. 175–190. 
56 Ibid., p. 176 (original italics). 
57 Ibid., p. 183. 
58 See e.g. Mieke Bal, Double Exposures: The Subject of Cultural Analysis, Routledge, New York and 
London, 1996, p. 88. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., p. 99. 
61 Ibid., p. 169. 
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In the case of an institution, it also becomes impossible to establish the categories of 
‘gender, ethnicity, race, age and cultural background’, because an institution is only capable 
of defining an impersonal subject. If we don't want to naturalise this impersonal subject, we 
can also define it as a universal subject, the male gendered agent of modernist exhibition 
practice and theory. In the modernist account the subject not only has no ‘connotations of 
gender’, and is therefore male,62 it is also ‘part of the “scientific” quality of “modernist” causal 
narratives that the position of the analyst is not included in the narrative account’,63 or at least 
so it seems.64
 
 A very early effort for establishing such an impersonal position was conceived 
by Alfred H. Barr, MoMA’s first and then director when, in the autumn of 1929, he made an 
exhibition of the paintings of Cézanne, Gauguin, Seurat and Van Gogh, which was the first 
instance of an exhibition display that later on ended up being called ‘white cube’. The 
ideologies informing this mode of presentation become explicit within the dichotomy of art 
and ethnography, in the face of displays of the latter. 
This ideology of neutrality leads us back to Bruce Ferguson’s metaphor of an institution 
‘speaking exhibitions’. This linguistic metaphor easily gives itself over to simplification, and 
this is perhaps the reason why Ferguson is ready to conflate the notion of art with the sum of 
art objects in order to criticise the privileged position of the single art object. In his account, 
however, the basic unit of the utterance – both in linguistics and in exhibitions – is the single, 
autonomous object, ‘separated from social spheres’ as thoroughly as possible. Semiotics 
and its use in the field of visuality can serve here as tools to dismantle the belief in 
autonomous, discrete, and neutral showing (and viewing). Thus if we translate Ferguson’s 
                                                 
62 As many articles and books discuss, the gender of modernity is without any doubt male. See e.g. 
Janet Wolff, The Feminine in Modern Art: Benjamin, Simmel, and the Gender of Modernity, public 
lecture at the Getty Summer Institute in Art History and Visual Studies, University of Rochester, July 
19, 1999; Rita Felski, The Gender of Modernity, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 
1995; Ann Ferguson, ‘Does Reason Have a Gender’, in Roger S. Gottlieb (ed.), Radical Philosophy: 
Tradition, Counter-Tradition, Temple Univ. Press, Philadelphia, 1993, pp. 21–47; etc. 
63 Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson, ‘Semiotics and Art History’, p. 184, Art Bulletin 73, 1991, pp. 174–
208. 
64 It was Wayne C. Booth, among others, who showed the inevitability of the narrator’s implication in 
the narration in his book The Rhetoric of Fiction, originally published by The University of Chicago 
Press in 1961, and subsequently republished in 1983. 
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formulation of ‘institutions speaking exhibitions’, then ‘exhibitions’ become equivalent to 
language, a means of communication. The ways in which the standard, Jakobsonian model 
of communication becomes so far from the successful ideal was pointed out by Mieke Bal in 
her book about exhibitions.65 According to Bal, this ideal model of communication can never 
be reproduced in real life and the message always arrives distorted in the process of 
communication. For Bal, it is crucial to note ‘that this [ideal] model obscures […] 
manipulation. Manipulation is an instance not only of ideological agency, but also of the 
historical embeddedness of that agency.’66
 
 
There is another crucial difference in Bal’s understanding of exhibition rhetorics, namely the 
way she defines the notion of the context. Together with Norman Bryson, Bal takes Jonathan 
Culler’s critique of context and his proposition of using the notion of ‘framing’ instead. 
According to them, context ‘is a text itself, and thus consists of signs that require 
interpretation.’67 In my view, the simplifying model that context proposes – as opposed to 
frames – is parallel to the way in which Ferguson thinks about signs, as discretely 
interpretable units in a chain of signs, i.e. utterances. Framing in its turn takes into account 
how signs are ‘constituted (framed) by various discursive practices, institutional 
arrangements, system of value, semiotic mechanisms.’68
 
 
One productive and interdisciplinary way of establishing a critical approach to the relationship 
between exhibitions and audiences may lie in the application of Stanley Fish’s reader-
response theory about the process of interpretation as a communicative act. As an 
introduction to Fish’s theoretical dealings with interpretation, I would like to rely on the 
metaphor of the interval in the theatrical sense of the term and connect it to a more 
politicised understanding of the production of meaning in the face of contemporary art 
                                                 
65 Mieke Bal, Double Exposures, op. cit., p. 261. 
66 Ibid., p. 261–262. 
67 Bal and Bryson, ‘Semiotics and Art History’, op. cit., p. 175. 
68 Ibid. 
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exhibitions. The interval as a metaphor is also referred to by Jean-Luc Nancy as part of his 
theoretical dealings with communities. Nancy departs from music and provides us with a 
definition: ‘In Western music, the interval is the name for a combination of two notes played 
at the same time, thus creating a sound that we hear as a new note. The separate notes 
composing the interval are still audible, but at the same time something new has installed 
itself between them; it comes to our ears without being reduced directly to its elements. The 
interval “is” nothing: it is nothing without its elements, and still it is some different from its 
elements. It “is” in the way of an event.’69
 
 For Nancy, the metaphor of the interval is 
instrumental in arguing for the inoperative and precarious character of communities in 
contemporary society from a fundamentally sceptical position; a position that nevertheless 
attaches value to the existence of communities and their loss. In my view, it is possible to 
retain an operative understanding of communities from a performative and semiotic 
perspective, which, in a convoluted manner, leads us back to the status of the interval as a 
metaphor for exhibitions. In this framework and in relation to contemporary art, community 
can be understood as the temporally constituted group of spectators who, according to a 
semiotic approach, function as an ‘interpretive community’ (Stanley Fish). 
The idea of community in terms of how audiences are constituted in the face of 
contemporary art exhibitions is related to the phenomena of what is known as ‘contextual 
curating’, although in my view and according to a semiotic approach to exhibition making, 
every act of curating and exhibition making is contextual in a semiotic sense. I would like to 
argue for a reconsideration of the neutrality of the white cube since it is not less of a context 
than any other context, and is not less regulated by a given set of rules than any other 
context. The difference between the contextual parameters of the white cube and that of a 
project-based and site-specific approach cannot be explained in purely semiotic terms, since 
they are both sign systems. When we, as visitors, enter the exhibition space, we enter a 
                                                 
69 Jean-Luc Nancy and Laurens ten Kate, ‘“Cum” … revisited: Preliminaries to Thinking the Interval’, in 
E. Ziarek & H. Oosterling (eds.), Intermedialities, New York, Continuum, 2007. 
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situation that is already organised along certain highly structured categories and codes 
(some theorists even call it a ritual70). These categories and codes limit ‘the possibilities for 
action (both verbal and physical), […] the world so organized […] will be perceived as 
normal. […] a normal context is just the special context you happen to be in, although it will 
not be recognized as special because so long as you were in it whatever it permits you to 
see will seem obvious and inescapable’.71 This means that the codes of the white cube have 
become so widespread and obvious that they are neutralised (and naturalised) to the extent 
that most people do not recognise them as codes but as ‘the’ ideal realisation of a code-free 
environment and neutral background for the presentation of works of art. Yet it is exactly on 
the promotion of neutrality that the white cube trades, and successfully manages to mask. 
The neutralisation of codes resonates with Krauss’ ideas on Barthes’ message without a 
code, although for Krauss this coincides with the case when the code ‘is out of reach of the 
[…] convention that might provide a code’.72
 
 For Krauss, who here mentions Deborah Hay’s 
performance, this code is equivalent with the traditional language of dance performance; but 
Krauss fails to recognise that this language is ‘recoded’ or ‘reframed’ by the contextual 
parameters of the location, the dancer and the audience, to name just a few elements of the 
framing process. 
To come back to the conjunction of ‘contextual curating’ and spectatorship, the former 
endeavours to create a temporal community that shares – to use Matthew Hills’ term – a 
‘semiotic solidarity’ among its members, no matter how utopian this may sound.73
                                                 
70 See e.g. Krzysztof Pomian and Carol Duncan. 
 There is a 
political aspect to emphasising contextuality these days that can be taken as a conscious 
move away from the approach to exhibition making that relies on the well-known context of 
71 Stanley Fish, ‘Normal Circumstances and Other Special Cases’, p. 288, in Stanley Fish, Is There a 
Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 
Mass. and London, England, 1980, pp. 268–292. This essay was originally published in Critical 
Inquiry, vol. 4, no. 4 (Summer 1978), pp. 625–644. 
72 Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index Part 2’, op. cit., p. 59. 
73 Coined by Henry Jenkins, Fans, Bloggers, and Gamers: Exploring Participatory Culture, New York 
Univ. Press, New York and London, 2006, p. 156. 
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the white cube. Even if in some cases this white cube takes the shape – but never the 
symbolic function – of a factory or other previously existing institution (such as a post office 
or a school for that matter). In my view, when an exhibition aims at the employment of a 
participatory approach to visitors and to communities, this decision is informed by explicit or 
implicit political considerations on the part of the curators, and is based on a political need to 
empower the spectators by the application of various methodological tools that do not 
exclusively belong to the realm of art, but often to other areas of social communication. 
 
On top of all the metaphors that I have used so far, I would like to introduce yet another, 
taken from the field of the semiotic approach to spectators and interpretation. In his book 
about the theoretical foundation of the emancipation of the readers, Stanley Fish mentions 
the following anecdote. ‘On the first day of the new semester a colleague at Johns Hopkins 
University was approached by a student who, as it turned out, had just taken a course from 
me. She put to him what I think you would agree is a perfectly straightforward question: “Is 
there a text in this class?” Responding with a confidence so perfect that he was unaware of it 
(although in telling the story, he refers to this moment as “walking into the trap”), my 
colleague said, “Yes; it’s the Norton Anthology of Literature,” whereupon the trap (set not by 
the student but by the infinite capacity of language for being appropriated) was sprung: “No, 
no,” she said, “I mean in this class do we believe in poems and things, or is it just us?”.’74
 
 
Despite all the criticism aimed at Fish’s ideas, his invaluable contribution to contemporary 
literary theory can be summed up as the radical emancipation of the reader in the face of the 
reception of works of art. Fish argued that texts – and, one might add, works of visual arts – 
do not have an intrinsic meaning invested in them by authorial intention, but rather meaning 
is always the product of an interpretation which – to a certain extent – contingently depends 
on the reader’s subjectivity. The element that, however, constrains the unlimited character of 
the signifying process, is the availability of codes and the ways in which we, as readers, 
                                                 
74 Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in this Class?, op. cit., p. 305. 
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choose from among these codes for the given purposes. This choice is defined partly by 
context and partly by ‘probability’ – we tend to choose the code that is the most plausible or 
obvious in a given context. When Fish calls this factor of probability ‘normal’, he means that 
certain circumstances occur more frequently than do others, which would then elicit a 
different reading in their turn. ‘But they remain circumstances still (statistically, not inherently, 
normal).’75
 
 It seems from Fish’s account that we tend to assign a certain interpretation to a 
given situation according to our experiences, which are more quickly based on statistical 
data of probability than on any inherent and stable quality of the situation or the sign itself. 
This can also serve as an argument against Krauss’ recurring usage of the phrase ‘message 
without a code’. 
In addition to this, as Fish claims, there is always a ‘purposeful’ approach to reading a priori 
the actual act of reading, and this also in the end affects which of the codes the reader 
decides to employ. One of Fish’s examples is the classroom, and it is also in this context that 
we have to understand his anecdote about the student asking for the content of the seminar 
at the beginning of the semester. 
 
The classroom – or the exhibition for that matter – is, of course, just one of these easily 
graspable contexts which can stabilise the otherwise unstable character of any text or 
meaning-making practice. Fish provides us with a number of convincing examples for that 
process, i.e. how the shift from one context to another may change the meaning of an 
utterance, demonstrating that ‘paradoxically [this] exercise does not prove that the words can 
mean anything one likes, but that they always and only mean one thing, although that one 
thing is not always the same. The one thing they mean will be a function of the shape 
language already has when we come upon it in a situation, and it is the knowledge that is the 
context of being in a situation that will have stabilized it.’76
                                                 
75 Ibid., p. 291. 
 
76 Ibid., p. 275 (original italics). 
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Fish calls this contextual operation ‘institutional nesting’77
 
 by which he means that in a given 
situation one context is ‘more available’ or more easily accessible than another. His anecdote 
can be taken as an instance of the discrepancy between the interpretations and the 
‘institutional nesting’ of the two people taking part in that conversation, although they both 
belong to the educational industry and to a certain extent to the same interpretive 
community. For the professor, the context was first and most strongly defined by the 
circumstances of the first day of the semester; thus by the word ‘text’ he understands the 
assigned reading materials that the seminar will discuss, and for the student the context was 
primarily defined by a knowledge of literary theory’s recent developments. It is interesting to 
note that there is an element of temporality at play with these two interpretations, since for 
those who are able to read the sentence ‘Is there a text in this class?’ in this second sense, 
the first meaning is also available, but not the other way round. This severely limits the 
utopian approach to communities on the foundation of ‘semiotic solidarity’. 
It is exactly in relation to the restricted possibilities of this solidarity that I would like to come 
back to the spatial confines of the classroom and to make use of this metaphor’s potential 
once again. Fish places a strong emphasis on the circumstantial expectations of a given 
temporal community in his theory. ‘[P]rofessors of English literature do not put things on 
boards unless they are to be examples of problematic or ironic or ambiguous language. 
Students know that because they know what it means to be in a classroom, and the 
categories of understanding that are the content of that knowledge will be organizing what 
they see before they see it. Irony and ambiguity are not properties of language but are 
functions of the expectations with which we approach it.’78
 
 
                                                 
77 Ibid., p. 308. 
78 Ibid., p. 277. 
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To translate this to the area of visual arts, and given that visitors of exhibitions rely on the 
same set of expectations of and assumptions about the ‘circumstantial forces’ (Stanley Fish) 
in operation, they are either equipped with the knowledge to understand the ambiguities of 
meaning that works of art may have in that context by virtue of being displayed with that 
purpose,79 or else all this is lost on them. According to Fish’s convincing arguments and to a 
semiotic approach to the quality of the ambiguity of language, this quality is by no means the 
‘natural property’ of a sign; it is rather the context that is ‘responsible for the ambiguity the 
sentence will then have.’80 An example of that could be Laurie Anderson’s song, which is 
based on the ambiguity of the banal and everyday situation of greeting, ‘Hello. Excuse me. 
Can you tell me where I am? / In our country, we send pictures of people speaking our sign 
language into Outer Space. We are speaking out sign language in these pictures […] / do 
you think They will read our signs? In our country, Goodbye looks just like Hello.’81 With the 
example of the simple sign of raising one’s hand, either saying hello or saying goodbye, the 
question of the ambiguity of meaning comes to the fore outside of the context of art. It is at 
this point and in this sense that the utopia of a temporal interpretive community falls short, 
and the question of political solidarity comes into operation.82
 
 
The utopia of such a community has also been challenged and criticised by the British art 
critic Claire Bishop as part of her work attacking the theory of relational aesthetics and its 
practitioners. It is on behalf of the restoration of the ‘aesthetic qualities’ of artworks that 
Bishop condemns what she sees as the moralising attitude of artists and curators who 
                                                 
79 In my view, the possible ambiguities of signs are the characteristics that can differentiate – in a 
semiotic sense – between signs in the context of exhibitions on the one hand, and signs outside of the 
context of art. 
80 Fish, ‘Normal Circumstances’, op. cit., p. 284. A similar idea is formulated by Jonathan Culler when 
he claims, ‘No sentence is ironic per se’ (Culler, ‘Structuralist Poetics’, op. cit., p. 154). Later on, in 
relation to deixis, Culler continues, ‘we can observe the effects of our expectations here, because we 
can produce readings by making certain assumptions’ (Culler, ‘Structuralist Poetics’, op. cit., p. 169). 
81 Laurie Anderson, ‘United States’, 1984. 
82 It is probably no coincidence that Panofsky also mentions the conventional character of greetings, in 
Erwin Panofsky, ‘Ikonográfia és ikonológia: bevezetés a reneszánsz művészet tanulmányozásába’, 
pp. 284–285, in Erwin Panofsky, A jelentés a vizuális művészetekben, Gondolat, Budapest, 1984, pp. 
284–307. Panofsky’s considerations of this sign usage are used by Victor Burgin in ‘Photographic 
Practice’, op. cit., p. 63. 
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conceive and implement community-based projects. If we want to translate this into semiotic 
terms, Bishop’s intention is to defend the supremacy of the ‘micro-context’ of the exhibition at 
the expense of the ‘macro-context’ of locality. The irony and the paradoxicality of her critical 
position is that even if the number of community-based projects seems to be decisively high 
these days, there is very little theoretical and critical analysis of them on a non-aesthetic, 
more trans-disciplinary and social basis. This also proves, for better or worse, that the code 
that is the strongest, the most accessible, and the most probable for the interpretive 
community operating in this context is still the aesthetic one. 
 
What is perhaps one of the most striking deficiencies of Part 2 of Krauss’ ‘Index’ essay is not 
so much the way in which she uses the notion of the index as interchangeable with that of 
the trace, but an almost complete dismissal of a possible avenue of comparison between the 
context of the actual exhibition in P.S.1 and any other possible exhibitions with the same 
works in a white-cube-style gallery space or museum. Even if at one point in the essay she 
distinguishes abstract works in the exhibition from visually similar abstract painting, for 
example by Elsworth Kelly, it is never in order to formulate a theoretical stance of exhibition 
rhetoric or contextuality; rather it stays on a contingent and purposeful level of discussing the 
particular show at a particular moment of time. 
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Chapter 4 
 
T H E  B O D Y  A N D  T H E  A R C H I V E  
 
 
In the 1980s art theory and criticism discovered the body as a new field of investigation, 
which has continued to play a strong role since then. The emergence of this field is probably 
the outcome of several social, political and aesthetic components, already strongly visible in 
the 1970s, such as feminism, Foucault’s theoretical impact, the emergence of new aesthetic 
forms (body art, performance, photography, video), and the foundation of new theories (e.g. 
the theory of the abject), among others. Even if there are visibly distinctive lines within the 
theoretical and artistic dealings with the body, not all of them have been directly reflected and 
referred to in October.1
 
 
One distinct example for a politicised analysis of the representation of the body – and in 
opposition to an essentialist understanding of it – can be found in the textual and visual work 
of Allan Sekula. Since the very beginning of his career the territories of the verbal and the 
visual have existed in parallel, not necessarily complementing one another in terms of their 
content, but always as part of Sekula’s overall concern for the representation of work and 
power. For this reason, in the following analysis I take Sekula’s work – both textual and 
visual – as one unity but not as unified and monolithic, and I read his more historical work in 
conjunction with contemporary materials but not with an historicizing intention. His activity is 
a good example for a new and complex relationship between artistic work and critical activity, 
similarly to Cindy Sherman’s practice as it is discussed by Rosalind Krauss, who claims that 
Sherman’s artistic work is an instance of practicing criticism itself.2
 
 
                                                 
1 Such is the case with the notion of the abject, which is replaced by Bataille’s informe as a result of 
the editors’ theoretical (and partly subjective) preferences. 
2 Rosalind Krauss, ‘A Note on Photography and the Simulacral’, October 31 (Winter 1984), pp. 49–68. 
 80 
Sekula, however, does not use himself as the subject of his own images in the indexical 
sense, and in the way Sherman has done, his visual and textual activity both operate as 
instances of critical practice. His criticality, however, is different from Sherman’s in the sense 
that Sekula seems to produce ‘metapictures’, inasmuch as many pictures can be taken as 
‘metapictures’ in W.J.T. Mitchell’s sense.3
 
 Sekula’s approach to creating a ‘metalanguage’ of 
images is more implicit and indirect, and in my view manifests itself as the foundation of a 
‘metainstitution’ – if I may coin such a term – that is directed towards a critique of the 
institution of photography, including all the elements that constitute this ‘institution’, such as 
artistic practice, education, various discursive activities (theory and criticism), etc. Certain 
elements of this photographic institution, which have a relevance to October’s trajectory – 
and which are also treated by Sekula – are discussed in Chapter 5. 
Among Sekula’s textual works, perhaps the most widely cited, referred to, anthologised, and 
‘recycled’ (Hilde van der Gelder) piece of writing in the domain of photographic theory and 
criticism is ‘The Body and the Archive’ essay.4 It was first published in the journal October 
along with other texts that raised the necessity of creating a new discourse on photography, 
and discussed the specificities of the medium in conjunction with a new kind of artistic 
practice in this field. As for the reception of this essay, it is interesting to note that, in my 
view, John Tagg’s activity in the field of the theory of photography is in many ways indebted 
to Sekula’s early critical work, and this is duly referred to in Tagg’s essays.5
                                                 
3 See W.J.T. Mitchell, Picture Theory, The Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1994, and 
particularly the chapter ‘Metapictures’, pp. 35–82. 
 Yet, even if 
Sekula’s text is widely cited, Tagg’s work on the relationship between photography and 
surveillance has been much more popularised than Sekula’s. It is not so easy to provide 
reasons for this difference in the popularity between the respective receptions of the texts, 
but one might stem from the fact that Tagg recurrently refers to Foucault and surveillance 
4 Allan Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, October 39 (Winter 1986), pp. 3–64. 
5 See John Tagg’s essays, particularly ‘A Means of Surveillance: The Photograph as Evidence in Law’, 
in The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories, Macmillan, London, 1988, 
pp. 66–102. 
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while Sekula’s analysis of power and its representation is not exclusively based on this 
labelling. This difference is noted by Sekula himself who – towards the middle of his essay in 
a footnote – makes a comment about Tagg’s approach and his exclusive reliance on 
Foucault’s theory, and more specifically on the Panopticon. Sekula compares Tagg with 
Carlo Ginzburg, an historian whose historical analysis and semiotic comparison of the 
methods of Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes is widely referred to by those who have a 
critical stance vis-à-vis the still prevailing positivist art historical paradigm. As Sekula argues, 
‘Ginzburg has proposed a model of observation and description that is more open to 
multiplicity and resistance than that advanced by John Tagg, who subsumes all documentary 
within the paradigm of the Panopticon.’6
 
 
In trying to set up the context of the first publication of ‘The Body and the Archive’ essay and 
comparing it with Sekula’s other theoretical texts from the 1970s and 80s, this one is 
strikingly the most ‘art historically’ or ‘scientifically’ written of all. Truly, its subject, the non-
artistic and instrumental usage of the relatively new technology of photography, was not 
typically the topic and the main interest of academic research in the history of art when 
Sekula did his research and wrote his text. For this reason, it is no wonder that this is the one 
that ended up being published in October as it fitted into the editorial goals of providing a 
platform for the discussion and the theoretical emancipation of photography, not just in 
contemporary art, but in historical terms too, from the perspective of an ‘ameliorated’ version 
of the history of art. Retrospectively, though, from the point of view of the 1996 ‘Visual 
Culture Questionnaire’,7
                                                 
6 Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 36, footnote 54 (and also p. 9, footnote 13). Sekula 
refers here to Tagg’s ‘Power and Photography Part 1, A Means of Surveillance: The Photograph as 
Evidence in Law’, in Screen Education, no. 36 (Winter 1980), p. 45 and p. 55. 
 in which the whole idea of visual culture is questioned by the editors 
of October partly on the basis of using non-artistic images, the journal’s whole editorial policy 
looks dubious if only for the publication of Sekula’s essay. I will come back to discussing the 
‘Questionnaire’ in the final chapter. 
7 In October 77 (Summer 1996), pp. 25–70. 
 82 
 
Whether a text such as ‘The Body and the Archive’ essay is art historically written or not 
does not necessarily depend on its subject matter. A clear example of this in close relation to 
Sekula is an essay that appeared in the famous interdisciplinary journal Third Text in 2005, 
by the Australian artist and writer Zanny Begg.8
 
 Begg, as her title suggests, tries to bring 
together recent pictures from the German artist Andreas Gursky with Sekula’s work on the 
global justice movement dating back to the late 1990s. Begg takes one of the movement’s 
most important ‘scriptures’ or apocryphal writings, Michael Hardt and Toni Negri’s Empire, 
and more specifically its magic word ‘multitude’, and reads it against the artists’ images. 
The somehow ironic undertone of my description of Begg’s standpoint is not directed towards 
anti-globalist politics, or the work of Gursky and Sekula, but towards Begg’s indiscriminate 
approach to her textual sources, which she puts into the service of uncritically praising the 
global justice movement. It is a traditional idea in Panofsky’s sense to find the corresponding 
textual source for the interpretation of visual works of art, which would be the basis for a 
synthetising, iconographical interpretation. In Begg’s case, the level of the history of style 
together with the history of types are obviously missing, since it would be impossible to 
define the content of such terms both in photography and in contemporary art. Yet, the way 
Begg relies on reading Negri and Hardt could serve as an example for the consistent 
realisation of Panofsky’s iconological method; a reading which proves by its mere existence 
not only the untenability of the iconological method, but also its unproductive character as a 
method of interpretation.9
 
 In Begg’s specific case, the relationship between the images and 
her textual source material ends up in an almost tautological circuit in which one is capable, 
to a certain extent, of shedding some light on the other, but they are not capable of opening 
up the field of interpretation beyond themselves. 
                                                 
8 Zanny Begg, ‘Recasting Subjectivity: Globalisation and the Photography of Andreas Gursky and 
Allan Sekula’, Third Text, vol. 19, issue 6 (November 2005), pp. 625–636. 
9 Ibid., p. 626. 
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To come back to Sekula’s essay and its relationship to art historical methodologies, his 
approach cannot be considered a purist one by the standards of the time. He makes 
extensive use of a variety of sources from the expanded domain of visuality, most of which 
were not born under the auspices of aesthetics. Yet his aim is not to use these materials in 
the service of an aesthetic theory or claim, but to demonstrate the intricate and dialectical 
relationship between artistic images and vernacular or instrumental visual production. We 
can think of a memorable period in art history’s historiography when, in the 1980s, the 
biggest ‘discovery’ of the most up-to-date scholarship on Marcel Duchamp connected 
Duchamp’s Cubist paintings with chronophotography on the basis of geometrical theories of 
the fourth (or n+1) dimension; it was claimed that the direct influence of these theories is 
visibly detectable in his paintings, as if Duchamp had been painting with a brush in one hand 
and with a geometry treatise in the other. Unlike this scholarship on Duchamp and non-
Euclidean geometry, Sekula pinpoints the complexities of the relationships between different 
image making practices.10
 
 
One of the principle elements in Sekula’s methodology is a strong emphasis on pictorial 
analysis, but not as this was described and advocated by Panofsky and post-Panofskyan art 
history. Sekula does not aim to search for and find the corresponding textual sources for the 
images he selects to examine, but rather has a dual goal in using these sources. On the one 
hand he takes words and images in one unity, as mutually supporting each other’s meaning, 
and on the other, he highlights the structural parallels between the two in order to 
demonstrate their ideological determination. In this sense he makes it clear that neither art 
nor non-artistic visuality is neutral, since even a claim for neutrality is highly ideological. 
 
Besides providing thorough analyses of his pictorial material and its ramifications in relation 
to textual sources, Sekula also touches upon the political-historical context of his topic. In the 
                                                 
10 Rosalind Krauss mentions Lucy Lippard’s references to the extraordinary proliferation of the 
scholarship on Duchamp and the distance they are both meant to take from this scholarship with their 
own approaches. See more on Krauss’ position on Chapter 3.1. 
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context of ‘The Body and the Archive’ essay, this is the France of the 1880s, where not only 
the policy of transporting recidivists to the colonies was in operation, but as a result of the 
agricultural crisis, ‘a renewed massive urban influx of displaced peasants’ reduced the figure 
of the vagrant to the position of a potential social and criminal danger in addition to all the 
unemployed city dwellers.11 In public debates, the vagrant was complemented by and 
partially overlapped with that of the anarchist as the outcome of a ‘renewed working class 
militancy’ a decade after the massacre of the Communards. An interesting historical outcome 
of the Commune and the following repercussions is the fact that ‘during the Commune, all 
city records prior to 1859 had been burned’, and thus ‘any Parisian over twenty-two years old 
was at liberty to invent and reinvent an entirely bogus nativity.’12 This ‘crisis of identity’ – as 
Bertillon himself called it – and the accompanying ‘extraordinary traffic in false documents’ 
flourished without any control. These three components (the vagrant, the unemployed, and 
the anarchist) merged ‘into a single composite figure of social menace’13
 
 and created the 
political backdrop for a scientific search for the definition and the need for control of the body 
and the biotype of the criminal. 
The textual context Sekula intends to create in ‘The Body and the Archive’ essay draws on 
two intertwining – and to a certain degree complementary – scientific pursuits in the 18th and 
19th centuries, physiognomy and phrenology. The traces that the ‘pencil of nature’ (Talbot) 
writes on the human face appear already in Lavater, who systematised this scientific area, 
and, as a result, these traces become indices to be read and deciphered in the same way as 
doctors read the symptoms of illnesses and detectives deduce information from clues.14
                                                 
11 Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 33. 
 As I 
have already stated in connection with semiotics and art history, the problem with the 
analogy between these systems and art history is that it presupposes only one possibility for 
this deciphering, only one correct context as the framework of a given set of sign or 
12 Ibid., pp. 33–34. 
13 Ibid., p. 33. 
14 Ibid., p. 11. 
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symptoms. Such as the case of Morelli’s method, which posits the same principles that of 
Lavater, that certain signs or features of the human body (or artworks) are in a metonymic 
relationship with the whole person (or artwork), and thus they are capable of telling much 
more about the person (and the artwork) then they actually denote. When Bertillon later 
invented the ‘portrait-parlé’ – the ‘speaking-likeness’ or ‘verbal portrait’, it was meant to be 
‘an attempt to overcome the inadequacies of a purely visual empiricism.’15
 
 In his taxonomic 
system Bertillon followed Lavater and his special attention to such morphological details as 
the ear. 
‘Since physiognomy and phrenology were comparative, taxonomic disciplines, they sought to 
encompass an entire range of human diversity. In this respect, these disciplines were 
instrumental in constructing the very archive they claimed to interpret.’16 This is an important 
comment from Sekula, as it points to the way in which the ideological justification of the 
archival mode based on these two sciences was used – and abused. It also shows how 
scientific realism directly influenced the organisation of social life and, indirectly, mid-19th-
century aesthetic ideas on realism (both in literature and in the visual arts).17 For Sekula, the 
‘usually ignored field of instrumental and scientific and technical realism’ serves as ‘evidence 
of a crisis of faith in optical empiricism’ that helps us to deconstruct ‘an overly monolithic or 
unitary model of nineteenth-century realist discourse.’18 Thus the optical model provided by 
the camera cannot adequately be equalled with the ‘truth-apparatus’ of the period; the 
camera was only part of a larger system of ‘bureaucratic-clerical-statistical system of 
“intelligence.” This system can be described as a sophisticated form of the archive.’19
                                                 
15 Ibid., p. 30 (original italics). 
 The 
scientific realism behind physiognomy and most of all phrenology was, in its turn, far from 
neutral. It functioned as an ideological background ‘to legitimate on organic grounds the 
dominion of intellectual over manual labor […] the ideological hegemony of capitalism that 
16 Ibid., p. 12. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 16. 
19 Ibid. 
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increasingly relied upon a hierarchical division of labor.’20 Paradoxically, though, even with 
the development of these elaborate taxonomies, all bodies ended up being ‘either bourgeois 
or subject to the dominion of bourgeoisie.’21
 
 
As a special field for controlling bodies which fall outside of this bourgeois normality, Joan 
Copjec examines the photographic images that were produced – under the suggestive title 
Iconographie – in the Salpêtrière mental asylum by J.-M. Charcot in Paris in 1887–88.22 The 
pictures exclusively depict women who are diagnosed with hysteria – for the obvious reason 
that hysteria was considered a feminine mental illness at that time. Astonishingly, though, 
Copjec seems to defend Charcot’s fundamentally masculine position by referring to his 
definition of this mental illness. For Charcot, hysteria ‘is a disease of the imagination, of the 
production of images cut off from the natural,’23 which is a definition that cannot be 
associated with gender specificity, thus, at its face value, seem to address to a generic 
mental condition. At the end of her essay Copjec formulates her oblique strategy of 
neglecting Charcot’s underlying and implicit gender bias.24 In defending her position, she 
underlies that Charcot’s scientific importance lies in his demonstrating that hysteria was not a 
gendered mental illness, yet she admits that, ‘all the photographs in the Iconographie are 
images of women.’25
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 12. 
 In my opinion, though, the strategy of overlooking the gender of 
Charcot’s visual demonstration material is a universalistic claim that does not help the 
maintenance of the feminist perspective in her analysis. This is because Copjec endeavours 
21 Ibid., p. 15. 
22 Joan Copjec, ‘Flavit et Dissipati Sunt’, October 18 (Autumn 1981), pp. 20–40. It is hard to miss the 
structural similarity between Charcot’s project and Panofskyan art history that comes back in Copjec’s 
essay when, describing Charcot’s method, she claims that, ‘observable facts are primary and theory in 
an additive, syntactic transcription of them. A good clinician is one who has a fineness of sensibility, 
which fineness shades over to an appreciation of art […]’ (Copjec, ‘Flavit et Dissipati Sunt’, op. cit., p. 
27). According to Copjec, Charcot’s photographs indeed display an artistic sensibility that 
distinguishes his pictures from other contemporary clinical representations. 
23 Copjec, op. cit., p. 30 (emphasis added). 
24 Ibid., p. 40. 
25 Ibid. 
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to ‘dismantle the master’s house with the master’s tool,’26
 
 which in her case is exactly that 
understanding of universalism which feminism has been fighting against. 
It would be impossible to outline the ramifications of the ways in which mental illnesses 
entered representation as a source of danger to society; recurrent contemporary discourses 
amply demonstrate the prevalence of this fear of the mentally ill. Moreover, since this field so 
closely intersects with psychoanalysis proper and its historiography, it would be impossible to 
discuss it from the perspective of that discipline, even within the framework of my 
interdisciplinary aims. Bearing in mind that Copjec’s essay focuses rather on the critical 
discussion of Charcot’s clinical project, its afterlife and influences on Freud (and indirectly on 
Sartre), the essay is interesting for two reasons in this present context. One is related to the 
representation of obscene bodies – obscene in the etymological sense of the term, as 
something outside of the scene – and to the ways and modes in which they may enter into 
visual representation. The other important area in Copjec’s text is her analysis of the 
character of these images. 
 
There is a detectable element of resistance in Charcot’s pictures as opposed to the images 
of the criminal in Sekula’s essay, even if the former ones are much indebted to contemporary 
physiognomic researches. The hysteric is considered a malign trickster who, being fully 
aware of his/her machinations, tries to promote an image of him/herself in ‘confusing 
categories of real and unreal […] perceptions […] making the physician a potential victim of 
trickery and deception and casting doubt on his senses which were the foundation of his 
knowledge […].’27
                                                 
26 I refer here to Tania Modleski, ‘Some Functions of Feminist Criticism, or the Scandal of the Mute 
Body’, October 49 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–24. 
 In my view it is not so much the question whether this is indeed the way in 
which the hysteric behaves, but that this is how his/her behaviour is feared to be a threat to 
scientifically founded knowledge on the one hand, and how this behaviour is capable of 
27 Copjec, ‘Flavit et Dissipati Sunt’, op. cit., p. 23. 
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symbolically restoring the unbalanced power relationship of the hysteric and the physician on 
the other. 
 
Similarly to the photographic records that are the focus of Sekula’s essay, the images of the 
mentally ill were also created as visual supports for scientific research and to illustrate the 
conclusive remarks of scientific knowledge production on hysteria. In both cases, there exists 
an obvious interplay between the visual and the verbal but in psychoanalysis this exchange 
is underwritten by an age old, almost atavistic belief in the word/image dichotomy. As Copjec 
stresses, Freud himself distinguished a border between the two areas of representation, ‘the 
analysand is on one side with images, the analyst on the other with thoughts.’28
 
 This setup 
already contains, by its mere existence, a division of power founded and ‘legitimised’ in this 
historical dichotomy. All this is complemented with a dichotomy of reality and its 
representation, which, in the case of the ways in which the hysteric patients function, is 
manifested in the analyst’s fear of deception on the part of the patients. 
Another interesting example for the word/image dichotomy is the instance of irony that 
Copjec mentions but does not further in relation to this. For her, irony is a question of 
representation even in the negative sense in which she discusses the visual accuracy of 
Charcot’s images, and she formulates her disbelief in the possibility of this accuracy exactly 
in relation to the proper physiognomic expression of such ‘mental constructions’ as irony as 
opposed to the expression of emotional states like repugnance and terror. Copjec herself 
poses the question, ‘What should a photograph of irony look like?’29 For her the irony of this 
particular representation lies exactly in the fact that these images are made of hysterics 
‘which means precisely that they are all under the sign of irony, of deception, that what 
seems, what appears, is not.’30
                                                 
28 Ibid., p. 20. 
 This does not only mean that Copjec shares the 19th-century 
opinion about the hysterics’ deliberate deception (which, in the case of the histerics, I would 
29 Ibid., p. 25. 
30 Ibid., p. 26 (original italics). 
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prefer to take as an instance of feminine resistance), but also takes irony as a visual function 
as opposed to another understanding of irony as a function of language.31 In this sense, even 
the visual sign needs to appear in a context or situation that is obviously created by extra-
visual elements and this is why her question is, indeed, ironic, but the image of the hysteric 
woman is not capable of representing irony since ‘no sentence [or visual representation] is 
ironic per se’.32
 
 
One of Copjec’s most crucial points is when she claims a structural parallel between the 
theory of hysteria and that of mimesis on the basis of the patients’ ‘mimicry of physical 
diseases, and of the imitation produced by hypnosis.’33 In her discussion of mimesis she 
relies on the theories of Sartre and Lacan, where one can find a sort of a linear temporality in 
the creation and reception of works of art, starting with the ‘emotion of the painter’ (or with 
T.S. Eliot, the ‘object’) that, after being ‘sensed’ (‘painter’), is translated into a ‘a work of art’ 
(‘painting’) which on its turn is ‘sensed’ again (‘viewer’) and that evokes an ‘emotion in the 
viewer’ (‘object’).34 As Copjec claims, between the (first) object and the painting ‘there is a 
relationship of equivalence’; the painting ‘is not the embodiment’ of the object, ‘not the 
externalization of a mental state’.35 This ‘long parenthesis’36
 
 on a specific understanding of 
mimesis – forwarded mostly by Sartre and to a lesser degree by Lacan – serves, for Copjec, 
to connect her discussion of hysteria to Husserl and phenomenology which – according to 
her goal that she formulates at the end of the essay – allows her to avoid the structural and 
ideological critique of these images. 
                                                 
31 See Richard Rorty, Esetlegesség, irónia és szolidaritás, Jelenkor, Pécs, 1994, p. 89; and Jonathan 
Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature, Cornell Univ. Press, 
Ithaca and New York, 1975, pp. 154–156. 
32 Culler, Structuralist Poetics, op. cit., p. 154 (original italics). 
33 Copjec, ‘Flavit et Dissipati Sunt’, op. cit., p. 30. 
34 Ibid., p. 33. 
35 Ibid., pp. 33–34. 
36 Ibid., p. 35. 
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In order to bring the analysis back to ‘The Body and the Archive’ essay and to a very different 
way of politicising the representation of the body, I would like to bring an early photographic 
work of Sekula into the discussion in order to open up the politicised visual field and also to 
demonstrate the intertwining relationship between his texts and his images. The Untitled 
slide projection from 1972 is a sequence of black and white images in which we see workers 
leaving the factory after their daily shift.37 There is a recurrence of this topic in the 
representation of workers; the earliest example is perhaps the Lumière brothers’ film from the 
very end of the 19th century. An interesting piece with the same topic is the painting by Bart 
van der Leck from 1910. In both cases – those of the painting and the Lumière film – men 
are to be seen with women together as an indication for a different gender structure that we 
know from the bourgeoisie. Harun Farocki’s film with the same title uses the original Lumière 
45-second-long sequence in order to bring together films, which depict workers within the 
factory and demonstrate that most films start exactly with the moment when ‘workers are 
leaving the factory’.38 Farocki also claims that the original Lumière footage already contains 
the germs for the disappearance of the visibility of physical work, which today is manifested 
in the geographical dislocation of global capital. Thus the representation of labour also 
regulates the way in which it is possible to envisage work; an idea that leads us to another 
aspect of the representation of work that is not related to the question of ‘what is shown,’39 
but rather to another inquiry, i.e. ‘who is authorized to look at whom with what effects’.40
 
 In 
this sense, Andreas Fogarasi’s video Arbeiter verlassen das Kulturhaus (2006) is only 
capable of registering the fact that the workers are gone forever – not only from the factory, 
but in Fogarasi’s case from the cultural houses, too – the factory has been demolished and 
its site has been turned into a shopping mall. 
                                                 
37 Collection of the Generali Foundation, Vienna. 
38 See also Elio Petri, La classe operaia va in paradiso [The Working Class Goes to Heaven]. The film 
shared the Grand Prix with another film, The Mattei Affair, at the Cannes Film Festival in 1972. 
39 Griselda Pollock, ‘Feminism/Foucault – Surveillance/Sexuality’, p. 15, in Norman Bryson, Michael 
Ann Holly and Keith Moxey (eds.), Visual Culture: Images and Interpretations, Wesleyan Univ. Press, 
Hanover and London, 1994, pp. 1–41. 
40 Ibid. 
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This brief survey has no intention of turning into a genealogy of how the location of physical 
work has shifted from the centres to the margins, but as Sekula’s work demonstrates, 
physical work hasn’t become extinct. At the time of Lumière, or even in 1972, capital was 
physically located in the same place with the workers, but today they are very far from each 
other geographically. This shift in the visibility of work from pre-Fordist to post-Fordist 
capitalism, in my view, coincides with what was noticeable at the time of the first Gulf War 
when the technology was there to broadcast the war itself live and globally – there were no 
bodies, either dead or alive, shown. The visible confrontation between the workers and 
capital are reduced to such events as the WTO meetings and other symbolic territories 
where the participants of these protests are not even those Third World workers who can 
hardly survive in their shameful working and living conditions, but those who share solidarity 
with them in the Benjaminian sense.41 This is probably the reason why such movements, as 
the Zapatista uprising (in 1994) and the large-scale strikes in France (in 1990s) are so highly 
estimated within the global justice movement – because in these cases the strikers are the 
same people as the victims of injustice.42
 
 
To continue with the representation of the working class, Sekula’s ‘The Body and the 
Archive’ essay is about the construction of the criminal body (and social deviance) via the 
means of visual representation in the form of the newest technology of the time, i.e. 
photography.43 This was accompanied by other ‘scientific’, taxonomic methods to create the 
biotype of the criminal.44
                                                 
41 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Author as Producer’, in Peter Demetz (ed.), Reflections, Schocken Books, 
New York, 1986, pp. 220–238. 
 The construction of the biotype is important in the sense that it 
bears the ‘organically’ visible signs of Otherness as opposed to the bourgeoisie. 
Photography, however, was also instrumental in the creation of other kinds of bodies to 
reinforce and maintain the image of the bourgeois as a form of social and cultural norm. As 
42 Begg, ‘Recasting Subjectivity’, op. cit., p. 626. 
43 August Sander’s ‘archive’ is a more sophisticated project that 19th-century taxonomies of 
physiognomy and phrenology, and Sander also questions realism in those 19th-century senses. See 
Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 12. 
44 Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 16. 
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complementary to Sekula’s ‘The Body and the Archive’ essay and also to his ongoing artistic 
concern with the visual representation of the working class and the suppressed in 
conjunction with a critique of capitalism,45 I would like to mention Griselda Pollock’s text in 
which she discusses 19th-century representations of working women through the lenses of 
Foucault and from a feminist perspective.46
 
 
In the essay, Pollock introduces her argument with a provoking subtitle ‘Classing the Body’ 
by which she means two interrelated territories. One is, of course, the way representations of 
the body get classified, or archived, and the other, perhaps more interesting one, is how 
representations betray or conceal their subjects’ social background in terms of class and 
what the ideologies behind this twofold endeavour are.47 What is important in Pollock’s 
analysis is that she introduces a feminist perspective and discusses images within the dual 
matrix of class and gender in the face of the Foucauldian reading of the Marxist class 
system. In my view, this is a crucial step, since it would be erroneous to speak about the 
representation of the human body as unified and universal in the ‘post-feminist’ age. It is 
almost a direct counter-argument against the concept of the worker that appears in Marx 
where the worker becomes ‘the abstract embodiment of labor power’ and is implicitly male.48
 
 
Pollock’s project in her essay ‘concerns relation in representation between bourgeois men 
and working women […] the conditions under which working-class women became the object 
of fascinated looking and of a disciplinary investigation in the nineteenth century.’49
                                                 
45 Ibid., p. 12. 
 ‘What 
were the pleasures of looking at representations of bodies that escaped or deviated from the 
bourgeois semiotics of the gendered and sexualized bodies of man and woman? These 
46 Pollock, ‘Feminism/Foucault – Surveillance/Sexuality’, op. cit. 
47 Another way of representing and classifying women in the 19th century was to relegate them to the 
position of the mentally disturbed. This is discussed by Joan Copjec, ‘Flavit et Dissipanti Sunt’, op. cit. 
See also Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 16. 
48 Sekula refers here to Karl Marx’s Capital (London, New Left Books, vol. 1, 1976, pp. 440–441), in 
‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 20. 
49 Pollock, ‘Feminism/Foucault – Surveillance/Sexuality’, op. cit., p. 9. 
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representations circulated both as part of the bourgeois deployment of sexuality amongst the 
proletariat and as an exciting defiance of it. They thus momentarily inched across the field of 
desire and law to proffer pornographic pleasure in the most unlikely fields—the fields of 
knowledge and power, where sexuality and surveillance mutually constructed each other in 
the interests of bourgeois men.’50
 
 
Pollock draws on many historical examples ranging from Van Gogh to Meunier, including not 
only a 19th-century French woman artist Cécile Douard, but also representations of female 
workers by male artists. Yet the most interesting, and perhaps less known, of her examples, 
are from the ‘extended field’ outside of ‘the domain of high art’,51 two sets of photographic 
images which were produced of working women, miners – one as visual evidence to support 
a petition for the House of Commons in 1863 to prohibit employing females on the basis of 
their indecent costumes. (They were wearing the same trousers as men did.) The other 
series of images was produced of the same women posing in their Sunday outfits to support 
the mine owners’ wish to ‘defend their access to cheap female labour’ by demonstrating the 
decency of these women.52
 
 This latter follows the ‘standardized rhetoric’ for representations 
of both women and bourgeois sitters in general. The first series, however, may strike us as a 
result the women’s recurring poses, especially their posture of resting a hand on the hip, a 
gesture that alone could be a starting point for further analysis of the visual rhetorics of 
women’s representations, but I would like to follow another line now which is related to the 
figure of the ‘working girl’ both as a group of concrete women and also as a structural sign of 
capitalist society. 
The term ‘working girl’ is commonly known as a slang designation for ‘prostitute’, but it 
probably dates back to the late 19th century when women started being employed in larger 
numbers not only in factories but also in offices, shops and the newly opened department 
                                                 
50 Ibid., p. 10. 
51 Ibid., p. 15. 
52 Ibid., p. 20. 
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stores. Since they had to move around in the city to go to work and then back home without 
appropriate male companionship, men deliberately mistook them for prostitutes and 
assaulted them. To use Griselda Pollock’s formulation, ‘The virgin/whore axis is written upon 
a social division of lady/working woman.’53 In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, manuals 
were circulated among employed women in London and Paris with exact descriptions of 
‘safe’ itineraries for them to follow. Many of them tried to organise themselves into groups 
with other working women from their neighbourhood in order to avoid unwanted solicitation 
from men on their way to or from work. Parallel to this, many working class women 
occasionally turned to prostitution to provide extra income for the family. This is exactly the 
landscape of late 19th-century urban life in which Jack the Ripper operated.54
 
 
Coming back to Griselda Pollock, her essay has manifold ramifications with Sekula’s textual 
and visual work which cannot be fully covered here, but one that I find especially important in 
the face of contemporary representations of politicised bodies is related to the ways in which 
these 19th-century representations engage with difference. The working women’s bodies bear 
no signs of sexual difference, they are ‘masquaraded’ as men, and thus ‘difference is 
seemingly suspended’, or as Sekula formulated it in the context of criminal archives, ‘zones 
of deviance and respectability could [not] be clearly demarcated.’55
 
 Yet these images were, 
indeed, subversive compared to traditional representations of the same women, bearing all 
the morally decent signs of femininity. 
It seems to me that this blurring of the clear boundaries correlates with a projection and a 
resulting fear of the possibility of blurring other boundaries of social relations ‘based on 
private property to the extent that the legal basis of the self lies in the model of property 
                                                 
53 Ibid., p. 34, and also p. 25. 
54 Judith R. Walkowitz, City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London, 
Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992. 
55 Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 14. 
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rights, in what has been termed “possessive individualism”.’56 The seemingly ‘rational’ legal 
discourse is put forward as an aid in enhancing psychological self-defence mechanisms. In 
this moral context the figure – or one of the emblematic embodiments – of the blurred or 
invisible boundaries between ‘normality’ and danger is the exceptional criminal genius who 
was invented as visibly ‘indistinguishable from the bourgeois, save for a conspicuous lack of 
moral inhibition.’57
 
 
In my view, today it is quite common that representations of the ‘Other’ that bear no sign of 
their otherness paradoxically end up being more subversive than those images which are 
proliferated with signs of difference. One example of this is Rosalind Nashashibi’s film 
Hreash House,58
 
 which shows one day of the life of an extended Palestinian family living a 
collective existence in a concrete block in Nazareth during Ramadan. Nashashibi’s film is 
highly ideological, but not along the well-known lines of media representations in which 
Palestinians appear either as perpetrators of terrorist acts or as victims of mostly Israeli 
military violence. Nashashibi endeavours to de-trivialise Palestinians by showing this 
particular family’s daily routine devoid of the double cliché of media images, i.e. the 
dichotomy of the victim and the terrorist. 
There is a similar and recurring subtext or project/ of de-trivialisation in Sekula’s photographs 
of workers and anti-globalists.59
                                                 
56 Ibid., p. 7. 
 This is achieved partly by the emphatic textual component of 
his work, and partly by certain visual rhetorical elements, such as the camera’s spatial 
position vis-à-vis the subjects of the images, or – similarly to Nashashibi – by showing, for 
example, the members of the global justice movement differently from the ways in which 
widely circulated media pictures do. Another important element, which is partly rhetorical and 
partly a more profound inquiry of the well-known premises of photography, is Sekula’s long-
57 Ibid., p. 15. 
58 Rosalind Nashashibi, Hreash House, 20 mins., colour, 16 mm. 
59 Tania Modleski mentions the idea of de-trivialisation in relation to feminism (feminism de-trivialises 
women), p. 18, in Tania Modleski, ‘Some Functions of Feminist Criticism’, op. Cit., pp. 3–24. 
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invested interest in the use of double images or sequences, or I could even say, in what is 
normally called the ‘photo essay’.60 Sekula indirectly questions what is traditionally taken as 
the basic unit of photography, the singular and isolated image: ‘singular’ in the sense of the 
basic unit which is supposedly capable of meaning making, and ‘isolated’ in a way that is 
deprived of any extra-visual information, or a context, let alone a caption. In his view, the 
archival mode is reproduced very often in photographic books and exhibitions, thus 
reinforcing ‘both the authority and the illusory neutrality of the archive’.61
 
 His anti-archival 
drive results in a counter-archival practice that is not only a critique of the archive per se, but 
also a critique of the social conditions of the archival mode. 
It is in the conjunction of the archive, the representation of the outcast, and the question of 
the photographic unit that the project of Francis Galton, an English statistician and the 
founder of eugenics, can be interpreted. Galton, who was a cousin of Charles Darwin 
himself, ‘invented a method of composite portraiture’,62 which served as a visual support – or 
a Sekula puts it, an ‘epistemological tool’63 – for his political programme of ‘social betterment 
through breeding’.64 This utilitarian ideology served as the ‘biologization’65 of the English 
class system and a justification for reducing the number of the ‘unfit’ in the face of the 
bourgeois fear of existing birth rates according to which there was a decline among the 
middle-classes and a definitive growth among the poor.66 With his composite photographs, 
Galton also seems to have erased the border between ‘the criminal and the working class 
poor, the residuum that so haunted the political imagination of the late-Victorian bourgeoisie 
[…] this meant that he merely included the criminal in the general pool of the “unfit”.’67
                                                 
60 Sekula explicitly rejects the term ‘photo-essay’. 
 For 
61 Allan Sekula, ‘Reading an Archive: Photography between Labour and Capital’ (1983), in David 
Campany (ed.), Art and Photography, Phaidon, 2003, p. 217. 
62 See Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 18. For an illustration of composite portraiture, 
see Sekula, p. 45. 
63 Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 46. 
64 Ibid., p. 42. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., p. 44. An example of this is the series those composite images he made of officers and 
‘enlisted men of the Royal Engineers’ (Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 50). 
67 Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 50. 
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Sekula, Galton’s activity is not so much about the ways in which visual representations are 
produced, but more an example of ‘an overdetermined instance of biopositivism’.68
 
 
Sekula himself poses the question that addresses the reasons for the relatively quick and 
easy embrace of the photographic archive into ‘police work and an emerging social science 
of criminology.’69 One crucial feature of the archive is the way in which it creates a ‘general 
equivalence between the images’70 in the sense that each image is taken as a unit and there 
is no hierarchy among these units. Archival classification is based on a paradigmatic 
relationship among its units but this is capable of conveying a false sense of equality when it 
comes to retrieval. It is in this sense that Sekula furthers the limited linguistic analogy, ‘The 
photographic archive’s components are not conventional lexical units, but rather are subject 
to the circumstantial character of all that is photographable.’71 Yet this imaginary ‘dictionary 
of photographs’ is possible only on condition of disregarding the specificities ‘of individual 
images in favour of some model of typicality,’72
 
 as for example in iconography. 
If we want to translate this to works of art, then an exhibition (or photographs in an album or 
in a book for that matter) could stand for such a framework, and the modernist design for 
displaying art objects corresponds with the striving for archival equality. This design was 
‘invented’ and first used on the occasion of an exhibition of the paintings of Cézanne, 
Gauguin, Seurat and Van Gogh which took place at The Museum of Modern Art in New York 
in the autumn of 1929 and was – to use this term as anachronistic in this historical context – 
‘curated’ by Alfred H. Barr, MoMA’s first and then director. He broke with the previous 
exhibition design practice and hung the pictures on plain, neutral walls without placing one 
                                                 
68 Ibid., p. 46. That the images themselves proved to be useless since they were too blurred and 
unclear is another point of criticism that Sekula raises (p. 47). A counter-example that Sekula mentions 
is a composite photograph by the sociologist-photographer Lewis Hine, which he made of girls working 
in a cotton mill and with which Hine intended to demonstrate the negative bodily effects of children’s 
employment in factories (Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 53). 
69 Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 17. ‘Criminology hunted “the” criminal body. 
Criminalistics hunted “this” or “that” criminal body’ (p. 18). 
70 Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 17. 
71 Ibid., p. 17. 
72 Ibid., p. 17. 
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above the other, as the result of a new method of visual interpretation. ‘The idea was to let 
the pictures stand on their own feet’ – as Barr’s wife formulated it.73 This intellectually 
defined, although aesthetically structured ‘method of presentation has now become […] 
institutionalised,’74
 
 as the ‘white cube’. The monolithic and fundamentally ideological nature 
of this mode of presentation is revealed when we compare it with the displays of 
ethnographic museums that are – even today – ‘visual jumbles’ rather than intellectually 
staged objects for ‘monocular viewing’. 
Coming back to ‘The Body and the Archive’ essay, Sekula’s aim is also to construct a critical 
history of how photography and statistics intersected and resulted in providing a scientific 
method for the criminal archive, although this ‘intersection […] led to strikingly different 
results in the work of two different men: Alphonse Bertillon and Francis Galton.’75
 
 Their 
approach and work can be taken as dialectical opposites of the general and the particular – a 
common pursuit that many artists of the time shared. It is sufficient to think of Degas’ 
paintings of ballet rehearsals, in which individuality is ‘underwritten’ by a sense of belonging 
to a group and sharing all the signs with other members of this group; yet even at all those 
moments of unified movement, we see signs of individuality which become apparent exactly 
because of the unified behaviour of the group. 
Interestingly enough, though, statistics are capable of visually demonstrating how the 
average may become the norm. Sekula refers to Quetelet, a statistician who noticed that 
when working with a large enough social data, these end up producing a bell-shaped curve – 
similar to Gauss’ curvature – where the more we approach the central mean, the more data 
we find around it. So in terms of probability, data tend to fall around the average. When it 
comes to criminals, according to the principles of a kind of ‘moral statistics,’ the probability 
                                                 
73 Quoted by Marian Mazzone, ‘The East Sees the West, But Can the West See the East?: Exhibiting 
NSK in America’, conference paper, ‘Ethics and Visuality: Constructing Social Space’ conference, 
University of Pécs, Hungary, June 4–6, 2000. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 18. 
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was high that people fell into the average non-criminal mean, which seemed to suspend free 
will or choice, even if the average was ‘a statistical fiction’.76 Physiognomy and phrenology 
was there to prove that social deviance correlated with physical ‘deviation from “normality”.’77
 
 
Yet the approach of Bertillon, director of the Identification Bureau of the Paris Prefecture of 
Police, did not concentrate on defining a ‘criminal type’, but on reconciling empirical police 
work with scientific principles.78 In this sense his method – and archival mode – can be 
paralleled with the standardisation of factory work as it was theorised by Taylor. In Taylorism, 
the work process is, on the one hand fragmented into smaller units, and on the other, these 
units in their turn should be able to be repeated and performed in an exactly identical manner 
an infinite number of times. Chronophotography is not only based on the same principles of 
standardisation, but also served as an instrument in the enhancement of productivity in such 
diverse areas as horse breeding and lean manufacturing.79 In this field the camera was a tool 
or a prosthesis that allowed the rendering intelligible of those phenomena that were 
otherwise imperceptable to the ‘naked’ eye. In this respect I disagree with Joan Copjec, who 
draws a parallel between the goals of Muybridge’s and Charcot’s methods, since the latter’s 
images functioned as illustrations for something that was already visible, but needed to be 
recorded for scientific purposes.80
 
 
Bertillon’s system was widely received enthusiastically, especially in the United States as an 
apt form of a ‘standardization of police methods’, yet it soon had to face the competing 
system of fingerprints, which proved to be, in semiotic terms, ‘a more radically synecdochic 
procedure’, as Sekula notes.81
                                                 
76 Ibid., pp. 21–22. 
 With fingerprints, a small, visually interpretable – indexical – 
trace of the body serves the basis for identification, which allows subjective elements to 
77 Ibid., p. 22, also p. 34. 
78 Ibid., p. 23. 
79 One of the most famous and entertaining critiques of Taylorism is visualised by Chaplin in Modern 
Times (1936). 
80 Copjec, ‘Flavit et Dissipati Sunt’, op. cit., p. 26. 
81 Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 34. 
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interfere to a much lesser degree. In addition, ‘fingerprinting was more promising in a 
Taylorist sense, since it could be properly executed by less-skilled clerks.’82
 
 In relation to the 
workers’ social position and to the condition of their legal rights, it is interesting to note that 
fingerprinting in this context demonstrates the anti-worker and anti-skill logic of Taylorism, 
which fragmented the process of production to such an extent that it did not require much 
skill or an overview of the entirety of the process. Thus workers became easily 
interchangeable and dispensable. 
This is in direct opposition to the efforts of the Photo Secession and other related artistic 
movements at the beginning of the 20th century when, according to artists’ claims, the visible 
marks of photographic hand labour gained a high prestige as opposed to the mechanically 
reproducible multitude of images or commodities. This elitist strategy, which valorised ‘the 
elegant few’ at the expense of ‘the mechanized many’,83 has disappeared by the 1920s, but 
recurs every now and then since (and is still prevalent in the Hungarian photographic scene). 
As Sekula comments, photographers adopted the visual rhetorics of the archival mode, even 
if this adoption cannot be taken as a unified approach to this paradigm. One of the most 
interesting examples is August Sander and his series of German people, which can be taken 
as an encyclopaedic survey of the Germans, but also as a profound disbelief in the 
possibilities of producing such an all encompassing overview of a ‘nation’.84
 
 
As a conclusion of ‘The Body and the Archive’ essay, Sekula claims that there was a ‘general 
demise of an optical model of empiricism’ already detectable by the 1910s, even if the 
position of photography as an objective technical means of visualisation in the natural 
                                                 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid., p. 58. 
84 Sander’s project also questions, albeit implicitly, the definition of a nation by purely visual means. 
One of the key tools in dismantling these received notions – such as nation, or professions – is 
Sander’s dismissal of his sitters’ full names. Sekula mentions Walker Evans as one of the main figures 
of the anti-archival movement; it is because of Evans’ relationship to the institutionalisation of 
photography that I discuss Sekula’s point (p. 59) in the chapter that deals with the ways in which 
photography ended up being institutionalised. 
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sciences had not changed much. Photography’s previously held potential for overall ‘truth 
claims’ receded, especially in the social sciences.85 There have been instances, though, of 
politicised, ideologically charged photographic projects which were born out of an 
instrumentalised need for social improvement, such as a the famous FSA (Farm Security 
Administration) project that endeavoured at recording the devastating social repercussions 
and human effects of the economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Yet these 
projects did not necessarily endeavour to create an all encompassing, ‘universal’ archive of a 
given subject from a specific perspective, since their relationship to the dichotomy of the 
individual and the universal was resolved by their bias for the individual. It was no longer a 
question of speaking about the average man, but of creating images of the idiosyncratic 
Other with a different ideological agenda in the background. Nevertheless, photography’s 
legitimacy has been still based on the archival mode and its ‘encyclopaedic authority’, whose 
‘shadowy presence […] authenticated the truth claims made for individual photographs.’86
 
 
Although Sekula’s essay does not explicitly focus on a semiotic understanding of 
photography, even in its documentary form, he makes a brief attempt to connect the archival 
mode as it appears in the work of Bertillon and Galton to the theory of signs and to one of its 
founders, Charles Sanders Peirce. In Peirce’s triadic typology, the index is a sign that is 
connected to its referent by a causal effect, while in the case of symbols – such as verbal 
language – this relationship is wholly arbitrary or conventional. Peirce mentions the 
photograph as an instance of the indexical sign yet, as Sekula notes, even if Bertillon 
‘subordinates’ the picture ‘to the verbal text of the portrait parlé’, the photograph remains 
‘wedded to an indexical order of meaning.’87
                                                 
85 Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, pp. 53–54. 
 In his turn and as a form of an ‘apotheosis of the 
optical’, Galton ‘attempted to elevate the indexical photographic composite to the level of the 
symbolic’, as an outcome of a ‘general law’ that he was to create out of ‘contingent 
86 Ibid., pp. 57–58. 
87 Ibid., p. 55 (original italics). 
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instances’.88 Sekula compares Galton’s endeavour to Stieglitz’s (an artist from a younger 
generation than Galton) and other neosymbolists for whom the photograph meant a lot more 
than ‘a mere trace, something that would match or surpass the abstract capabilities of the 
imaginative or generalizing intellect.’89
 
 
As Sekula concludes, both Galton and Stieglitz believed in meaning stemming from the 
sign’s ‘organic’ properties, and were blind or ignorant of how meaning is ‘in fact certified by a 
hidden framing convention.’90 It is perhaps with a good reason, partly because the frame of 
the archive and that of science were considered neutral, thus non-existent, and partly 
because they both had another cause to defend beyond the meaning making and contextual 
capacities of their images. Yet Sekula ‘reproaches’ art historical approaches to photographic 
practices for ignoring the specific social field of image production and consumption that 
appears in the police archives. He explains this dismissal with a drive to maintain ‘a certain 
liberal humanist myth of the wholly benign origins of socially concerned photography.’91
 
 
Sekula is quite unique in his approach to bringing artists and ‘scientists’ together on the 
same platform (even if he has theoretically founded reasons for doing so). Generally there is 
a strict division between artistic and socially instrumental images, which very often results in 
attributing too much power to social application and too little to artistic usages. Since Sekula 
is himself an artist, the questions follow. How can pictures attain at least a certain level of 
power and on what level, in which context, and in what ways can this power be operative? I 
would like to argue with the metaphor of the prostitute in relation to promiscuity and 
‘permissiveness’ (Charles Esche92
                                                 
88 Ibid. 
) for the reclamation and the expansion of the – political – 
power of images that, in my view, is a specificity of Sekula’s work. 
89 Ibid., p. 55. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., p. 56. 
92 Sarah Pierce, ‘A Politics of Interpretation’, p. 162, in Paul O’Neill (ed.), Curating Subjects, De Appel, 
Amsterdam, pp. 159-173. 
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To start offering a possible answer to these questions, I would like to make use of W.J.T. 
Mitchell’s proposition, with which he wants to shift from the power model to the subaltern 
model when it comes to images and desire.93 In this context, it is no wonder ‘that the “default” 
position of images is feminine’ within the structure of the ‘opposition between woman as 
image and man as the bearer of the look.’94 In my view, it is the second, subaltern, model, 
which can be productively complemented by the model, or the metaphor of the prostitute in 
reclaiming political power to images. Prostitution itself – the act of selling one’s own body for 
the sexual gratification of the customer in exchange financial recompense – is not about a 
wish to sell indiscriminately and without any scruples, because that alone would not be 
considered as outrageous, abject, and something to be controlled or banned. Prostitution is 
neither about a moralising drive, nor a feminist cause. ‘[T]he prostitute is the ur-form of the 
wage labourer’, and at the same time a dangerous sign. As Susan Buck-Morss claims, in the 
case of ‘regular’ labour, ‘every trace of the wage labourer who produced the commodity is 
extinguished when it is torn out of context by its exhibition on display.’95 So the prostitute 
becomes dangerous as a sign, ‘as a dialectical image’96 that epitomizes capitalism’s 
mechanisms clearly and visibly, exactly because she simultaneously embodies and 
‘synthesizes’ both seller and commodity.97
 
 
The answer in the domain of art theory that Mitchell gives to his own question ‘what pictures 
want from us, what we have failed to give them, is an idea of visuality adequate to their 
                                                 
93 Mitchell, ‘What do Pictures Really Want?’, p. 74, October 77 (Summer 1996), pp. 71–82. 
94 Ibid., p. 75. Mitchell quotes Norman Bryson, ‘Introduction’, in Visual Culture: Images and 
Interpretation, op. cit., p. xxv. 
95 Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 1989, pp. 184–185. 
96 The idea of the relation of the dialectical image to Sekula’s work is raised by Ruth Sonderegger, 
‘Nichts als die reine Wahrheit? Ein Versuch, die Aktualität des Dokumentarischen mit den 
materialistischen Wahrheitstheorien Benjamins und Adornos zu verstehen’, p. 70, in Karin Gludowatz 
(ed.), Auf den Spuren des Realen: Kunst und Dokumentarismus, MuMok, Vienna, 2003, pp. 65–89. 
97 See Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing, op. cit., pp. 184–185; and Jennifer Doyle, Sex 
Objects: Art and the Dialectics of Desire, Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London, 2006, 
pp. 56–59. 
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ontology’;98 That is, we allow them to speak for themselves and we listen to what they have 
to say. All this sounds good until we try to place this into a poststructuralist framework and 
within existing theories of the Other. The Austrian philosopher Ruth Sonderegger takes a 
critical stance vis-à-vis the poststructuralist understanding of the relation between subject 
formation and political representability. Poststructuralism can be criticised for giving up the 
idea – even if it was for good theoretical reasons – of a coherent, self-sufficient, self-
contained and universal identity, and the possibility of its transparent representation. All this 
happened exactly at the moment when the ‘subaltern’ could have been given a voice. This 
has been paralleled by the loss of the belief in the transparency of the documentary as a 
result of various deconstructivist theories. As Sonderegger formulates it, ‘this took the carpet 
off from under the feet of those for whom the documentary could be still instrumental in their 
political agendas.’99 In this context, Jacqueline Rose’s comment about the ‘nostalgia for 
unmediated representation’100 sounds theoretically acceptable, but politically quite 
retrograde, since a consequent theoretical disbelief in ‘the homogenizing calls to the 
universal subject position of the working class’101
 
 would render political activism’s unifying 
aims impossible. 
Yet, the relationship between artistic and documentary representations should be envisaged 
in a more complex manner, and exactly for political reasons. As Sonderegger summarises it, 
‘A mere document cannot be art, as some say. For them, documents are essential parts of 
scientific, pedagogical, and legal proofs and demonstration materials, and one expects 
different things from art. Others are not even interested in the conflictual border between 
documents and art.’102
                                                 
98 Mitchell, ‘What do Pictures Really Want?’, op. cit., p. 82. 
 For them everything is representation, there is no truth and no reality, 
only opaque constructions. It is equally possible that some may even have a need to 
99 Sonderegger, ‘Nichts als die reine Wahrheit?’, op. cit., p. 67. 
100 Jacqueline Rose, ‘Sexuality and Vision: Some Questions’, p.117, in Hal Foster (ed.), Vision and 
Visuality, Seattle, Bay Press, 1988, pp. 115–127. 
101 Begg, ‘Recasting Subjectivity’, op. cit., p. 628. 
102 Sonderegger, ‘Nichts als die reine Wahrheit?’, op. cit., p. 65. 
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envisage a pure, ‘avant la lettre’ state for the documentary which, in fact, probably never 
existed, as John Grierson, the filmmaker from 1920s who first used the term ‘documentary’ in 
relation to film, reminds us in his text First Principles of Documentary: ‘Here [in the world of 
documentary proper] we pass from the plain (or fancy) descriptions of natural material, to 
arrangements, rearrangements, and creative shapings of it.’103 I agree with Sonderegger’s 
suggestions about the need to find alternatives between these polarities, and in my view the 
work of Sekula is an important instance in this quest.104 Particularly because the ‘abolition of 
the category of the referent’ – to formulate it in a semiotic way – would render the ‘alteration 
of material reality’ difficult or even impossible.105
 
 
It seems to me that one of Sekula’s answers to the dichotomy of aesthetics and politics lies 
in his recurrent use of the term ‘realism’ in conjunction with a variety of qualifying adjectives, 
such as ‘critical’, or ‘socially instrumental’, etc.106 ‘Socially instrumental realism’ is of course 
applied to describe the sort of realism that ‘was central to the process of defining and 
regulating the criminal.’107 This Sekula calls ‘new juridical photographic realism’,108
 
 the 
potential of which was recognised almost as early as the invention of the medium. This 
recognition stemmed from the need to regulate and observe a new ‘sub-proletarian’ class as 
a dangerous social Other onto which many fears of the upper classes were projected. 
As Sekula claims, the potential for using the medium of photography for different, and 
sometimes even opposing, purposes had been investigated ever since medium had first 
been invented and used. This duality of technology in general is a common dialectic, yet it is 
interesting to see to what extent the pioneers of photography were aware if it. Sekula 
                                                 
103 Quoted by Sonderegger, ‘Nichts als die reine Wahrheit?’, op. cit., p. 68. 
104 Sonderegger, ‘Nichts als die reine Wahrheit?’, op. cit., p. 69. 
105 Modleski, ‘Some Functions of Feminist Criticism’, op. cit., p. 17. 
106 Okwui Enwezor, ‘Archive Fever: Photography Between History and the Monument’, p. 26, in 
Archive Fever: Uses of the Document in Contemporary Art, Steidl/ICP, 2008, pp. 11–51. Enwezor 
mentions Hal Foster’s The Return of the Real, in which Foster coins the term “traumatic realism” in 
relation to the work of Andy Warhol and uses it as the title of a whole chapter (pp. 127–168). 
107 Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 7, and p. 62. 
108 Ibid., p. 5. 
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mentions Daguerre, and in particular Fox Talbot, both of whom recognized this duality; he 
writes: ‘we are confronting, then, a double system: a system of representation capable of 
functioning both honorifically and repressively.’109 According to Sekula, the pictorial genre in 
which the clearest dialectical form manifests itself is ‘photographic portraiture’, which on the 
one hand subverted ‘the privileges inherent in portraiture’ (in its original, 17th-century 
bourgeois form), and which on the other hand, as a form of illustration, provided subjects for 
a ‘generalized look—the typology—and the contingent instance of deviance and social 
pathology.’110
 
 Traditionally taken, the portraiture in its ‘ceremonial’ form belongs to the 
domain of art historical analysis, and the same genre in the second, ‘repressive’ form to the 
field of instrumental social usage. It is in this sense that Sekula’s text works on different 
premises, which from my temporal perspective can be labelled as ‘visual culture’ and not 
even an expanded form of art history per se. 
It is exactly the genre of the portrait that became the major instrument in Bertillon’s police 
archive. The ‘semantic value’ of the photographic portrait proved to be ‘the final conclusive 
sign in the process of identification.’111 The major shift in Bertillon’s method is related to 
standardisation; he was not only critical of the inconsistencies of earlier photographic 
practices, he also ‘argued for an aesthetically neutral standard of representation.’112 This new 
system consisted of ‘standard focal length, even and consistent lighting, and fixed distance 
between the camera and the unwilling sitter. The profile view served to cancel the 
contingency of expression; the contour of the head remained consistent with time. The frontal 
view […] served better in the search for suspects.’113
                                                 
109 Ibid., p. 6 (original italics). 
 It is interesting to note that this 
standardised mode of lighting and ‘objective’ presentation became an important visual 
rhetorical means later in the 1920s (August Sander), 1930s (Edward Weston), and 1980s 
110 Ibid., pp. 6–7 (original italics). 
111 Ibid., p. 29. 
112 Ibid., p. 30. 
113 Ibid. 
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(Robert Mapplethorpe) with artists whose work, to various degrees and from different 
positions, challenged objectivity and semantic equality. 
 
‘Against the grain’ of a monolithic reception of Foucault as the ruthless critical analyst of the 
mechanisms of power and repression, Sekula makes it clear that the duality of the 
technology also appears in Foucault’s writings. This means that a ‘positive therapeutic or 
reformative channelling of the body’ was present along with the appearance and the 
refinement of these scientific and technological inventions, as Foucault himself discusses.114 
Yet Sekula, while acknowledging this dialectics, claims that the inherent logic that is behind 
the refinement of this kind of ‘socially instrumental realism’ inevitably results in repression, 
since the conjunction of the technical and ‘the semantic refinement and rationalization of 
precisely this sort of realism was central to the process of defining and regulating the 
criminal.’115
 
 
When discussing realism, it seems to be obvious to think of the question Richard Rorty 
posed in the introduction to his famous book on the linguistic turn.116 Instead of asking the 
rhetorical question ‘Should we philosophize?’, Rorty inquires, ‘How should we 
philosophize?’.117 The same line of inquiry could be applied to realism when, instead of trying 
to define its meaning, we could perhaps aim at defining it in this indirect way, via its 
adjectives. As Sekula puts it, ‘Any interest that I had in artifice and constructed dialogue was 
part of a search for a certain “realism,” a realism not of appearances or social facts but of 
everyday experience in and against the grip of advanced capitalism.’118
                                                 
114 Ibid., p. 7, referring to Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1977) and Volume 1 of his History of 
Sexuality (1978). 
 I think the fact that 
115 Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 7. 
116 Richard Rorty, The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method, Univ. of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1992 (originally published in 1967). 
117 Ibid., p. 13. 
118 Jennifer E. Quick, ‘The Dialectics of Time: Reflections on the Work of Andreas Gursky, Omer Fast, 
and Allan Sekula’, p. 17, in Trajectories, pp. 14–19. 
http://www.postmastersart.com/artists/omer_fast/O%20Fast%200908%20Trajectories.pdf (accessed 
March 2, 2010) 
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Sekula applies the notion of realism in such a heterogeneous and even instrumental way is 
part of his ‘promiscuous’ overall strategy both as an artist and as a theorist. 
 
The question of the various understandings and strategies of realism leads us to the conflict 
between aesthetics and the documentary, which is a recurring topic in discussions on art, 
and with a good reason. This recurrence is probably an indication of the acuteness of the 
conflict, of its politically charged character, and of the impossibility of resolving their 
relationship once and for all. In contrast to her general statement on ‘the nostalgia for 
unmediated representation’, Jacqueline Rose mentions the example of the Black British film 
collective, Sankofa, and their production from the mid 1980s, Passion of Remembrance.119 
According to Rose, the film mixes two modes of representation, the surreal and cinéma 
vérité, precisely ‘at the level of cinematic form to represent their incommensurability and their 
relation.’120 The film makes use of ‘techniques which deconstruct the positionality of the 
spectator as controller of the field of vision […] This is a film whose political force stems from 
inmixing, from its refusal to settle the question of representation, in the way that it uses 
simultaneously what have been historically two antagonistic cinematic forms.’121
 
 
The reason why I mention Rose’s accurate comments on the representational strategy of this 
film is that I see a clear parallel with Sekula’s methods, which also serve to create a possible 
position, even if it is an unstable one, for politically engaged art. In my view it is exactly this 
mixed and unstable constellation of a position that is able to produce the possibility for 
political engagement in a wider sense. It is in this respect that Ruth Sonderegger speaks of 
‘the double identity of Sekula’s work.’122
                                                                                                                                                        
Quoted from Sekula’s Photography Against the Grain, Press of the Nova Scotia College of Art and 
Design, Nova Scotia, 1984. 
 This is manifested in his mixing of the styles of his 
textual elements and ‘captions’ – sometimes they take the form of a description, background 
119 The artist Isaac Julien was also founding member of Sankofa film collective. 
120 Jacqueline Rose, ‘Sexuality and Vision: Some Questions’, p. 125, in Hal Foster (ed.), Vision and 
Visuality, op. cit., pp. 115–127. 
121 Ibid., p. 125. 
122 Sonderegger, ‘Nichts als die reine Wahrheit?’, op. cit., p. 83. 
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information, theoretical reflection, etc., sometimes they are factual, personal, or ironic.123 One 
of the most famous cases in which this mixing of styles, modes and registers has already 
proved to be effective for political purposes is the Communist Manifesto, which also employs 
a variety of disparate elements, ranging from the gothic novel to fortune telling and even 
drawing on popular culture.124 In the case of ‘The Body and the Archive’ essay, the text also 
has a composite character in the sense that it mixes various discursive modes, ranging from 
historical analysis to aesthetic interpretation and from political claims to theoretical 
statements. Yet, as for all of Sekula’s activities, this is exactly – and paradoxically – its 
methodological, intellectual and political strength.125
 
 
It is in the conjunction of solidarity and the postmodernist critique of authorship that Sekula 
concludes his essay. For him, the story of the South African photographer Ernest Cole 
serves as a moral conclusion for the advice ‘to avoid an overly monolithic conception of 
realism,’126 with which he retrospectively, though implicitly, explains his promiscuous usage 
of the term. Cole was a Black South African photographer in the 1960s, who photographed 
everyday instances of the operation of ‘power, survival, and criminal resistance’ until his 
activity caught the police’s attention. He managed to flee South Africa with the images he 
had taken, which were published in 1967 under the title House of Bondage, after which he 
vanished ‘from the world of professional photojournalism.’127
 
 
Cole’s disappearance can be taken as an act of solidarity, and his photographs as instances 
for the ambiguous status of images. These pictures document the effects of oppression, but 
                                                 
123 Ibid., p. 85. 
124 See Peter Osborne, ‘Remember the Future? The Communist Manifesto as Cultural-Historical 
Form’, in Peter Osborne, Philosophy and Cultural Theory, Routledge, London and New York, 2000, 
pp. 63–77. 
125 At the end of his essay Sekula mentions the actuality of Bertillon’s and Galton’s presence, which is 
manifested in renewed forms of surveillance and also in works of art which deal with these 
repercussions. Yet, in the face of the attacks of 9/11, it would be too easy and also too far-fetched to 
extend this to the contemporary situation. Nevertheless, the resonance of ‘political issues […] can be 
heard in the aesthetic sphere’ (Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 62). 
126 Sekula, ‘The Body and the Archive’, op. cit., p. 64. 
127 Ibid. 
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also the act of committing petty crimes, depending on the framing intentions and contextual 
parameters of their readers. It is exactly at this point that Sekula calls for solidarity as a 
context-producing force, which may be useful in preventing ‘the cancellation’ of such 
testimonies as Cole’s. Solidarity – a nice, old-fashioned term which recurs in Sekula’s texts 
and images – may also lead us back to the beginning of this chapter. ‘Neither the contents, 
nor the forms, not the many receptions and interpretations of the archive of human 
achievements can be assumed to be innocent. And further, even the concept of “human 
achievements” has to be used with critical emphasis in an age of automation. The archive 
has to be read from below, from a position of solidarity with those displaced, deformed, 
silenced, or made invisible by the machineries of profit and progress.’128
 
 
                                                 
128 Sekula, ‘Reading an Archive’, op. cit., p. 218. 
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Chapter 5 
 
T H E  J U D G E M E N T  S E A T  O F  P H O T O G R A P H Y  
 
 
When considering and reconsidering October’s almost legendary relationship to 
photography, one soon encounters the fact that the number of essays published in the 
journal are far less numerous in comparison with their fame and impact on aesthetic 
discourses and art theory. For this reason it is crucial to examine the most important and 
influential claims of these texts on the one hand, and on the other to compare their aesthetic 
stance to other theoretical positions that appear outside of the journal. This investigation also 
aims at demonstrating the specificity of the medium, which partly manifests itself in its 
recurrent naming; no other artistic field has been so consistently differentiated from the other 
media by its own, self-proclaimed designation as photography has done.1 This endeavour by 
photography is underwritten by another assertion aimed at an aesthetic consideration of the 
medium. This approach not only dismisses the fact that the ‘ideas of aesthetic rightness’ 
within the aesthetic discourse are ‘mutable’,2
                                                 
1 A telling example of this, within the Hungarian context, is the existence of a separate board for 
photography at the Hungarian National Cultural Fund. On the international art scene one can think of 
the existence of specialised museums or journals of photography. 
 it is also in a conflictual relationship with a 
recurring claim from the 1970s that has been explicitly and implicitly formulated by such 
theorists and critics as Christopher Phillips, Allan Sekula, Victor Burgin, Clifford Geertz, 
Rosalind Krauss, Pierre Bourdieu, John Tagg, Martha Rosler and Abigail Solomon-Godeau, 
who all raise the need for a non-aesthetic, or a not exclusively aesthetic, discourse on 
photography. The ways in which these theorists outline the principles and methodologies of 
2 Martha Rosler, ‘In, Around, and Afterthoughts (On Documentary Photography)’, p. 186, in Martha 
Rosler, Decoys and Disruptions: Selected Writings, 1975–2001, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
and London, England, 2004, pp. 151–206. (Also published in Richard Bolton (ed.), The Contest of 
Meaning: Critical Histories of Photography, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 
1989, pp. 303–341.) 
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such an approach are nevertheless rather sporadic. This chapter aims to summarise and 
confront theoretical understandings of the institutionalisation of the photographic field. 
 
The question of photography’s institutionalisation is far less obvious than it seems at first 
sight. Douglas Crimp, a former and very influential editor of October whose impact on the 
journal’s editorial dealing with photography was decisive, makes an astute comment about 
the historical character of this institutionalisation in an essay which interestingly enough did 
not appear in October. According to Crimp, ‘If photography was invented in 1839, it was only 
discovered in the 1960s and 1970s—photography, that is, as an essence, photography 
itself.’3 For Crimp, the paradoxicality of this institutionalisation lies precisely in the fact that it 
happens at the moment when photography enters the museum, becomes autonomous, and 
starts to be framed by an exclusively and all encompassing, institutionally supported 
aesthetic discourse.4
 
 
One of the few texts in October that raises this question of photography’s institutionalisation 
is Christopher Phillips’s seminal essay entitled ‘The Judgement Seat of Photography’, 
published in issue 22 in 1982.5 The title of Phillips’ text is already suggestive in the sense 
that it is a quotation taken from Walter Benjamin’s essay ‘A Short History of Photography’.6
                                                 
3 Douglas Crimp, ‘The Museum’s Old, the Library’s New Subject’, in On the Museum’s Ruins, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 1993, pp. 66–83. Originally published in Parachute 
22, Spring 1981. The version published in On the Museum’s Ruins is obviously revisited since it 
contains references of essays that were published after the original 1981 publication of Crimp’s essay, 
such as Christopher Phillips’s text. See footnote 4 below. 
 
Phillips’s article starts with two mottos and within the context of my present aims, both bear a 
symbolic importance. The first motto comes from Walter Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay and 
4 Crimp, ‘The Museum’s Old’, op. cit., p. 74. 
5 Christopher Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat of Photography’, October 22 (Autumn 1982), pp. 27–63. 
6 In Phillips’s essay, in footnote 5, he probably refers to the first English-language publication of 
Benjamin’s essay in the journal Screen, vol. 13, no. 1 (Spring 1972) (trans. Stanley Mitchell). There is 
at least one other English language version of this essay available with the title ‘A Small History of 
Photography’ in Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street and Other Writings, Verso, London and New York, 
1979, pp. 240–257 (trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter). This is important only because 
there are differences between these two translations, and, interestingly, precisely between the 
formulations of this phrase. Instead of the term ‘judgement seat’, in the second version the translators 
employ the word ‘tribunal’. 
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underlines photography’s capacity for the production of an infinite number of perceptionally 
identical copies. The second is taken from Alfred Stieglitz, and states almost exactly the 
same as Benjamin. The first motto is interesting in the face of Benjamin’s American reception 
and the role October played in the promotion of Benjamin’s views on mechanical 
reproducibility, and Phillips’ essay is one instance within this history. 
 
As for Stieglitz, his statement is in a sharp contrast with his artistic endeavours and 
principles, and can be taken either as the manifestation of some wishful thinking or as a way 
of – not necessarily consistently – navigating between the polarities of photographic 
practices and theories of the time. In the face of October’s implicit editorial policy, it is no 
wonder that neither a critique of this discrepancy nor a critical analysis of Stieglitz’s activity 
appears within the journal. In this respect it is easy to detect the editorial biases of the journal 
with the few ‘monographic’ essays on photographers, which it is hard to explain with any 
detectable policy.7 The reason why this discrepancy between Stieglitz’s ‘words and images’ 
is worth discussing is his – probably involuntary – role in the foundation of the most basic 
and long-lasting schism on photography between artistic and documentary images. The idea 
of this division was raised by Allan Sekula in an essay he devoted to the discussion of this 
question, using the visual examples of Lewis Hine and Stieglitz.8
 
 
According to Abigail Solomon-Godeau, the notion of the documentary entered into the 
‘lexicon’ of photography only in the late 1920s. According to her, this fact ‘implies that until its 
[the category of the documentary] formulation, photography was understood as innately and 
inescapably performing a documentary function.’9
                                                 
7 Examples for these vary from Abigail Solomon-Godeau’s text on Auguste Salzman (‘A Photographer 
in Jerusalem, 1855: Auguste Salzman and His Times’, October 18 [Autumn 1981], pp. 91–107) to 
Carol Armstrong’s essay on Diane Arbus (‘Biology, Destiny, Photography: Difference According to 
Diane Arbus’, October 66 [Autumn 1993], pp. 28–54). 
 The appearance of this appellation seems 
8 Allan Sekula, ‘On the Invention of Photographic Meaning’, in Victor Burgin (ed.) Thinking 
Photography, Macmillan, London, 1982, pp. 84–109. 
9 Abigail Solomon-Godeau, ‘Who Is Speaking Thus? Some Questions about Documentary 
Photography’, p. 169–170, in Solomon-Godeau, Photography at the Dock: Essays in Photographic 
History, Institutions, and Practices, Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1991, pp. 169–183. The 
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to have been inspired by film, where John Grierson started to employ the term in the mid-
1920s (see more about it in Chapter 4). For Solomon-Godeau, the foundation of this 
terminology is directly related to the then prevalent photographic practices, which she 
characterises as dominated by ‘symbolism and aestheticism (in the stylistic form of 
pictorialism).’10
 
 Her observation has a strong resonance with Sekula’s approach and with the 
ways in which he envisages the dichotomy of the aesthetic and the documentary. 
Sekula’s text starts with two images, Lewis Hine’s Immigrants Going Down Gangplank, New 
York (1905) and Alfred Stieglitz’s The Steerage (1907). To compare the pictures of these 
particular photographers is probably not the most obvious choice, but the similarities of the 
images’ subject matter and the fact that they were produced at roughly the same time 
provides Sekula with the intellectual justification to do so. Both images depict the scene that 
became so typical in the formation of the United States and its foundational propagandistic 
metaphor of ‘the melting pot’. Yet the visual rhetorics of the images ‘betray’ many different 
aspects of the aims and positions of the two photographers. As we know from Stieglitz’s 
personal recollection, he was obliged to take this journey to Europe with his current wife, but 
he was scornful of the snobbery of social division that manifested themselves in the strict 
separation of the classes on the ship, so he wandered off from his social circles and became 
interested in the lower deck’s daily life. His picture’s vantage point is a signifier for his social 
distance, but this distance could also be interpreted as an indication for an ‘objective’ position 
for the photographer and a possible position for a scientific observer. The objectivity 
suggested by the distanced photographer’s symbolic position is in sharp contrast with 
Stieglitz’s writings on his own work and his views on the principles of photographic image 
making. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
essay was originally published in 1987, and in Hungarian in 2000: Abigail Solomon-Godeau, ‘Nézd 
csak, ki beszél? Néhány kérdés a dokumentarista fotográfia kapcsán’, Ex Symposion, 2000/32–33, 
pp. 65–74. 
10 Solomon-Godeau, ‘Who Is Speaking Thus?’, op. cit., p. 170. 
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In arguing for Stieglitz’s major role in the foundation and the promotion of the schism 
between documentary and artistic photography, Sekula mentions the magazine Camera 
Work, which ‘was solely Stiglietz’s invention and […] an artwork in its own right, as a sort of 
monumental container for smaller, subordinate works […] whatever appeared between these 
covers passed through Stieglitz’s hands.’11 The aim of establishing the status of art in relation 
to photography is clearly there in the magazine not only in the selection of the publishable 
images, but also in the magazine’s choice of textual material, and it is for these reasons that 
Sekula holds Camera Work (and Stieglitz) responsible for ‘inventing, more thoroughly than 
any other source the myth of the semantic autonomy of the photographic image.’12
 
 
This way of understanding a magazine as ‘a monumental framing device’13 easily makes 
sense when we consider our contemporary situation and try to envisage the different visual 
and textual contexts in which images may appear, which in most cases fall out of the control 
of the producer of the images. In the case of high culture, the pictures are contextualised by 
the format of an exhibition (or a catalogue). The framing histories and capacities of the art 
institution have to be compared and confronted with the context of magazines such as 
Newsweek, for instance. The American critic David Levi Strauss has demonstrated the ways 
in which ‘hard core’ documentary and photojournalistic images get ‘corrupted’ and 
ideologically ‘hyper-charged’ within such publications in the proximity of other pictures, 
especially advertisements.14 Another significant point is the question of agency; not 
necessarily in the sense of artistic authorship, but in terms of the power to control the life of 
one’s own images after they have been made. In the case of these magazines, the recurring 
phrase about the pictures is ‘Newsweek took them,’15
                                                 
11 Sekula, ‘On the Invention’, op. cit., p. 92. 
 thus agency – and we could add, 
subjectivity – is obliterated from the beginning. The reason why this is important for Levi 
12 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
13 Sekula, ‘On the Invention’, op. cit., p. 92. 
14 The same question of contextual framing is also raised by Solomon-Godeau, ‘Who Is Speaking 
Thus?’, op. cit., pp. 179–180. 
15 David Levi Strauss, Between the Eyes: Essays on Photography and Politics, Aperture, New York, 
2003, p. 17. 
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Strauss is not to trade on promoting ‘objectivity’ versus propaganda; for him the problem with 
mainstream news media is exactly that it masquerades its own ideological biases by claiming 
objectivity. It is in this sense that such publications as Newsweek (or National Geographic for 
that matter) can take the position of objectivity versus the subjectivity of magazines like 
Camera Work (even if they are produced in different historical periods). 
 
The promotion of photography as art reveals one of the most fundamental paradoxes of 
photography in the face of high art, which was raised and discussed by Pierre Bourdieu.16 
The camera is an object or a device that is economically accessible to less socially privileged 
classes and groups, and to use a camera and produce acceptable images does not need 
any special training or skill. In the system of cultural division, the upper classes aim at 
distinguishing themselves from the petite bourgeoisie and from the working classes by – 
among other things – maintaining their privileged access to certain cultural practices, such as 
high art. That is why ‘members of photographic clubs seek to ennoble themselves culturally 
by attempting to ennoble photography, a substitute within their range and grasp for higher 
arts.’17 And this is exactly the reason why, in terms of formal and aesthetic criteria, 
photography is probably the most conservative of all genres and media, since it needs to be 
elevated from and kept outside of the visual premises of popular culture.18
 
 
Photography’s artistic status has not only been challenged from the position of the 
documentary and vernacular practices, but also from the position of high art itself, particularly 
by painting. It is not necessarily because of their similarities as two-dimensional pictorial 
representational systems or because of painting’s privileged position within the hierarchy of 
artistic media and genres. The 19th-century Romanticists, such as Théophile Gautier and 
                                                 
16 Pierre Bourdieu, Photography: A Middle-Brow Art, Polity Press, 1990. Originally published in French 
in 1965 with the title Un art moyen. 
17 Bourdieu, Photography, op. cit., p. 9. 
18 To my understanding and in my terminology, popular culture is not equivalent to mass culture. In the 
case of the former, the producers and the consumers of culture largely overlap, while in the case of 
the latter, the consumers are provided with the products of the cultural industries. 
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later on the Goncourt brothers, formulated their ideas about the fear of the possible threat of 
mass production on the privileges of high art that also found its echo in Baudelaire’s thought. 
His most famous quote is repeated by Sekula as well, ‘A revengeful God has given ear to the 
prayers of this multitude. Daguerre was his Messiah.’19 Paradoxically, though, Baudelaire 
failed to notice that although the daguerreotype was capable of ‘reproducing’ Nature, it was 
not based on technical reproducibility since its end result was a unique image.20
 
 In fact 
Baudelaire’s attack was probably as much diverted against naturalism, the prevailing 
aesthetic mode of the time, as against the appearance of technology within the arts. 
Coming back to Sekula’s comparison of Stieglitz’s and Hine’s images, Hine’s goals and 
purposes were diametrically opposed to Stieglitz’s artistic intentions. Hine was far from being 
an artist; he was a sociologist who published his images outside of the aesthetic ‘discourse 
situation’,21 in social-work journals with a reformist political aim and with a philanthropic 
undertone. These journals and reformist movements often appeared as ‘a political threat to 
capital’ due to the ‘lack of a clear institutional status’ even if they ‘stood clearly to the right of 
the Socialist party.’ 22 Yet Hine’s images betray as many aesthetic concerns as Stieglitz’s; 
they are not only aesthetically composed and have other aesthetic characteristics (lighting, 
framing, etc.), but also address the historical conventions of the artistic canon, as the 
examples of the images published and analysed in Sekula’s essay demonstrate (e.g. Lewis 
Hine: A Madonna of the Tenements, 191123
                                                 
19 Baudelaire is quoted by Sekula, ‘On the Invention’, op. cit., p. 96. 
). In Hine’s case, the aesthetic concerns clearly 
serve political needs and not the other way around. He does not only intend to elevate his 
subjects and subject matters to a higher cultural level, but at the same time, using these 
artistic and aesthetic conventions, renders his images legible for an audience that is well 
acquainted with high cultural pictorial formulas. It is also in this sense, and in relation to 
20 In this context it is also ironic to see the quantity of known photographic portraits of French 
intellectuals that have survived (in comparison with painted portraits). 
21 Sekula, ‘On the Invention’, op. cit., p. 103. 
22 Ibid., p. 104. 
23 Reproduced in ibid., op. cit., p. 106. 
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raising the historical contextual parameters of Hine’s images, that Sekula’s approach 
becomes political. 
 
Another noteworthy aspect of Sekula’s theoretical standpoint within the framework of this 
chapter is that when confronting with the dichotomy of aesthetics and the documentary 
(which he calls ‘binary folklore’24), he convincingly demonstrates that both are ideologically 
constructed categories that serve a variety of different, often political interests. For Sekula, 
there is no proper documentary or artistic image, only a contextually defined reading 
according to which ‘every photograph tends, at any given moment of reading in any given 
context, towards one of these two poles of meaning.’25
 
 This ‘tendency’ corresponds with the 
ways in which different ideological interests intermingle within a given reading, such as in the 
case of Hines, where the aesthetic or artistic ‘pole’ (as Sekula calls it) is in the service of the 
political (i.e. the documentary). 
What is important to note in relation to the politicised and political approach of Sekula’s 
essay and the reception of his – and other theorists’ critical – texts in October is the overall 
neglect of his theoretical and critical position that remains – at best – underrepresented in the 
course of the journal’s history. This generally stands for a kind of poststructuralist analysis 
that aims at a critique of the ideologies – visible or hidden – that inform the images. The fact 
that this approach is so much missing from the journal is in direct contradiction with some 
seminal essays within the journal (such as Christopher Phillips’26 or Rosalind Krauss’27
                                                 
24 Sekula, ‘On the Invention’, op. cit., p. 108. 
) that 
raise the need for a non-aesthetic discourse on photography, but never develop the exact 
parameters of such a theoretical approach. The critique of ideology is an even more burning 
25 Ibid. 
26 Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit. 
27 Rosalind Krauss, ‘A Note on Photography and the Simulacral’, October 31 (Winter 1984), pp. 48–68. 
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issue when we bear in mind the quantity and the popular forms of the dissemination of 
photographic images, as Pierre Bourdieu also noted and commented on.28
 
 
When discussing the dichotomy of aesthetics and the documentary and their conjunction with 
the polarity of realism and symbolism, Sekula establishes a series of binary oppositions to 
describe some aspects of these terms’ relationship, such as ‘photographer as seer vs 
photographer as witness, photography as expression vs photography as reportage, theories 
of imagination (and inner truth) vs theories of empirical truth, affective value vs informative 
value, metaphoric signification vs metonymic signification.’29
 
 The polarity of metaphor and 
metonymy can serve here as a useful opposition in discussing and analysing various areas 
of photography, especially in the face of contemporary ethnography and the critique of 
museum display which are recent, interdisciplinary areas of visual studies where cultural 
signs – both visual and verbal – are often analysed from a postcolonialist perspective and 
with the critical tools of the semiotic approach to narratology. 
An example I would like to use here to demonstrate this interdisciplinary investigation is the 
work of the Hungarian photographer Péter Korniss who, in 1997, held a major retrospective 
exhibition of the photographs he has been making/taking in Transylvania (Romania) since 
1967 in the Műcsarnok (Kunsthalle, Budapest) – the largest contemporary art exhibition 
space in Hungary at that time. Parallel to the exhibition, a coffee-table-like book of 160 pages 
was also published. Korniss has published his images in the form of monographic books 
since as early as 1975 at least, and he cannot, by any means, be considered a so-called 
‘banned artist’ under the socialist regime. Since the political changes of 1989, his career has 
reached unprecedented heights and full official recognition. 
 
                                                 
28 Bourdieu, Photography, op. cit. 
29 Sekula, ‘On the Invention’, op. cit., p. 108 (original italics). 
It is important to note that Abigail Solomon-Godeau perceives the notion of the documentary mode in 
a radical way, claiming that, within this context, the surveillance camera would be the degree zero of 
the documentary. See Solomon-Godeau, ‘Who Is Speaking Thus?’, op. cit., p. 169. 
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The work of Korniss readily offers itself as a ‘theoretical object’, to describe it using a term 
coined by Mieke Bal. The first and most conspicuous problem with Korniss’s work is a lack of 
coherence, which manifests itself in a discrepancy between the words and the images he 
presents. Textually he claims he documents a disappearing way of life, but visually he 
displays the images in an art gallery, thus using the same sing both as a metaphor and as a 
synecdoche. Textually he claims he documents his trips, but visually he uses black and white 
photography, which functions as a metonymy of art in this case. Textually he claims to 
represent the past, visually he aims at constructing an identity for an ‘imagined community’ 
(Benedict Anderson30
 
), which is ready to accept this as its own in the present. In my view this 
lack of coherence serves to blur these above-mentioned boundaries, thus blurring the 
ideology and resulting in the neutralisation of this very ideology. 
On the level of rhetorics, the narratological function that Korniss occupies in the narrative he 
has created poses a dilemma vis-à-vis his subjects. Syntactically, Korniss himself is a 
narrator writing in the first person singular and referring to his own subjectivity with the use of 
this first person. Semantically speaking, however, there is also a third person singular 
present, whose role is to document and to show us the Transylvanians and their life 
‘objectively’. Moreover, there is an – unsuccessful – attempt to display a pragmatically taken 
second person narrative in which the ‘you’, the Transylvanians, are supposed to be given 
‘voice’. In reality, however, this ‘voice’ can never be ‘heard’, since in the narrative structure 
these people do not appear as narrators, as speakers for themselves, having their own 
voice, but are bequest with the narratological position of the ‘focaliser’, which can be 
understood as the extension or doubling of the role of the narrator. They are not capable of 
telling any other story except the one that the narrator chooses for them to tell.31
 
 
                                                 
30 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
Verso, London and New York, 1983. 
31 Phillips also mentions the ‘unitary authorial “voice”’ which is capable of creating different modes of 
narratives (‘comic, harsh, ironic, delighted, and even cruel’), and which can be contrasted with ‘the 
uninflected “mechanical utterance of a machine”’ (Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit., p. 59). 
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The dilemma that Korniss’s narratological position poses is the same as the one Decartes’ 
famous statement formulates. The Cartesian division between subject and object became 
the central dogma of modern epistemology.32 The analysis of this division from the point of 
view of narratological-rethorical functions shows that the notions of objective truth and 
impersonal knowledge are connected to ‘the third person fictional narrative’, where the 
narrator is external and invisible, and the presentation aims to be neutral.33
 
 All this becomes 
fundamentally contradictory when we want to position Decartes’ famous statement (‘I think, 
therefore I am’) in this system: his statement is based on objective knowledge and 
epistemology, but from the point of view of narratology, it is a first-person mini-narrative with 
the denotative and connotative functions of subjectivity. It is the incoherence and 
contradictory character of the Cartesian dilemma, among others, that can be taken as an 
indication to the impossibility of a complete subject/object division, and therefore the 
impossibility of totally impersonal and objective knowledge. 
The choice of the narrative form on the part of the narrator cannot, by any means, be 
considered as a merely formal element, but as a – conscious or unconscious – decision that 
carries serious consequences, which directly touch upon the question of epistemological 
competence and indirectly raise questions of power. In Korniss’s case, these can be 
summed up in three main points: 1/ The photographer’s problematic, and to a certain extent 
abusive, relation to the subjects of his images; 2/ the viewers’ connotative and fantasmatic 
relation to the images and to the reality these images are meant to denote; 3/ the association 
of these images to the proliferation of Hungarian political propaganda of the 1990s, which is 
related to symbolic territorial claims, directed towards our neighbouring countries. 
 
                                                 
32 Mieke Bal, Double Exposures: The Subject of Cultural Analysis, Routledge, New York and London, 
1996, p. 59. 
33 Ibid., p. 171. 
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For Solomon-Godeau, the various subject positions that appear in photography can be 
summed up in three, ‘unchanging tropes’,34 which partly overlap with those problematic 
aspects that I have just outlined in relation to Korniss’s images. The first one is related to the 
ways in which the subject is ‘depicted’ ‘as a pictorial spectacle usually targeted for a different 
audience and a different class.’35 The second revolves around the ways in which the 
representation of an individual, the pictorial effect of his/her ‘victimization or subjugation’ 
starts functioning ‘as a metonym for the (invisible) conditions that produced it […] irrespective 
of good intentions, personal or institutional politics, or ameliorative intent,’36 or, as one could 
add, irrespective of the good intentions of the photographer. This leads to the third ‘trope’, to 
a ‘probably inevitable slippage from the political to the anecdotal or the emblematic.’37
 
 The 
individualisation of the subjects inevitably results in entering the field of the personal and the 
anecdotal, which takes off the edge of political militancy and turns these subjects into 
representations that are easy to relegate away from the political field of immediate 
intervention. 
All this is not to inscribe Korniss’s images to a tendency that Martha Rosler describes and 
calls ‘a new genre of victimhood’38 in relation to the labour photography of the late 1920s and 
30s (even if the ‘subjects’ of Korniss’s images become representations, they are by no 
means turned into victims). This tendency aims at rescuing those people who became 
victims as ‘helpless persons’ ‘by someone else’s camera’39
                                                 
34 Solomon-Godeau, ‘Who Is Speaking Thus?’, op. cit., p. 178. 
 by adding a new layer of 
documentary on top of the existing one from 1930s with the means of historical research 
which is capable of discovering the subjects’ real names and circumstances. Yet, as Rosler 
concludes, this endeavour eventually cannot succeed in truly rescuing the poor from their 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., pp. 178–79. 
37 Ibid., p. 179. 
38 Martha Rosler, ‘In, Around, and Afterthoughts’, op. cit., p. 187. The essay was originally published in 
1981. 
39 Ibid., p. 187 (original italics). 
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poverty because the ‘relative distance’ between them and us ‘has not been abridged,’40
 
 but is 
reproduced time and again. According to Rosler, one of the best and most powerful 
instances of this is the work of Diane Arbus. 
The creation of a pictorial narrative raises another question in relation to the reception and 
the institutionalization of photographic images. Christopher Phillips refers to the ways in 
which the ambivalent discourse surrounding Robert Capa’s photographs is highly ideological 
when it becomes part of the more general dilemma between aesthetics and the 
documentary. The effort to reframe Capa’s ‘politically committed Spanish Civil War reportage 
as a self-conscious “experimenting with photographic syntax”’ serves the institutional interest 
of ‘redeeming’ Capa’s picture from the ‘aestheticized photographic tradition,’41
 
 and this can 
be realized only by stressing his own claims for fictionalizing his photographic practice. If 
there is an element of narrativity in the images, it supports this fictionalizing reading of the 
images. There seems to be a whole range of documentary photographers whose work has 
fallen prey of this museological and theoretical tendency. 
The most important claim of this reading of Korniss’s images is related for several reasons 
and from a poststructuralist position to a reassessment of the notion of ideology. The ‘stale 
aroma of a theoretical anachronism’ – as Kaja Silverman puts it42 – has not stopped exuding 
from the notion of ‘ideology’ which is probably due to the ‘vicissitudes of Marxism’, to lend 
Terry Eagleton’s formulation43
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 188. 
 to a certain type of 20th-century political thinking (and action). 
It seems that neither the vulgar Marxist methodology of interpretation, nor the political events 
that happened under the banner of Marx’s name in the 20th century are helpful in dismantling 
the aversion not just to the overt and political usage of the term, but to any form of thinking 
41 Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit., p. 60. Phillips’ quotes are from Ben Lifson and Abigail 
Solomon-Godeau, ‘Photophilia: A Conversation about the Photography Scene’, p. 107, October 16 
(Spring 1981), pp. 103–118. 
42 Kaja Silverman, Male Subjectivity at the Margins, Routledge, New York and London, 1992, p. 15. 
43 Terry Eagleton, ‘Ideology and its Vicissitudes in Western Marxism’, in Slavoj Žižek (ed.), Mapping 
Ideology, Verso, London and New York, 1994, pp.179–226. 
 124 
where it my be detected as an agenda. To a certain extent this overall resistance, and even 
paranoia, appears to be justifiable particularly in those parts of the world – like ours here in 
East-Central Europe – where Marxist social and political theory, with its specific 
understanding of the term of ‘ideology’, was directly translated into a justification of power, 
and abused partly via the invasion of not just the political but of the everyday, too, by a 
certain directly politically motivated form of this particular term (i.e. ideology). Yet ideology in 
some form or another is always present, and often in forms that have so long and to such an 
extent been naturalised that they are taken as non-ideological. 
 
In the original, late 18th-century understanding of the term ‘ideology’, epistemology was 
closely related to it.44
 
 The most influential development of ideology, however, can be found in 
Marx, when he tried to articulate the relationship between politics, economics and culture, 
and referred ideology as not only the foundation of social relations, but also as a means 
possessed exclusively by the ruling class and used in the suppression and exploitation of the 
working class. The term ‘ideology’ comes back when we would least expect it: with New 
Criticism of the 1940s and 50s. The New Critics opposed ideology as being irrelevant, and 
even detracting from the aesthetic value of the artwork. In the past 60 years, ‘ideology’ has 
been used as a synonym for politics to designate an especially coherent and rigidly held 
system of political ideas. 
The semiotic understanding of the notion of ideology makes a radical break with most 
previous definitions and usage on the basis of ‘a conception of sign as permeable and open 
both to the sign systems that surround it and to the circumstance in which it is articulated [… 
A] semiotic view of ideology allows us to define the political interests of all social groups as 
                                                 
44 Late 18th-century French rationalist philosophers used it to designate the ‘science of ideas’, or the 
‘philosophy of mind’ as opposed to older metaphysical conceptions. See James H. Kavanagh: 
‘Ideology’, in Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (eds.), Critical Terms for Literary Study, 2nd 
edition, The Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1995, pp. 306–320. Also W.J.T. Mitchell, 
Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology, The Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1986, pp. 164–
168. 
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ideologically motivated.’45 This not only means that there is no privileged class or social 
group which can exclusively be associated with ideology, but also that in as much as the 
production of signs is incoherent, no ideology can be total and coherent either.46
 
 
Another question that the semiotic approach to ideology has posed is related to the ways in 
which ideology is responsible for the formation of human subjectivity, both that of the author 
and the reader. I would like to argue for a reconsideration and a re-acceptance of the notion 
of ideology in the field of art theory and criticism from the position of semiotics. This position 
may help to avoid committing the ‘intentional fallacy’, but still be able to produce a dynamic 
reading, and to make critical comments about the author’s position as he/she is the source of 
the artistic utterance/statement (i.e. the work of art) – as I tried to demonstrate with the 
example of Korniss. 
 
The semiotic understanding of the formation of subjectivity can be used as a deconstructivist 
tool in dismantling the authoritative approach to the function of the ‘author’, as Robert 
Scholes claims, ‘The producers of literary texts are themselves creatures of culture, who 
have attained a human subjectivity through language […] Through them speak other 
voices—some cultural and public, some emerging distorted form those aspects of private 
need repressed as the price for attaining a public subjectivity in language. An author is not a 
perfect ego but a mixture of public and private, conscious and unconscious elements, 
insufficiently unified for use as an interpretive base.’47 Thus, interpretation cannot exist out of 
ideology, but together with ideology can ‘explore and exploit the gap between representation 
and responsibility.’48
                                                 
45 Keith Moxey, The Practice of Theory: Poststructuralism, Cultural Politics, and Art History, Cornell 
Univ. Press, Ithaca and London, 1994, p. 43. 
 
46 There remains, of course, the possibility of speaking about a hegemonic ideology (in Ernesto 
Laclau’s and Chantal Mouffe’s sense) in political terms (such as global capitalism). This, however, 
would lead this discussion very far from its original goals and purposes even if such discussions are 
central in the contemporary art scene these days. 
47 Robert Scholes, Semiotics and Interpretation, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven and London, 1982, p. 
14. 
48 W.J.T. Mitchell, Picture Theory, The Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1994, p. 421. 
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To come back to Phillips’ text, he convincingly argues for a reconsideration of photography in 
the face of modernist museum practice, which has tried ‘to portray photography as the 
legitimate (albeit eccentric) off-spring of the Western pictorial tradition and to demonstrate 
that it was born with an inherent “pictorial syntax” that forced originality (and modernism) 
upon it’.49 The integration of photography, which is originally an ‘industrial simulacrum’,50 
happened in such a gradual and unquestioned way that photographic images became the 
museum’s ‘natural and special object of study’51
 
 and display without any theoretical or 
practical opposition. (This reached such a point that – primarily historical – photographic 
exhibitions are the most popular shows in museums with record visitor attendance.) As 
Phillips points it out, the authority with which the museum assimilated photography is in 
diametrical opposition to Benjamin’s theory of aura and its related territories of generally old 
fashioned art historical categories such as connoisseurship, originality, reproducibility and 
authorship. 
In Philips’ terminology, the ‘museum’ may refer both to an institutional category and also 
specifically to The Museum of Modern Art in New York and its Department of Photography 
(with John Szarkowski as its then head), whose activity in the domain of photography marked 
the ways and possibilities in which photography became institutionalised.52 On his turn, 
Douglas Crimp notes that MoMA’s Department of Photography was ‘the first such 
department in any art museum’, and takes its seminal activity as a starting point for further 
critical comments on the ambivalence of photography’s position within the museum.53
                                                 
49 Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit., p. 62. Here Phillips refers to MoMA curator Peter Galassi’s 
exhibition and catalogue Before Photography from 1981. 
 For 
Crimp, one of Szarkowski’s distinctions is a telling example not only for the position of 
50 Phillips refers here to Jean Baudrillard’s term and the related theory that the French philosopher 
developed in his L’Echange symbolique et la mort (Paris, Editions Gallimard, 1976, pp. 85–88) among 
others, in Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit., p. 27. 
51 Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit., p. 28. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Crimp, ‘The Museum’s Old’, op. cit., p. 68. 
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photography within existing artistic and picture making practices, but also for its intertwined 
relationship with the reception of these images. Crimp quotes Szarkowski, ‘The invention of 
photography provided a radically new picture-making process—a process based not on 
synthesis but on selection […] Paintings were made … but photographs, as the man on the 
street puts it, were taken.’54 The way in which Szarkowski (and Ansel Adams among 
others55) differentiates between making and taking only underlies the recurrent need for 
photography’s reconsideration as art, thus instead of dealing with its dual, or ambivalent 
character, it adds to its confused and often unproductive aesthetic reception. When Crimp 
compares the artistic legacy of such emblematic artists of the 20th century as Picasso and 
Duchamp, and examines how these legacies exercised an influence on the artists of 1970s, 
he arrives at the dichotomy of making and taking, ‘the readymades propose that the artist 
cannot make, but can only take what is already there.’56
 
 Thus Crimp’s usage of this dual 
metaphor is justified by a larger aesthetic field than that of photography. 
Photography’s comparison with painting may happen in various forms and on different levels, 
yet painting’s art historical vocabulary is often borrowed in analyses of photographs. The 
reason for this is not exclusively motivated by the art market’s pressure on photography to 
produce unique objects that resemble ‘art’, but by the implicit assumption that the pictures 
produced by these two mediums are similar enough to allow the extension of that vocabulary 
to even non-artistic images. It is quite revealing to observe how even critics working 
exclusively with photography apply this vocabulary, such as is the case with Ben Lifson, then 
critic of the popular New York weekly Village Voice, who claimed that 19th-century 
photographers such as Le Gray, ‘had sketching on his mind […] Watching him discover how 
a camera sketches the world differently from a brush is to watch him come to grips with his 
medium […] to come to see in ways we might call abstract but which he just called 
                                                 
54 Ibid., p. 71, original italics. Solomon-Godeau also mentions this phrasing (‘taking an image’) as an 
instance of the historically established, aggressive vocabulary of photography and its implications in 
her ‘Who Is Speaking Thus?’, op. cit., p. 181. 
55 Crimp quotes Ansel Adams’ views on this difference in ‘The Museum’s Old’, op. cit., p. 71. 
56 Crimp, ‘The Museum’s Old’, op. cit., p. 71 (original italics). 
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photographic.’57 One can easily oppose this description of Le Gray’s working procedure with 
exactly what Abigail Solomon-Godeau raises in the discussion with Lifson, that the usage of 
the metaphor of sketching blurs precisely those features that distinguish the two mediums in 
terms of originality. Solomon-Godeau’s argument echoes Szarkowski’s as well as Crimp’s 
above-mentioned observation, ‘I don’t believe that one sketches with a camera, no matter 
how minimal or reductive the image—I think one takes pictures with a camera.’58 Yet it is 
Lifson, who himself introduced the idea of sketching with a camera, who later on in the 
discussion opposes the false and unproductive comparison between photography and 
painting.59
 
 
The dichotomy of the artistic images and the utilitarian usages of photography also appears 
in Phillips’s essay as one of the implicit foundations of MoMA’s Department of Photography 
and the authority the museum had started to build, since its foundation, with a series of over-
extensive exhibitions, ambitious scholarly catalogues and art historical connoisseurship. 
Phillips formulates this dichotomy with a kind of figurative language where the metonymy 
‘Moholy-Nagy’ is meant to stand for a more expanded understanding of ‘fotokunst’ [sic!], 
while Stieglitz becomes equivalent with his promotion of ‘kunstfotografie’ [sic!].60 With the 
100th anniversary exhibition of photography at MoMA, Photography: 1839–1937, its curator, 
Beaumont Newhall, displayed a disinterest ‘in the old question of photography’s status 
among the fine arts.’61 Yet even if Newhall seems to have managed to avoid this dichotomy 
by refusing ‘to make the expected pronouncement on photography’s place among the fine 
arts,’62
                                                 
57 Lifson and Solomon-Godeau, ‘Photophilia’, op cit., p. 105. 
 his categorisation is, from my perspective, no less problematic with its technocratic 
approach, where the exhibited items were ‘grouped according to technical processes 
(daguerreotypy, calotypy, wet-plate, and dry-plate periods) and their present-day applications 
58 Ibid., p. 106 (emphasis added). 
59 Lifson and Solomon-Godeau, ‘Photophilia’, op. cit., p. 109. 
60 Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit., pp. 32–33. 
61 Ibid., p. 32. Beaumont Newhall was not only MoMA’s first appointed curator of photography, but also 
the first such curator in any art museum. See Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit., p. 35. 
62 Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit., p. 33. 
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(press photography, infra-red and X-ray photography, astronomical photography, “creative” 
photography).’63
 
 This mixing of criteria and approaches does not, in my view, solve the 
problem of categorisation, but rather prolongs it without allowing its critical reconsideration. 
Moreover, it does not provide any new typology or taxonomy for photographic images where 
the dichotomy between art and vernacular image production could be productively and 
consistently resolved (or at least, exposed). In addition, or even prior to these arguments, the 
exhibition was on display in an art museum that – even if only implicitly – framed the 
reception of the photographs as images that have at least something to do with art and 
aesthetics. 
When dealing with the dichotomy of aesthetics and the instrumental usages of photography, 
the impact of MoMA cannot be under emphasised, since the ways in which photography 
ended up being integrated into the art museum was intellectually a parallel endeavour to the 
creation of a then new discourse on art. It is in this sense that we can compare Newhall’s 
standpoint within photography with Alfred Barr’s approach to modern art that, for Phillips, is 
perhaps best represented by his famous chart, on which Barr set up a web of influences 
among the artistic trends and tendencies of the 19th and 20th centuries. As Phillips points it 
out, according to the chart, ‘the various “currents” of modern painting depended on an 
admittedly formalist supposition: the existence of a self-enclosed, self referential field of 
purely aesthetic factors, untouched by the influence of any larger social or historical forces.’64 
Thus the question, ‘How were these aesthetic factors to be isolated?’65 automatically follows, 
assuming that this isolation is indeed possible. Newhall’s answer to this question, as Phillips 
sums it up, lies in his technical understanding of the medium, including an historical 
understanding of successive ‘technical innovations’ that are taken independently ‘of 
developments in […] graphic arts or painting.’66
                                                 
63 Ibid., p. 32. 
 Newhall’s almost technocratic approach is 
64 Ibid., p. 34. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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then complemented by his way of discussing photographic images, which appraises them on 
the ground of these technical innovations’ ‘aesthetic consequences’.67
 
 Within Newhall’s 
scheme, these became photography’s intrinsic properties and the basis for any aesthetic 
judgement concerning the medium. 
Phillips also explains how photography has never been the exclusive terrain of art history, 
since most photographs we encounter daily are produced – and I would add, consumed – 
outside of the realm of art, yet their interpretation has, from the very beginning, been based 
on an assumed similarity to the classical – and supposedly transparent – system of 
representation. On the one hand Phillips refers here to Louis Marin’s comment that, in the 
system which ‘posits: [that] “nobody is speaking”; it is reality itself that speaks.’68 On the other 
hand he also makes it clear how, historically, MoMA, with its position of power with the 
foundation of the photography department and with a combination of authoritative 
standpoints (such as connoisseurship, ‘the singling out of monuments’, the establishment of 
a canon, and a historical standpoint),69 is responsible for photography’s integration into the 
vast area of art history, with its prevalent theories of representation (see Marin’s comment). 
This was complemented by a vocabulary of collectors and ‘print connoisseurship’, with such 
terms as ‘rarity, authenticity, and personal expression’70 in conjunction with anchoring this 
vocabulary within the existing system of the fine arts by employing such categories of genre 
as ‘landscape, portraiture, and architectural studies.’71
 
 
On top of all this, Newhall and his circle made the ultimate claim to position photographers 
they intended to canonise within the modernist discourse with an understanding of the artist 
as the source of creativity. Here, Phillips quotes Newhall again and his text accompanying 
                                                 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., p. 59. 
69 Ibid., p. 35. 
70 Ibid., p. 36. 
71 Ibid., p. 37. 
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the canonical exhibition 60 Photographs: ‘Each print is an individual personal expression.’72 
With MoMA’s successful activity, its department of photography, its curator(s) and board 
members, photographs became museum objects with exactly the same style of display as 
other multiples, thus ‘they were given precisely the same status: that of objects of authorized 
admiration and delectation,’73
 
 without paying any attention to the circumstance of their 
production and previous reception. 
Following Newhall’s ambitions, and after Edward Steichen’s somewhat interim period, the 
same instrumental handling of photography appears with John Szarkowski, whose curatorial 
and art historical contribution subscribes itself to the promotion of photography’s aesthetic 
interpretation, at the expense of any other approach.74 Szarkowski went further than Newhall 
in creating the aesthetic framework for photography; further than merely emphasising those 
formal qualities of the photographic image which could create the basis for its similarity with 
other fine art printmaking techniques (limited editions, framing and other displaying devices, 
etc.). Szarkowski’s aesthetic, yet formalist, approach, however, insisted on those descriptive 
elements of the image that were otherwise available to the ‘organizing logic’ of an art 
historical analysis too (‘the detail, the thing itself, time, the frame, and the vantage point,’ 
which all meant a ‘stage for a move to the iconographic level’75 for Szarkowski), and 
dismissed – or even disagreed with – the possibility of adopting Greenberg’s formalist 
standpoint on painting for photography with Greenberg’s emphasis on the ‘material support’ 
of the medium. Ironically, despite these crucial differences, they both rely on T.S. Eliot’s 
poetic theory.76
 
 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., p. 38. This success story was somehow interrupted when, in 1947, Newhall resigned from his 
position due to Edward Steichen’s appointment as Director of Photography at MoMA. But the 
museological framework for photography’s reception was already established by then and is still 
prevalent today. According to his own recollections, Steichen himself was not interested in the 
promotion of photography as fine art (Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit., p. 41). 
74 See the details of Szarkowski’s methodological aims in Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit., p. 
56. 
75 Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit., p. 57. 
76 Ibid., p. 60. 
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There is an even stronger, political facet to promoting the value of connoisseurship on the 
part of the museum. As Martha Rosler claims, a new genealogy of documentary photography 
was established precisely by Szarkowski when, describing the work of the ‘new 
documentarians’ (Garry Winogrand, Diane Arbus and Lee Friedlander), he emphasised the 
personal quality of their images as opposed to earlier, more socially concerned approaches, 
such as that of Walker Evans and particularly that of Robert Frank. These latter artists, as 
Szarkowski notes, ‘made their pictures in the service of a social cause … to show what was 
wrong with the world, and to persuade their fellows to take action and make it right.’77 As for 
the newer generation of documentarians, ‘what they hold in common is the belief that the 
commonplace is really worth looking at, and the courage to look at it with a minimum of 
theorizing.’78 For Rosler, Szarkowski’s views are hardly acceptable, given the circumstances 
in which they were formulated; Szarkowski’s text was written in 1967, and, as Rosler points 
out, ‘in an America already several years into the “terrors” and disruptions of the Vietnam 
War. He [Szarkowski] makes a poor argument for the value of disengagement from a “social 
cause” and in favor of connoisseurship of the tawdry.’79 Within this particular political context, 
I can only admire Rosler for refraining from a sarcastic tone in her judgement of Szarkowski’s 
conservative, museologial position, although she voices her reservations vis-à-vis the 
problematic aspects of seeing artists as looking at the world from ‘elevated vantage points’ 
and picking out society’s ‘frailties’ and ‘imperfections’.80
 
 
As a general judgement on this museological position Phillips concludes, ‘The dual sentence 
spelled out here—the formal isolation and cultural legitimation of the “great undifferentiated 
whole” of photography—is the disquieting message handed down from the museum’s 
                                                 
77 Rosler, ‘In, Around, and Afterthoughts’, op. cit., p. 189. Later on Rosler highlights the fact that for 
Szarkowski, the real forerunners of theses subjective documentarians are the ‘bohemian 
photographers like Brassaï and the early Kertész and Cartier-Bresson’ (Rosler, ‘In, Around, and 
Afterthoughts’, op. cit., p. 190). 
78 Ibid., p. 189. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., p. 190. 
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judgement seat.’81 All this, of course, seems to be problematic vis-à-vis the museum’s 
privileged role in producing not just a pictorial, but also a discursive canon; the latter, in its 
turn, becoming the source of a further blurring of critical ideas, and the site of further 
unquestionable authoritative intellectual and financial power.82
 
 
It is not so much a critique of the museum’s position of power that is important in this context, 
but rather the way in which the interpretation of photography has been related to that of the 
visual arts as a pictorial representational mode, and also what is at stake with the 
maintenance of this relation. Why is a certain category of photography so willing to give up 
power in favour of guarding its fragile and highly questionable autonomy?83
 
 And why do 
certain theoreticians support this endeavour? These seem to be rhetorical questions in the 
face of October’s editorial policy, but not within a more general framework of possible 
theoretical approaches to photography. 
The institutional questions that Phillips raises have a strong resonance with Tagg’s 
classification of photographic images. According to Tagg, the origins of the current taxonomy 
of photographic images date back to the time when, approximately a hundred years ago, the 
most influential technical revolution of photography took place.84
                                                 
81 Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit, p. 63. Phillips quotes here Szarkowski’s The Photographer’s 
Eye. The same question of isolation is raised by Rosler, ‘In, Around, and Afterthoughts’, op. cit., p. 
188. 
 The invention of the 
portable Kodak camera and the film roll made photography accessible to a vast number of 
people with no training or aesthetic inclination and possible for them to become so-to-say 
picture producing beings. According to Tagg, it is since then that the two categories of 
photography have existed together with the efforts of a certain group of photographers to 
82 Rosler also points out the museum’s problematic relationship to the cultural legitimacy of the 
documentary when photographs are interpreted within a generalised, and thus eternalised, framework 
of the dealings with the ‘human condition’ (Rosler, ‘In, Around, and Afterthoughts’, op. cit. p. 195). 
83 A similar question is formulated by Rosler in ‘In, Around, and Afterthoughts’, op. cit., p. 187. Rosler 
employs the word ‘protectiveness’ in describing photographers’ attitude vis-à-vis the position of their 
own work within the visual and aesthetic realm. 
84 John Tagg, ‘A Means of Surveillance: The Photograph as Evidence in Law’, p. 66, in The Burden of 
Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories, Macmillan, London, 1988, pp. 66–102. 
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promote an aesthetic discourse on photography, thus trying to preserve this category’s 
relatively autonomous status as art. 
 
To the second group belong those images that, on the one hand, can be related to the 
modern institutions of knowledge, images that function as tools in storing data and which are 
used as proofs by various scientific, technical, medical, legal and political apparatuses.85 On 
the other hand, we find images of the more expansive and less autonomous provenance, 
such as advertisements and images produced and consumed by the basic unity of 
consumption, the family. Thus, according to Tagg, photographic practice can be divided into 
the realm of art, whose privilege is a function of the lack of power, and the scientifico-
technical domain whose power is a function of the renouncement of privilege.86
 
 This 
categorisation by Tagg is based on Althusser’s ideological theory and Foucault’s critique of 
power, and manages to avoid classification along the lines of the intention of both the 
producer of the image, as well as its user. 
Interestingly enough and quite exceptionally, another categorisation appears in a later issue 
of October, in which Krauss takes on Bourdieu’s analysis of photographic images.87
 
 Bourdieu 
suggests that there is no legitimation whatsoever for privileging the aesthetic discourse on 
photography rather than any other discourses. Photography’s immense popularity is due to 
its social function, and aesthetic categories are simply not compatible with this. Yet Krauss 
never seems to apply this approach, which is very difficult to explain even in the face of her 
theoretical position. 
For the relationship between artistic work and critical practice, Krauss raises the particularity 
of certain artistic practices of the 1970s and 80s when she analyses Cindy Sherman’s work 
                                                 
85 Tagg, ‘A Means of Surveillance’, op. cit., p. 66. 
86 Ibid., p. 67. 
87 Krauss, ‘A Note on Photography’, op. cit. 
 135 
as a means of practicing criticism itself.88 She departs from Bourdieu’s claim according to 
which ‘photographic discourse can never be properly aesthetic, that is, can have no aesthetic 
criteria proper to itself, and that, in fact, the most common photographic judgement is not 
about value but about identity’.89 Thus the formalist-aesthetic approach to photography is not 
more legitimate than any other approach. Similarly to Bourdieu, Krauss claims that 
photography’s immense popularity can be explained exactly by its social function. The 
photograph ‘is an agent in the collective fantasy’ of a given social unit’s cohesion, which is 
produced as a tautological proof of its own unity. As Bourdieu formulates it: ‘Photography 
itself […] is most frequently nothing but the reproduction of the image that a group produces 
of its own integration.’90 Therefore, a critical discourse on photography is incommensurable 
with such traditional aesthetic categories as originality, singularity, expressiveness, etc.91
 
 
When photography aims at deconstructing ‘the possibility of differentiating between the 
original and the copy’, it does so through stereotypes,92 such as in the work of Cindy 
Sherman. Her ‘images reproduce what is already a reproduction – that is, the various stock 
personae that are generated by Hollywood scenarios, TV soap operas, Harlequin Romances, 
and slick advertising.’93 Moreover, Sherman’s images bear another, more important and 
more profound consequence: the fact that she ‘is both subject and object’ of her images 
‘functions as a refusal to understand the artist as a source of originality,’94
                                                 
88 Ibid. 
 which is one of the 
basic premises of Western art. This artistic strategy is in opposition to what has been 
prevalent within the photographic field, namely the dichotomy of artistic and documentary 
images. For Sekula, this dichotomy is epitomised by the polarity between Stieglitz and Hines, 
and for Crimp, between Picasso and Duchamp, and the ways in which subjectivity (and its 
89 Ibid., p. 56. 
90 Pierre Bourdieu, Un Art moyen, Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1965, p. 48. Quoted by Krauss, ‘A Note on 
Photography’, op. cit., p. 56 (original italics). 
91 Krauss, ‘A Note on Photography’, op. cit., p. 58. 
92 Ibid., p. 59. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
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artistic product, originality) becomes foundational for such modernists as Ansel Adams or 
Szarkowski.95
 
 
By introducing the notion of the simulacrum as a means of discussing the anti-originality 
tendency, Krauss makes use of it in designating the impossibility of distinguishing between 
reality and fantasy, between the actual and the simulated.96 Photographic images, therefore, 
are not copies of reality, but products of the ‘reality effect’ created by simulation and signs, 
and it is exactly by the this token that photographic images are capable of deconstructing ‘the 
whole concept of the uniqueness of the art object, the originality of its author, the coherence 
of the oeuvre […] and the individuality of so-called self-expression.’97 It is on this basis that 
Krauss revises Bourdieu’s claim, that photography has no discourse of its own (although 
Bourdieu has never said that). According to Krauss, ‘there is a discourse proper to 
photography; only […] it is not an aesthetic discourse. It is a project of deconstruction in 
which art is distanced and separated from itself […]. Thus Sherman’s use of photography 
does not construct an object for art criticism but constitutes an act of such criticism. It 
constructs of photography itself a metalanguage with which to operate in the 
mythogrammatical field of art, exploring at one and the same time the myths of creativity and 
artistic vision, and the innocence, primacy, and autonomy of the “support” for the aesthetic 
image.’98 To this I would like to add that with her pictures Sherman doesn’t reproduce the 
existing social relation, but by using her own body and employing ‘techniques of patriarchal 
panopticism,’99
                                                 
95 See Crimp, ‘On the Museum’s Old’, op. cit., p. 72. 
 she creates a gap – a kind of a ‘sature’ – between the ‘original’ film and her 
image. When spectators are confronted with this gap or sature, they mobilise their 
knowledge in order to handle it, so they get an opportunity to look at the stereotypical within 
these representations. 
96 Krauss, ‘A Note on Photography’, op. cit., p. 62. 
97 Ibid., p. 63. 
98 Ibid., p. 68. 
99 Tania Modleski, ‘Some Functions of Feminist Criticism, or The Scandal of the Mute Body’, p. 6, 
October 49 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–24. 
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This genealogy of photography’s dichotomy between art and the documentary that I have 
outlined here looks seamless if for nothing else but the maintenance of this dichotomy 
through changing historical, political, social and aesthetic circumstances. But there is another 
area that needs to be addressed within the context of the institutionalisation of photography. 
This is related to a specific, somewhat blurred territory of instrumental usage which appears 
in the conjunction with the museum’s display practice and design, advertising, mass culture 
and avant-garde artistic movements. This question has been raised not only by Christopher 
Phillips, but other important art historians, as well, such as Benjamin Buchloh, who, in one of 
his most famous essays, analyses the ways in which Russian avant-garde art and exhibition 
display design was used and recycled with diametrically opposing ideological and 
propaganda aims in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and later in the 1930s under different 
historical circumstances.100 Solomon-Godeau also raises the need for an historical 
understanding of the instrumentality of documentary, and she perceives this as a result of its 
‘altered ideological parameters’.101
 
 
The application of photography within these frameworks has in part to do with a general 
usage of photography in the context of the museum. Phillips mentions here Beaumont 
Newhall’s resignation and Edward Steichen’s appointment as Director of Photography at 
MoMA. Comparing the two experts’ approaches to exhibition making, Newhall’s resignation 
probably due to the fact that Steichen’s main interest was not the promotion of photography 
as art and as a museum object, but in exploiting the potentials of the medium to convey 
politicised ‘messages’ to the audiences, and disregarding those – ‘aesthetic’ – aspects of the 
photographic image which, for Newhall, turned it into an artwork. Thus in Steichen’s display, 
                                                 
100 Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, ‘From Faktura to Factography’, October 20 (Fall 1984), pp. 82–119. It is 
interesting to note that both Phillips’ and Buchloh’s articles were reprinted in an important collection of 
essays that aimed at assembling critical texts about photography. See Richard Bolton (ed.), The 
Contest of Meaning: Critical Histories of Photography, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 
England, 1989. 
101 Solomon-Godeau, ‘Who Is Speaking Thus?’, op. cit., p. 176. 
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the photograph was enlarged, cropped, directly mounted on the wall, and so on, in the same 
way in which it is used in non-artistic practices, such as in advertising or in non-art museums 
– where the photograph functions as a source of additional visual information but not as an 
autonomous and unique object of contemplation.102
 
 
On the other hand, this blurred territory is also related to the political climate of the 1920s 
and 30s, and specifically to the ways in which this usage (i.e. that of Steichen) was intended 
to be mobilised as a tool against Nazism and Fascism. This claim is a central element in 
Walter Benjamin’s activity, and, more concretely, one of the focal points of his ‘Work of Art’ 
essay. Yet, as Phillips remarks, the avant-garde project of the 1920s was subsequently 
‘abused’ not only before the end of World War II, but also after the victory of the allied forces 
when, with the installation design devised by an ex-Bauhaus member, Herbert Bayer, 
Steichen realised a powerful exhibition titled Road to Victory103 in which he included those 
images of ‘quasi-documentary reportage’104
 
 which he had collected during his service in the 
War. 
In the case of these quasi-documentary images, the production of a ‘visual narrative’105
                                                 
102 Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit., pp. 43–45. 
 and 
the ideology that informs the display are more apparent than in the curatorially organised 
displays of photographs as artworks. For Phillips, this museological dichotomy of 
photographs can be summed up as follows, ‘[…] the underlying premise at work is that of the 
ultimate availability and duplicability of photographs […] not reappropriated and domesticated 
in a later and very different set of circumstances. To prise photographs from their original 
contexts, to discard or alter their captions, to recrop their borders in the enforcement of a 
unitary meaning, to reprint them for dramatic impact, to redistribute them in new narrative 
103 Ibid., p. 43. Bayer left Germany in 1938. 
104 Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit., p. 43. The introduction of this term ‘quasi-documentary 
reportage’ on my part further complicates and nuances of the basic dichotomy of art and the 
documentary, yet it is important to stress this distinction. 
105 Phillips, ‘The Judgement Seat’, op. cit., p. 45. 
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chains consistent with a predetermined thesis – thus one might roughly summarize 
Steichen’s operating procedure.’106
 
 All this was meant to attract a wider audience for MoMA’s 
exhibitions, which were otherwise considered elitist, partly as the result of the activities of 
such curators as Beaumont Newhall. 
On top of all this, Stecihen’s (and MoMA’s) exhibitions were meant to travel to venues all 
over the United States, sometimes even simultaneously all over the world, thus repeating the 
distribution of mass-produced picture magazines and Hollywood films. It is in the conjunction 
of mass culture and the questionable standing of photography’s autonomous status that one 
can think of the ways in which institutions (magazines and museums) become – as Allan 
Sekula says – ‘monumental framing devices’, or – as Phillips designates it – ‘orchestrator[s] 
of meaning’.107 And it is in this sense that David Levi Strauss’ comments on the anonymity of 
the photographer and the framing potentials of such news media as Newsweek. One can, 
however, encounter a huge difference between magazines and museum that Phillips entirely 
dismisses, i.e. the presence/absence of extensive textual materials, and advertisements. No 
matter how frivolous the exhibited pictures are, both modify largely the contextual reception 
of the images, as David Levi Strauss has demonstrated.108
 
 
When dealing with the dichotomy of aesthetics and the documentary, the artist and writer 
Martha Rosler offers a unique and very productive position for viewing the products of an 
expanded field of photographic practices. Instead of looking at photographs in the framework 
of this binary opposition, she proposes ‘a dialectical relation between political and formal 
meaning […] their interpenetration.’109
                                                 
106 Ibid., p. 46. 
 Rosler makes her standpoint clear beyond doubt when 
making a statement about her understanding of this dialectical relation, ‘I would argue 
107 Ibid., p. 48. 
108 John Szarkowski, who was Steichen’s successor in the position of Director of Photography at 
MoMA in 1962, followed Newhall’s line and curatorial principles. Szarkowski’s activity was also a 
reaction to Steichen’s institutional heritage, which may count as an important standpoint vis-à-vis 
mass culture. 
109 Rosler, ‘In, Around, and Afterthoughts’, op. cit., p. 186. 
 140 
against the possibility of a nonideological aesthetic; any response to an image is inevitably 
rooted in social knowledge – specifically, in social understanding of cultural products.’110
 
 
From the vantage point of my contemporary position, it is interesting to observe that despite 
all the theoretical efforts that have been made in favour of the foundation of a new discourse 
on photography, recently traditionalist ideas and approaches have managed to creep back 
into the discussion – with all sorts of pretexts and subtexts that are engaged to legitimise 
them either consciously or as side effects. An example of this is an article by Sarah James, 
which is important to mention for two reasons. One is because of her critical stance vis-à-vis 
the ways in which photographic theory was established by October, and more specifically by 
Krauss, with her insistence on the index as a central theoretical tool within the framework of 
her – as James claims – ‘structuralist’ approach to photography. The other reason is that 
even if, from a chronological standpoint, James’ article falls out of the scope of my 
discussion, it aptly demonstrates the fact that most of the fundamental theoretical questions 
of photography have not ceased to exist in spite of all the literature written on the topic and in 
spite of photography’s immense popularity (which is probably due to the maintenance of 
photography’s basic myths and the lack of adequate critical debates around them). 
 
James’ text starts with a provoking sexual metaphor for photography. James uses ‘a well-
recycled quotation from 1969’ which Jean-Louis Bourgeois created as a metaphor for ‘the 
public’s popular reaction to photography exhibitions: ‘Going to a gallery and finding “only” 
photography is a little like going to a whorehouse and finding only pornography. You feel 
gypped.’ The meaning and purpose of this anecdotal citation seems to be clear enough, but 
James continues and expands the metaphor for our contemporary situation, ‘Today’s 
galleries must be veritable empires of porn and masters of dupe, so ubiquitous is the 
photograph within our art institutions’ walls. Yet today the gallery-going public is more 
                                                 
110 Ibid. 
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comfortable with the photograph – and its artistic status – than it has ever been.’111
 
 To reflect 
on the ways in which art institutions are obliged to function these days when facing their 
financial supporters’ demand for ever increasing visitor numbers would divert my discussion 
in another direction. Yet it is interesting to note within the frameworks of this chapter to what 
extent exhibitions of photography have reached a level of popularity among the visitors; art 
institutions often display these exhibitions in order to ameliorate their statistics, thus justifying 
their financial needs with the public’s attendance. 
In her article, James formulates a recurring discontentment with the state of critical 
engagement with photography, but unlike many theorists who argue for a reconsideration of 
these theoretical methods on various grounds and on behalf of visual culture or cultural 
studies, James reclaims an aesthetic approach ‘to the photographic medium’, as she calls 
it.112 Besides lamenting the over-theorisation of the relationship between painting and 
photography as passé, James also condemns the appearance of a new genre of 
‘monumental photography’ which ‘has led to a theoretical engagement with photography’s 
new proximity to the traditional arts, specifically with painting.’113 Here she refers to such 
theoreticians as the formalist ‘Michael Fried and his detractors ([Diarmuid] Costello 
included),’114
 
 but she considers these discussions boring, unproductive, and passé. Within 
this present context, this demonstrates the fact that even today – in spite of the time when 
October actively took part in discussions on photography – there is very little new theory 
available in the field of photography that is able to detach itself from the traditional pictorial 
tradition and its preference for artistic imagery. 
                                                 
111 Sarah James, ‘What Can We Do with Photography’, Art Monthly, December–January, 2007–2008, 
pp. 1–4. 
112 Ibid., p. 2. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. James finds Costello’s ideas on photography relevant from a philosophical point of view, 
though. 
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The article also condemns what James takes as a semiotic approach to photography, 
although her vision has practically nothing to do with a poststructuralist and interdisciplinary 
‘theory of signs’. James intends to go back to such concepts as style or mimesis, even at the 
expense of simplifying and misreading poststructuralist theories of representation and 
textuality. It is worth quoting her at great length in order to more clearly illustrate her position, 
‘What I want to do here has a lot to do with aesthetics. If we establish the necessity of 
leaving behind the tautological linguistic and textual analysis of photography – properly, once 
and for all – then instead of seeing the medium of photography in all of the ways it negates 
traditional aesthetics, we can see it in all of the ways that it transforms them. Photography is 
to do with aesthetics. We do experience photography aesthetically. Photographic artists do 
engage in the medium aesthetically.’115 In my view, James’ authoritative voice and seemingly 
unquestionable position hides the fact that within her vocabulary the notion of the aesthetic 
remains undefined and unclear, almost to the point where it becomes synonymous, or even 
equal, with the visual. Yet the question of establishing a new discourse for photography is left 
without an adequate answer. It is in no way enough to do lip service and talk of ‘the 
inherently dialectic nature of photography’116
 
; it is equally important to describe what this 
dialectic is comprised of. 
The – half-heartedly – hinted at target of James’ criticism seems to be October and some 
other structuralist approaches to photography with which she implies to argue in favour of 
mimesis as it appears in Adorno’s theory. From my poststructuralist perspective, James’ 
maintenance of such binary oppositions as, for example, the real and its representation, 
subjectivity and objectivity, photographer and spectator, the original and imitation, blurs the 
fact that the legacy of the Frankfurt School needs a historically embedded reception similarly 
to the reading of those photographic works which James intends to rescue from the allegedly 
‘ahistorical’ semiotic interpretation. In my view, James fails to fulfil her aim of contributing to 
                                                 
115 James, ‘What Can We Do with Photography’, op. cit., p. 3. 
116 Ibid. 
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the creation of a new discourse for photography, as some vague interpretations of individual 
bodies of interesting photographic works are not really enough to do this. At the very end of 
the article she claims, ‘ … perhaps most importantly […] we can start to rethink documentary 
photography – still one of the most dominant forms of contemporary practice – and its crucial 
and mislaid attachment to the real.’117 Since James also fails to explain this in detail, it is 
difficult to imagine in what ways she considers photography’s relation to the real ‘mislaid’ and 
how exactly she envisages this reconsideration of the relationship of pictorial representations 
‘to the real’ outside of framework of the semiotic approach that she so vehemently and 
categorically opposes.118
 
 
Photography’s immense popularity has prevailed for many decades, to the extent that has it 
ended up being institutionalised as a pictorial representational genre in its own right, unlike 
many other genres in the realm of the visual arts. The theories – whether aesthetic or ‘non’-
aesthetic – that have been conceived to support or critically assess photographic image 
production are numerous, yet they do not seem to be able to put forward a radically new and 
truly interdisciplinary approach. In the rare cases when they are capable of mobilising an 
interdisciplinary interpretive framework, they do not strive to establishing a ‘theory’ but 
content themselves with the analysis of a given set of images without the desire for a 
foundation of a theoretical stance. It may very well be possible that such a theory should be 
considered as part of some newer disciplines, such as visual culture. The final chapter deals 
with possible avenues of research into the conjunction of photography and new disciplinary 
models. 
 
                                                 
117 Ibid., p. 4. 
118 See more on the potentials and critique of the semiotic approach in Chapter 3.1 on Krauss’ ‘Index’ 
essay. 
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Chapter 7 
 
C O N C L U S I O N / V I S U A L  C U L T U R E  Q U E S T I O N N A I R E  
 
 
This conclusion takes an unusual form inasmuch as it could also function as a chapter of its 
own. My reason for merging these two purposes, i.e. the function of a separate chapter and a 
conclusion, is quite simple. In 1996, October published a ‘Questionnaire’ on the then new 
discipline of visual culture1
 
 which, by the mere fact of its publication, made October’s 
standpoint – both symbolically and very concretely – explicit when it came to theoretical and 
political discussions of knowledge production and its institutional framework. The questions 
formulated by the editors retrospectively interpret October’s fundamentally modernist 
heritage on the one hand, and the journal’s relationship and commitment to semiotics and to 
a new understanding of art and art history within a larger framework of structuralism and/or 
poststructuralism on the other. It seems to me that October’s initial interest in the promotion 
of the photographic is reframed by the theoretical standpoint and the rhetorics of the 
‘Questionnaire’. 
In conjunction with the analysis of the ‘Questionnaire’, it is perhaps equally important to pose 
a set of questions that address October’s intellectual and institutional trajectory. Has there 
ever been a truly structuralist period in art history, let alone in October? Who would be the 
structuralist art historians? In his book Cultural Theory, Philip Smith places the beginning of 
structuralism in the 1950s.2
                                                 
1 ‘Visual Culture Questionnaire’, in October 77 (Summer 1996), pp. 25–70. 
 In the arts and in art history that was the peak of modernist 
criticism and Greenberg’s intellectual and organisational power. Can Krauss be considered 
as a structuralist at all? In Chapter 3 and in relation to the index, I indeed interpreted her 
approach as a structuralist one in the sense of Lévi-Strauss and structural anthropology. The 
2 Philip Smith, Cultural Theory: An Introduction, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, p. 97. 
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question of who else can be considered as structuralist automatically follows, but the answer 
is not to be found so easily. Another territory that is worthy of being considered touches upon 
the relationship between poststructuralism in art history and the visual turn (i.e. the 
appearance and emergence of visual studies). This latter is – at least partially – addressed in 
this chapter-cum-conclusion. 
 
Before I start discussing the ‘Questionnaire’ itself and attempt to answer these interrelated 
questions, I would like to put forward some other arguments which may support my choice of 
the ‘Questionnaire’ for the final chapter, some of which lead us back to the beginning of 
October and my text. One is a similarity between Artforum and October, a resemblance 
between their handlings of personal and intellectual disagreements. From time to time, 
editors and contributors such as Krauss and Michelson left Artforum, and a similar yet more 
profound schism took place when Douglas Crimp decided to resign his editorial position at 
October in 1990.3
 
 This latter is an indicator of the fact that since its foundation, October has 
not been able to give an adequate platform to the discussion of conflicting ideas and 
intellectual positions. In this respect, the journal is the opposite of Critical Inquiry, in which 
debates in the form of replies and counter-replies often continue through several issues. 
Coming back to the ‘Questionnaire’, there are four questions that the editors put forward for 
‘a range of art and architecture historians, film theorists, literary critics, and artists’ to respond 
to. Besides a textual analysis of the questions and the responses with which I aim to point 
out some of the most symptomatic and crucial points of the discussion in the context of the 
previous chapters, one of the most striking characteristics of the debate is the absence of 
some of the most important protagonists and advocates of visual culture, such as Nicholas 
Mirzoeff, W.J.T. Mitchell, Irit Rogoff and Mieke Bal. This absence might be an indicator of the 
                                                 
3 Douglas Crimp, ‘The Editors: To Our Readers’, in October 53 (Summer 1990), pp. 110–112. Some 
even go so far as to claim that Tim Dean’s essay ‘The Psychoanalysis of AIDS’ was ‘commissioned’ 
by the editors as a belated and indirect reply to Crimp’s resignation. (Tim Dean, ‘The Psychoanalysis 
of AIDS’, October 63 (Winter 1993), pp. 83–116. 
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possibility that the editorial questions are indirectly addressed to the understanding of visual 
culture these theorists advocate, even if for them, visual culture is shorthand for a large field, 
or ‘strategy’ with conflicting ideas, tools and approaches.4 In this respect, it is interesting to 
compare two key texts that both bear the title ‘What is Visual Culture?’ by Mitchell and 
Mirzoeff respectively; with this suggestive title they both aim at defining the parameters of the 
new discipline.5
 
 They do this in a complementary manner; Mitchell is more interested in 
answering the question ‘how’, while Mirzoeff focuses on the territorial expansion of ‘what’. 
Coming back to Mitchell, right at the beginning of his text he notes that it was originally 
meant as an ‘internal memo’ for the Visual Culture Working Group at the University of 
Chicago, but later on in the text he defines it as ‘a failed attempt at a manifesto’, a ‘working 
paper’, a ‘proposal’, a ‘syllabus’, ‘remarks’, and finally a ‘document’. All these designations of 
genres imply very different, sometimes even diametrically opposing, textual and reading 
strategies, which indeed defines the ‘slippery’ and hybrid character of the text itself. On top of 
a detailed analysis of Panofsky’s essay ‘The History of Art as a Humanist Discipline’ (1940), 
we can also find elements of a curriculum and pedagogical principles, and even a list of 
keywords in the field. The fact that Mitchell pays so much attention to Panofsky may be 
justified by the fact that the essay was published in a volume commemorating/celebrating the 
100th anniversary of Panofsky’s birth, but it does not explain his intellectual commitment to 
Neoplatonist philosophy and Panofskian art history as foundational traditions within the 
framework of visual culture. To a certain extent and in an implicit way, Mitchell clarifies the 
hybridity of his essay when he mentions the deep disagreements among members of the 
working group. Interestingly enough, the most crucial of these resulted in an understanding 
of semiotics as the most important foundational disciplines in visual culture; as opposed to 
                                                 
4 It is Irit Rogoff who employs the term ‘strategy’ to describe the project of visual culture. See Irit 
Rogoff, ‘Studying Visual Culture’, in Nicholas Mirzoeff (ed.), Visual Culture Reader, Routledge, New 
York and London, 1998 (1st edition), pp. 14–26. 
5 W.J.T. Mitchell, ‘What is Visual Culture?’, in Irving Lavin (ed.), Meaning in the Visual Arts: Views from 
the Outside: A Centennial Commemoratum of Erwin Panofsky (1892–1968), Princeton Univ. Press, 
1995, pp. 207–217. Nicholas Mirzoeff, ‘Introduction: What is Visual Culture?’, in Mirzoeff (ed.), Visual 
Culture Reader, op. cit., pp. 3–13. 
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this, the group preferred the notion of visual experience as the most appropriate and 
acceptable starting point. 
 
In his turn, Mirzoeff’s text is just one of the many (in the first edition three, in the second, six) 
introductory essays and conversations in the seminal volume of which he himself served as 
editor,6 and in that sense his essay is framed by all the other texts in the book. This also 
underlines one of the major features of visual culture, its ‘tactical’ (Mirzoeff) potentials for 
diversity. In order to answer the implicit question of ‘how visual culture should proceed with 
its workings,’ Mirzoeff first mentions Heidegger’s term ‘world picture’, and then goes on to 
another, ‘visualizing’, and later comes to the notion of the ‘sublime’, claiming that there have 
been considerable shifts in the history of these terms’ meanings, so they cannot adequately 
be used in the analysis of the changed and changing situation.7 It is precisely due to the 
existing ‘gap between the wealth of visual experience in contemporary culture and the ability 
to analyze that observation marks both the opportunity and the need for visual culture as a 
field of study.’8 One of Mirzoeff’s most crucial remarks addresses the institutional framing of 
visual experience; he notes that most of this experience reaches us ‘aside from […] formally 
structured moments of looking.’9
                                                 
6 These include essays by Irit Rogoff and W.J.T. Mitchell. 
 In my view, one of the most innovative aspirations of visual 
culture lies exactly in its attempt to address these instances and to propose ‘formally 
structured’ discursive frameworks in order to analyse them. In this respect, Mitchell 
envisages the institutional parameters of visual culture differently from Mirzoeff; for Mitchell, 
these parameters are already there and given along the lines of university departments, 
syllabuses, and structures. In his turn and contrary to Mitchell, Mirzoeff believes that the 
answer to the contemporary crisis of visuality must be addressed outside of these structures, 
and ‘rather than simply create new degrees in the old structures of the liberal arts canon, let 
7 Mirzoeff, ‘What is Visual Culture?’ (1998), op. cit., p. 8. 
8 Ibid., p. 3 (emphasis added). 
9 Ibid., p. 7 (emphasis added). 
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us try to create ways of doing postdisciplinary work.’10 It is, indeed, a political question to 
leave the old, ‘territorialized’ and ‘compartmentalized’ structure of knowledge behind, instead 
of ‘redrawing them along another set of lines.’11
 
 
The notion of visual experience, however, is an element that recurs in both Mitchell’s and 
Mirzoeff’s texts, yet neither of them feels the necessity to define precisely in what ways and 
with what kind of meaning they employ the term, whether they attribute more to it than a 
mere emotional/cognitive reflection of the world and its events/happenings in human 
consciousness (although for some, experience taken in this sense is contrasted ‘with the 
kinds of consciousness involved in reasoning and conscious experiment’12). In Mitchell’s 
essay, visual experience is juxtaposed with, or even opposed to, semiotics, suggesting their 
mutual exclusivity. Indeed, working with visuality starts with a simple experience of 
encountering, or becoming aware of a visual phenomenon (very often a cultural product, 
such as a work of art),13
 
 yet even Peirce thought it was more than passive perception, as the 
everyday usage of the word would suggest. 
There is an interesting recurrence of one of the most fundamental topoi of the American way 
of life in Mirzoeff that strangely echoes the same experience recalled by Michael Fried some 
thirty years prior to Mirzoeff’s text. Both texts touch upon the question of visual experience in 
the face of an understanding of what art and culture respectively consist of. As Mirzoeff sums 
up the experience, ‘Consider a driver on a typical North American highway. The progress of 
the vehicle is dependent on a series of visual judgements made by the driver concerning the 
relative speed of other vehicles, and many maneuvers necessary to complete the journey. At 
the same time, he or she is bombarded with other information: traffic lights, road signs, turn 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p. 10. 
11 Mirzoeff quotes here and refers to Irit Rogoff, ‘What is Visual Culture?’ (1998), op. cit., p. 11. 
12 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 
1983 (revised edition), p. 127. 
13 It is interesting to note that Raymond Williams connects experience with innocence as opposing 
terms, which seems to have a relevance for the famous art historical topos the ‘innocent eye’. See 
more on that in Chapter 1. 
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signals, advertising hoardings, petrol prices, shop signs, local time and temperature, and so 
on. Yet most people consider the process so routine that they play music to keep from 
getting bored. Even music videos, which saturate the visual field with distractions and come 
with a soundtrack, now have to be embellished by textual pop-ups.’14
 
 
In his turn, Fried refers to the sculptor Tony Smith, and his description of a car ride the artist 
had taken one night. ‘When I [Tony Smith] was teaching at Cooper Union […] someone told 
me how I could get onto the unfinished New Jersey Turnpike. I took three students and drove 
[…] to New Brunswick. It was a dark night and there were no lights or shoulder markers, 
lines, railings, or anything at all except the dark pavement moving through the landscape of 
the flats, rimmed by hills in the distance, but punctuated by stacks, towers, fumes, and 
colored lights. This drive was a revealing experience. The road and much of the landscape 
was artificial, and yet it couldn’t be called a work of art […] There is no way you can frame it, 
you just have to experience it.’15
 
 The multifaceted character of the experience even from a 
historical perspective not only allows us, readers, to muse about the ways in which this 
experience is culturally and visually constructed, but also on its relationship to art, and, in a 
broader sense, on a theoretical understanding of visual culture’s instrumentality as an 
academic discipline. In my view, it is exactly these blurred and ambiguous territories where 
visual culture is able to establish productive strategies of interpretation. 
Coming back to a semiotic approach to the notion of experience, and in a Peircian vein, an 
experience is more that just an instantaneous event between an individual and the world. It is 
a process, a constant exchange between a subject and the world. In her book on semiotics 
and cinema, Teresa de Lauretis dedicates a whole chapter to the relationship between 
                                                 
14 Nicholas Mirzoeff, ‘What is Visual Culture?’, p. 5, in Nicholas Mirzoeff, An Introduction to Visual 
Culture, Routledge, London and New York, 1999, pp. 1–32. 
15 Michael Fried, ‘Art and Objecthood’, pp. 130–131, in Gregory Battcock (ed.), Minimal Art: A Critical 
Anthology, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc, New York, 1968, pp. 116–147 (emphasis added). 
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semiotics and experience in the face of recent film theories.16 According to her, experience is 
not just something ‘individualistic, idiosyncratic’, and particular, ‘but rather […] a process by 
which, for all social beings, subjectivity is constructed. Through that process one places 
oneself or is placed in social reality, and so perceives and comprehends as subjective […] 
those relations—material, economic, and interpersonal—which are in fact social and, in a 
larger perspective, historical.’17 Thus experience ‘is the effect of […] interaction’ with the 
world, and ‘is produced […] by one’s personal, subjective engagement in the practices, 
discourses, and institutions that lend significance (value, meaning, and affect) to the events 
of the world.’18 This semiotic understanding of the construction of human subjectivity in 
interlinked with a semiotic construction of ‘social reality’, and it if for this reason that de 
Lauretis employs the Peircian term ‘semiosis’ to name ‘the process of their reciprocally 
constitutive effects.’19
 
 
The theory that de Lauretis outlines in her book is, on the one hand, based on a critique of 
current semiotic and film theories (e.g. that of Umberto Eco and the journal Screen), and on 
the other an attempt at constructing a feminist theory of subject formation in the face of 
cinematic spectatorship. The construction of identity within the framework of this latter 
conjunction is also a central point in the vast literature on Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner, to 
which October contributed by publishing Giuliana Bruno’s essay on the film.20 Such an 
approach to mass culture may be the result of postmodernism’s powerful academic 
positioning in the sense that brings it the closest to the project of visual culture, namely that 
for many, postmodernism became synonymous with an ‘engagement of mass culture by 
critical art and theory.’21
                                                 
16 Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema, Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington, 
1984, pp. 158–186. 
 In her essay Bruno also underlines the almost overwhelmingly visual 
17 Ibid., p. 159 (original italics). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., p. 182. 
20 Giuliana Bruno, ‘Ramble City: Postmodernism and Blade Runner’, in October 41 (Summer 1987), 
pp. 61–74. 
21 See Helen Molesworth’s reply to the ‘Visual Culture Questionnaire’, op. cit., p. 54. 
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character not only of the film, but of contemporary culture in general, by quoting a relevant 
passage from Paolo Portoghesi, ‘Postmodern in architecture can be generally read as the re-
emerging of the archetypes and the reintegrations of the architectural conventions and thus 
as the premise for the creation of an architecture of communication, an architecture of the 
visual, for a culture of the visual.’22 In her analysis, Bruno relies on Jameson’s two key 
notions, schizophrenia and pastiche,23 but she goes further and places them in a spatio-
temporal matrix as ‘schizophrenic temporality and […] spatial pastiche.’24 Similarly to the 
schizophrenic, the replicants live in a continuous present without a conceivable past or 
future, therefore ‘they are denied a personal identity, since they cannot name their “I” as an 
existence over time.’25
 
 
One way they attempt to secure an identity, though, is the replicants’ constant referring to 
photographic images from their ‘past’, as a token (or proof) to extend their existence beyond 
the momentary present. The other token, which could anchor them in the past and provide 
them with both an identity and a history, is the figure of the mother. In a semiotic vein, Bruno 
also claims that pastiche celebrates ‘the effacement of the referent in the era of post-
industrialism’26 which is not only a ‘mechanical’, one-to-one understanding of signs and 
meaning making, but an argument similar to Krauss’ ideas on the shifter as a prominent 
instance of an ‘empty’ sign. As Bruno formulates it, ‘photography is perceived as the medium 
in which the signifier and the referent are collapsed onto each other.’27
                                                 
22 Giuliana Bruno (quotes Paolo Portoghesi, Postmodern: l’Architettura nella societa postindustriale, 
Milan, Electa, 1982, p. 11), ‘Ramble City’, op. cit., p. 67 (emphasis added). 
 Yet what is important 
here is to note the ways in which Blade Runner and Bruno’s essays record the changing 
notion of a document and the construction of an identity: in postmodernism they have both 
become visually presented and secured. 
23 See Fredric Jameson, ‘Postmodernism and Consumer Society’, in Hal Foster (ed.), The Anti-
Aesthetic, Bay Press, Seattle, 1983, pp. 111–125, and also Fredric Jameson, ‘Postmodernism, or the 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’, in New Left Review 146, July–August 1984, pp. 53–92. 
24 Giuliana Bruno, ‘Ramble City’, op. cit., p. 62. 
25 Ibid., p. 70. 
26 Ibid., p. 67. 
27 Ibid., p. 72. 
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There is another example, prior to the foundation of visual culture as an academic discipline, 
for the establishment of a strategically interdisciplinary interpretative framework, which was 
published in October. It is probably not a coincidence that the essay is about the film Alien, 
another ‘aesthetically effective mass-cultural’ hit from the late 1970s.28 In the text, James H. 
Kavanaugh mobilises a set of seemingly disparate theoretical tools (from Marxism through 
Lacan to Greimas) in his analysis of the network of ideologies that the film addresses. One of 
the most important ‘achievements’ of the film from a feminist perspective is the way in which 
the female protagonist is depicted or, rather, defined. Ripley is not only the commander of 
the space ship; a fact that the film itself takes for granted, but unlike an overwhelmingly large 
number of Hollywood films with female protagonists, her story is not turned into a love story, 
so her character is not defined by a relationship to a man. As de Lauretis formulates the 
mainstream cinematic tendency within the context of experience, ‘women are also human 
beings, although in the symbolic order of culture they do not speak, desire, or produce 
meaning for themselves, as men do, by means of the exchange of women.’29
 
 
It is also interesting to observe how Kavanaugh employs the Greimasian semantic rectangle 
(or semiotic square) in order to demonstrate the ideological conjunction between feminism, 
science and humanism within the cinematic narrative.30
                                                 
28 James H. Kavanaugh, ‘“Son of a Bitch”: Feminism, Humanism, and Science in Alien’, in October 13 
(Summer 1980), pp. 91–100. 
 Within the context of this particular 
film as an instance of a feminist perspective, it is even more important to note that the square 
is capable of going beyond the customary system of binary oppositions inasmuch as the 
relationship between given pairs may vary from contradiction (between the furthest points of 
the square), to contrariety (along the horizontal axis of the points), to complementarity (along 
29 De Lauretis, op. cit., p. 160. 
30 Kavanaugh, ‘Son of a Bitch’, op. cit., p. 98. Kavanaugh calls it a ‘semantic rectangle’, and Nöth uses 
the term ‘semiotic square’ (Winfried Nöth, Handbook of Semiotics, Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington 
and Indianapolis, 1990, p. 319). 
There is an attempt by Krauss to apply the semiotic square to the domain of minimalist, site-specific 
sculptural installation in the face of architectural interventions. See Rosalind Krauss, ‘Sculpture in the 
Expanded Field’, October 8 (Spring 1979), pp. 31-44. 
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the vertical axis of the points). Thus in the film, the top left corner of the square (S) would be 
‘human’ (i.e. Ripley); the top right corner (-- S) is ‘antihuman’ (the Alien); the bottom left 
corner (-- S¯) stands for ‘not-human’ (Ash, the robot), and the bottom right corner (S¯) is for 
‘not-antihuman’ (i.e. the cat). All this means that in the film, a woman is selected to represent 
the human, which is a major shift from the patriarchal matrix that many feminists, including 
film theorists, assess with a critical approach. Kavanaugh sums it up, ‘To say that Alien 
broadcasts a very sophisticated set of overwhelmingly feminist signals articulated in 
contradictory relation to other signals about class, and about humanism and science, opens 
the way to knowledge of how this film, and those ideological raw materials it extracts from a 
specific field of social discourse, operate.’31
 
 
As opposed to the publication of these essays for instance, October’s explicit relationship to 
the new field of visual studies is best represented by the ‘Questionnaire’. According to 
Mirzoeff, for many who are critical of the idea of visual culture as a new discipline, its most 
problematic aspect does not revolve around ‘its emphasis in the importance of visuality’ but 
‘its use of a cultural framework to explain the history of the visual.’32 For Mirzoeff, this was 
manifested in ‘a widespread nervousness among art historians’ vis-à-vis a questionably 
founded fear of the relativisation ‘of all critical judgement’.33 As Mirzoeff also implies, many of 
the replies to the ‘Questionnaire’ amplify the already emotional approach of the editors’ 
questions, often in a condescending tone, such as Thomas Crow’s reference to the 
phenomenon of the ‘mass-market bookstore’.34 As a counter-argument against those who 
fear the challenges that visual culture could bring to ‘the cozy familiarity of traditional 
university power structures,’35
                                                 
31 Ibid., p. 99 (original italics). 
 Mirzoeff refers to Tom Conley’s highly critical response in 
32 Mirzoeff, What is Visual Culture? (1999), op. cit., p. 22. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., pp. 22–23. Crow’s contribution to the ‘Visual Culture Questionnaire’, op. cit., pp. 34–36. 
35 Mirzoeff, What is Visual Culture? (1999), op. cit., p. 23. 
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which Conley sees the usage of ‘a “fraudulent” scare tactic’ exactly as a challenge to his 
power.36
 
 
As Mirzoeff also remarks, the art historians’ fear is probably based on one of visual studies’ 
‘false oppositions’, the possibility or impossibility of distinguishing ‘between the products of 
culture and those of art.’37 For Mirzoeff, this is an untenable opposition that feeds the 
anthropological understanding of this division, but, as he perceives it, ‘art is culture both in 
the sense of high culture and in the anthropological sense of human artifact.’38 Instead of 
abandoning the usage of the term ‘visual culture’, Mirzoeff proposes to examine its relation to 
other usages of the notion of culture and the historical legacies of these usages. Instead of 
subscribing to the dichotomy between the two notions of culture (the artistic and the 
anthropological), Mirzoeff refers here to Stuart Hall’s understanding of the term. ‘Cultural 
practice […] becomes a realm where one engages with and elaborates a politics.’39 Within 
Mirzoeff’s framework, culture is an area ‘where people define their identity and […] it 
changes in accord with the needs of individuals and communities to express that identity’40
 
; 
thus both a historical and geographical axis are in play within this structure. 
There are other examples that attempt to establish the disciplinary boundaries of the field of 
visual culture, and aim at providing a survey of the possible theoretical approaches to the 
discipline. Some of these are visibly critical of the implicit approach that appears in October’s 
‘Questionnaire’ (Moxey, Rogoff, Bal, Mirzoeff, etc.); others simply record, or even reconcile 
the differences within the parameters of an introductory essay to the field, such as is the 
case with James D. Herbert’s text, written for the second edition of the foundational volume 
                                                 
36 See Tom Conley’s contribution to the ‘Visual Culture Questionnaire’, op. cit., pp. 31-32. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., p. 24. 
40 Ibid. 
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Critical Terms in Art History.41 Indeed, Herbert’s essay summarises the most important 
claims of visual studies, and sheds light on October’s rather obscure and undefined 
terminology, including their famous claim for the dematerialisation of the image, but it does 
so at the expense of losing visual culture’s foundational dichotomies or even antagonisms, 
especially the ones that this relatively young field has vis-à-vis art history, even in its 
revisionist state (i.e. ‘new art history’). In Herbert’s case, this approach also results in an 
implicit and perhaps even involuntary depoliticisation of the social context of image 
production. For example, when he describes the origins of the World Wide Web and claims 
that it ‘began as an esoteric electronic medium for the ostensibly disinterested transmittal of 
scientific information,’42
 
 not only does he accept the belief in scientific disinterestedness, but 
dismisses the potentiality of the World Wide Web’s military use and the original research that 
was conducted for the development of that technical facility. 
To go further with Herbert’s description, it is interesting – and at the same time quite telling – 
to see how the division between disembodied images and ‘materialized’ ones overlaps with 
the borderline between the commodified products of the cultural industries (mainstream 
Hollywood cinema, television, the World Wide Web, etc.) on the one hand, and that of high 
culture on the other. Yet, there is no reason formulated in his essay for this duality, it simply 
appears to serve the interests of defending traditional art history’s premises. This duality, or 
rather dichotomy of mass culture versus high art, appears also in a politicised framework 
within the ‘Questionnaire’ as a fear of visual studies producing ‘subjects for the next stage of 
globalized capital,’43 which is an assumption obviously based on an understanding of 
‘capitalist hegemony’ as ‘coherent and consistent.’44
                                                 
41 James D. Herbert, ‘Visual Culture/Visual Studies’, in Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff (eds.), 
Critical Terms in Art History, 2nd edition, Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003, pp. 452–464. 
 Yet, as Mirzoeff also notes while 
referring to Michel de Certeau’s ideas, this is far from the case, and where there is power 
(i.e. ‘globalized capital’), there is always resistance and criticality, even if this voice is weak 
42 Ibid., p. 457. 
43 ‘Visual Culture Questionnaire’, op. cit., p. 25. 
44 Herbert, ‘Visual Culture/Visual Studies’, op. cit., p. 457. 
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and hardly visible.45 Another reason why the foundation of the discipline of visual studies 
cannot afford ‘to dismiss the world of the commodity as unworthy of serious cultural analysis, 
or to hand that realm of investigation over to the social scientists’46 is exactly because this 
would also entail a dismissal of the disciplinary and the critical power of the field. When I use 
the term ‘criticality’, I refer to Irit Rogoff’s understanding of the term. For Rogoff, criticism, 
critique and criticality possess both a temporal and a structural quality; temporal inasmuch as 
they designate successive phases of critical approaches, and structural in a way that they 
establish different networks, i.e. rearticulate the relations between ‘makers, objects, and 
audiences.’47 One strategy Rogoff proposes here is to look at culture from ‘oblique angles’, 
or, to put it an other way, ‘the diverting of attention from that which is meant to compel it, i.e. 
the actual work on display, can at times free up a recognition that other manifestations are 
taking place that are often difficult to read, and which may be as significant as the designated 
objects on display.’48
 
 
The fact that the ‘Questionnaire’ did not fulfil the potentials of a criticality for the 
establishment of, at least, a distance between academic disciplines and a total assumption of 
commodity culture is manifested in the impersonal language and the authoritative tone that 
the questions employ as dubious rhetorical tools to suggest an overwhelming opinion 
attributed to large quantities of impersonal, unidentified or, rather, ‘disembodied’ subjects, as 
Keith Moxey suggests.49
                                                 
45 Mirzoeff, ‘What is Visual Culture?’ (1998), op. cit., p. 8. 
 The rhetorical position that the editorial questions imply strangely 
echoes the editors’ criticism vis-à-vis Douglas Crimp’s statement that he formulated on the 
occasion of his resignation. As the editorial ‘reply’ claims, ‘Although Douglas’ reference to 
“larger conflicts … about editorial policy” remains unspecified and therefore wholly obscure to 
46 Herbert, ‘Visual Culture/Visual Studies’, op. cit., p. 458. 
47 Irit Rogoff, ‘Looking Away’, p. 119, in Gavin Butt (ed.), After Criticism: New Responses to Art and 
Performance, Blackwell Publishing, London, 2005, pp. 117–134. 
48 Ibid., p. 119. 
49 Keith Moxey, ‘Nostalgia for the Real: The Troubled Relation of Art History to Visual Studies’, in Keith 
Moxey, The Practice of Persuasion: Paradox and Power in Art History, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca and 
London, 2001, pp. 103–123. 
 157 
us, it does, of course, cast a rhetorical shadow over the journal and its editors.’50
 
 Yet, unlike 
the case of the ‘Questionnaire’, Crimp clearly stated the reasons for his departure, which he 
explained by referring to a concrete instance of editorial disagreement on the ‘quality’ of 
certain texts to be published on AIDS and activism. 
It is at this point that I would like to come back to Modleski’s metaphor of the ‘innocent 
reader’ (‘Never a virgin, but always a whore’),51
 
 which provocatively joins at least two 
important elements. One is related to the age-old art historical topos of the innocent eye, the 
other one to the social position and the theoretical function of the prostitute (as I discussed it 
in Chapter 4). It is quite telling that this topos takes vision and the acquisition of knowledge 
via visuality as corruption, as something negative that we have to accept, live with, but not 
necessarily like. In order to extend the metaphor of the whore, I would like to mention yet 
another, although indirect and subdued usage of it that has a direct relevance to visual 
culture and the ‘Questionnaire’. As I have mentioned above, some of the main protagonists 
of visual culture were left out of the circle of the interviewed, among whom W.J.T. Mitchell 
has a separate essay within the same issue of October; a fact that I interpret as a 
manifestation of the editors’ ambivalence vis-à-vis the discipline and Mitchell’s theoretical 
stance. 
Besides analysing the artworks’ interpretative meaning, rhetoric, and power, Mitchell 
suggests personifying pictures and examining what they are indeed about when they 
become ‘animate’.52
                                                 
50 Crimp, ‘The Editors, To Our Readers’, op. cit., p. 111. 
 In his definition Mitchell recalls one of Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales. 
Condemned to death for raping a noble lady, a knight is granted a year’s reprieve. During 
that time he must find the answer to the question of what women want most. This is the 
recurring question that Freud also posed much later, yet he too was unable to provide an 
51 Tania Modleski, ‘Some Functions of Feminist Criticism, or The Scandal of the Mute Body’, in 
October 49 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–24. 
52 W.J.T. Mitchell, ‘What Do Pictures Really Want?’, in October 77 (Summer 1996), pp. 71–82. 
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adequate answer. As Freud himself concluded: ‘The great question that has never been 
answered, and which I have not yet been able to answer, despite my thirty years of research 
into the feminine soul is, What does a woman want?’ Coming back to Chaucer’s tale, unless 
the knight returns with the correct answer, he cannot avoid his execution. The knight sets off 
on his quest and poses the question to a number of women, but seems to get the wrong 
replies: women want money, fame, love, beauty, fine cloths, admirers, etc. The sophisticated 
and somewhat cynical storyteller, the Wife of Bath, obviously knows the right answer: women 
want power/sovereignty most, because that is what they mostly lack. 
 
Pictures – like the women in Chaucer’s story – want power, power over the viewers, so, as 
Mitchell suggests, the question is not so much about what pictures do, but rather what they 
want. This means not only a shift from power to desire but also, and perhaps paradoxically, a 
realistic move since ‘images are certainly not powerless, but they may be a lot weaker than 
we think,’53 even those images that pretend either not to have this desire or not to be pictures 
at all, such as abstract paintings. According to the modernist theory formulated by Greenberg 
and Michael Fried, these works of art are even corrupted by the spectator’s presence. Lacan, 
however, reminds us that the desire not to display desire is itself a desire, so instead of 
iconoclasm, i.e. fighting against this power, we should examine how it functions. As Mitchell 
concludes: ‘perhaps the most interesting consequence of seeing images as living things is 
that the question of their value (understood as vitality) is played out in a social context’54
 
 
which in its turn needs critical analysis, too. 
It is interesting to perceive the discrepancy between the editorial questions and some of the 
essays that October has published since its foundation. One such discrepancy may be 
detected between the way they refer to ‘anthropology’ and how models of ‘ethnographic 
criticism’ appear within the journal. Tania Modleski’s essay is an instance of the latter when – 
                                                 
53 Ibid., p. 74. 
54 W.J.T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images, The Univ. of Chicago 
Press, Chicago and London, 2005, p. 92. 
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in relation to ‘women’s response to a largely oppressive popular culture’ – she poses the 
rhetorically suggestive question of ‘whether this particular tool [reception theory, i.e. 
ethnographic criticism] of the “master” can aid us in “dismantling” his house.’55
 
 According to 
Modleski’s critical stance, this refers to women’s position in culture and a critical approach to 
hegemonic cultural consumption as such, but it can be easily extended to other forms of 
oppressive and asymmetrical cultural or economic relationships and their critical 
assessment. 
According to Modleski, the emergence of reception theory, or as she calls it, ethnographic 
criticism, is due to the discontent ‘with the formalistic analyses associated with the work of 
the film journal Screen in the 1970s.’56 These analyses were mostly concerned with the 
explanation of how subjects are constructed by products of popular culture, which ignored 
the ‘complex histories and multiple cultural affiliations (educational, religious, vocational, 
political, etc.)’57 of these actual subjects. Ethnographic criticism is able not only to ascertain 
how meaning is conveyed by a given cultural ‘text’, but ‘more importantly how and in the 
name of what other system of meanings and values people might come to refuse the 
dominant or “preferred” readings of that text. Ethnographic criticism takes as its slogan the 
phrase coined by Stuart Hall that people are not “cultures dupes,” and insists that therefore 
popular texts must somehow “allow … audiences to make meanings that connect with their 
social experience.” The aim of ethnographic criticism is, then, to locate these areas of 
resistance to the dominant ideology which, once identified, could theoretically be pressed 
into the service of radical political struggle.’58
                                                 
55 Modleski, op. cit., p. 4. Here, Modleski refers to a text of Audrey Lorde, ‘The Master’s Tools Will 
Never Dismantle the Master’s House’, in Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua (eds), This Bridge 
Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color, Persephone, Watertown, Mass., 1981, p. 98. 
 In my view, this is not only an answer to Sarah 
James’ accusation of galleries as ‘veritable empires of porn and masters of dupe’ these days, 
56 Ibid., p. 4. 
57 Ibid., p. 4. 
58 Ibid., p. 5 (original italics). 
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it is also an indirect and anteceding answer to October’s accusations of the disciplinary 
organisation of visual culture along the models of anthropology. 
 
Within the parameters of this thesis, I aimed at analysing some aspects of October’s 
theoretical standpoint and the role it played in the process of art history’s disciplinary renewal 
in the 1970s and 80s. In the face of the given array of methodological approaches and tools 
of that era, October’s achievement cannot be assessed as anything else but profoundly 
radical, yet from an interdisciplinary perspective, this renewal proves to be rather limited. 
October ended up staying within the disciplinary boundaries of art history and has clearly 
been not able to shift its focus and methodology to meet the challenge of contemporary 
visual production, whether cultural or artistic. Perhaps not so much in the case of the journal, 
but rather in the wider context of art history, this gate keeping may entail a risk of turning – or 
as Keith Moxey puts it, ‘fossilizing’59 – the discipline into an ‘antiquarian’ field of inquiry, while 
visual culture will continue to adopt those areas of investigation that have critical and 
contemporary relevance. It is precisely the challenge that arrives from the contemporary field 
of artistic production and critical theory that may help the discipline to reshape its disciplinary 
engagements, no matter how temporary, ‘imprecise and inadequate’60
 
 these reshapings may 
seem. 
                                                 
59 See Keith Moxey’s contribution to the ‘Questionnaire’, op. cit., p. 59. 
60 See Martin Jay’s contribution to the ‘Questionnaire’, op. cit., p. 44. A similar viewpoint vis-à-vis 
contemporary art is formulated in Helen Molesworth’s contribution to the ‘Questionnaire’, op. cit., p. 54. 
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